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HEADQUARTERS TENTH ARMY
Civil Affairs Section
APO 357

Subject: Report on Observations of Civil Affairs Operations
on SAIPAN, TINIAN AND GUAM.

To: A/C/ of S, G-1 Section, Headquarters tenth Army, APO 357.

14-20 Sept. 44.

/s/ MALCOM S. MAC LEAN,
Lieutenant Commander, USNR.
Chief of Section.

(25 Sept. 1944.)

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Subject: Report of Observations of Civil Affairs Operations on Saipan, Tinian and Guam.

To: A/C of S, G-1 Section, Headquarters Tenth Army, APO 357.

1. Observer spent 14 to 20 September 1944 on Saipan at the Civil Affairs Camp "Susupe" with the exception of 17 September spent at the Civil Affairs Camp on Tinian. He visited Civil Affairs headquarters Guam, and four of the six camps there on 21-22 September. He left Saipan on 23 September, was forced back by engine trouble, left again on the 24th and returned to this headquarters on the 25th.

2. The following observations and reports of comments by Civil Affairs officers are prepared, recorded and forwarded as of possible interest and use to the general and special staff, Tenth Army, in planning forward operations, and for special use of the Civil Affairs Section, this headquarters.

3. Observer's comments should be interpreted in the framework of the brevity of inspection and the fact that it was made at approximately D + 90 for Saipan, D + 60 for Tinian and D + 45 for Guam. Also the bulk of time was spent on Saipan because that show most represents in miniature the problems of Civil Affairs operations in Oriental areas. It represents the picture of heavy destruction by combat of civilian homes and business establishments, of three civilian racial groups, enemy, friendly alien, and wards of the United States and of the resultant conflicts, language difficulties and security problems as well as those of supply, relief, organization and personnel.

GENERAL

1. The story of Civil Affairs in these islands repeats that of the invasion of Sicily and Italy. It is a story of heroic effort on the part of groups and individual Civil Affairs officers and enlisted men; of great ingenuity, endless labor, and high courage; of unusual accomplishment in the face of too few personnel, too little and too late supply and equipment. The job was done at high costs in terms of fatigue and illness of highly trained personnel. The only improvement noted in this show over those in the Mediterranean was in communications. Every Civil Affairs officer on the three islands was near a telephone.

2. In all three islands, declared secure many days before, units and individual Japanese soldiers are still hiding in jungle, ravine and cave; are making night raids and infiltrating for food and weapons; are slowly being dug out by Marine patrols, Many enemy soldiers and some civilians are being shot, some soldiers and many civilians are surrendering. This situation has direct effect on military government in several ways:

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a. It makes mandatory both guarding and positive identification by bright colored clothes, armbands or badges of all civilians permitted outside the camps for work parties, salvage farming or other duties lest they be shot.

b.

b. It denies the use of large areas of arable land to civilian farmers under Civil Affairs control and hence cuts drastically the chance of producing quantities of fresh farm produce for civilian camps and combat and garrison unit messes.

c. It necessitates continuous G-2 and Civil Affairs Intelligence screening of civilians to locate those who can help us by serving as patrol scouts, and those who must be locked up or transferred to Prisoner of War camps.

3. In Saipan and Tinian (to a less degree in Guam) civilians are still coming out of hiding into the camps at a wholly unforeseen rate. On Saipan 72 were brought in by a Civil Affairs truck and Marine patrol on D + 94. The daily intake of new refugees varies from approximately 5 to over 100. This continuous indrift gives rise to the following Civil Affairs problems:

a. The necessity for sending out patrols with trucks and loud-speaker units, accompanied by interpreters and trusted civilians who know the area, to try to call in families still in hiding. This is dubbed "hog-calling".

b. The continuous maintenance of a receiving center in each camp to administer immediate medical care and feeding, preliminary identification and classification, and assignment to camp billets.

c. The continuing demand for camp expansion to house the indrift, with the resultant need to stockpile or acquire building materials and tools, to freeze a portion of available labor (sometimes needed by combat and garrison units) and assign them permanently to building additional shelter, kitchen, latrine, laundry and bathing facilities. On Saipan this was a matter of great concern because the best they had been able to provide at any time was 6 or 8 or rarely 10 square feet of living space per person whereas the Japanese are providing the United States and Allied civilians they have captured with a minimum of 16 square feet per person.

d. The need to have on hand supplies of clothing, food, tools and building materials to care for this variable indrift which upsets all schedules of estimates, requisitions and issue of relief supplies.

e. The necessity of having full liaison with combat and garrison units so that they will, by agreement, leave ample space for camp expansion at the campsites with adequate water supply, access to roads, and other essential facilities.

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1. Two of the three chief civil affairs officers said flatly, and the third implied that:

a. They did not like their duty and preferred any other in the service to Civil Affairs.

b. They thought it an error to assign officers to command in Civil Affairs who had had little or no training or orientation in military government. They recommended in future operations that officers both trained and experienced in the European Theater Civil Affairs operations be assigned command.

2. In all camps it was assumed a mistake had been made in putting officers and enlisted billets, showers, mess, and latrines either in or in plain sight of civilian camps. This leads to loss of face, to discomfort and to loss of morale from being too long and too close to the job. In fact, all agreed that in oriental areas it is essential that Civil Affairs put on a fine front or the job cannot be well done.

3. On one island the split and conflict between Civil Affairs staff and field was evident. Approximately half of the Civil Affairs officers were at headquarters, had tent offices in town and billeted and messed with the island command. The rest were on duty in widely separated camps, several of them isolated by bad roads, in contact only by phone except for rare inspection trips. Field officers, as in Sicily and Italy, asserted that this organization was futile. Orders from staff were sometimes issued after the job to be done had already been finished; sometimes it had been done by a method contrary to instructions in the orders. Others issued, while pertinent to camps close in to military establishments, had no bearing on rural and distant camps. One, issued by the commander on advice of his legal section, let to all the comfortable furniture (picked up from shattered homes and hence private property) being removed from the camps, brought in, at great effort, to the city where there was not enough storage space or tarps so that it was piled in the open and battered by tropical sun and rain.

4. It was recommended by all hands and especially by the medical staff, that Civil Affairs personnel who operate during the assault phase up to D + 45 and D + 60 be replaced at about this time by fresh personnel and be given as full rehabilitation as other assault forces. The surgeons assert that the daily average of loss of work among Civil Affairs personnel from fatigue, dengue, dysentery and the like was over 8% and would run much higher in malarial, typhus, and other epidemic areas. Moreover, it was clear that some officers and enlisted men who are excellent operators in the tension and confusion of the assault phase with many emergencies, go to pieces with boredom in the daily routine of garrison life and activity.

5. It was agreed that organizationally Civil Affairs in the Pacific islands thus far occupied strikingly different from Civil Affairs Europe in the one fact that in the latter it was dispersed over wide land masses; controls were indirect; there were plenty of trained and enthusiastic natives to assist Civil Affairs under supervision; communication and supply lines are

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greatly extended, and most Civil Affairs is concerned with reorganizing rural and urban community life. In the Pacific thus far, however, control is direct, it is confined to refugee and custodial camps, there are fewer trained natives to assist, and internally communications and supply lines are short. All hands warned that in the forward operations Civil Affairs will encounter both community and camp type of situations and must be prepared for both.

6. All hands advise, that, while Civil Affairs personnel must be kept to a minimum in first assault on beachheads, by D + 2 to D + 5 this minimum must be present and must include:

- a. MP's to round up civilians.
- b. Field hospital units to treat civilians wounded and sick.
- c. Supply scouts and salvage crews to move close behind the front lines, siezing and guarding food, clothing, and medical dumps; machinery; safes, vaults, currency and records.
- d. Interpreters with each unit however small.
- e. Trained refugee and internment camp organizers, to do initial relief feeding and care.
- f. Civil Affairs engineers, construction sanitary and water supply.
- g. One or more labor officers.

It is clear that with such Civil Affairs detachments ashore all urgent matters on the beachheads can be taken care of.

7. It was urged by all Civil Affairs commands that firm and clear genreal orders be issued to all units concerning looting, vandalism, unwarranted destruction and souvenir hunting. As in the Mediterranean theater, our units of all branches, combat and service indulged in widespread violation of the rules of war against such actions. They tore apart and bayoneted rice bags and food and medical cases in captured enemy dumps out of curiosity to see what they contained and thus destroyed hundreds of tons of good stuff. They cracked safes and vaults in banks and postoffices and took currency and strewed essential records among the rubble in rain and sun. They bull-dozed under a number of new diesel and gasoline small craft engines, They split open the suitcases and duffle bags, stowed for safe-keeping by civilians, took silks and other valuables and strewed useful clothing on the ground. They looted a Catholic church of its gold cross, alter cloths, images, candelabra, cups and robes. In a number of cases they robbed civilians of clothing and money and gave the clothing to other civilians. They caught, killed, cooked and ate valuable animals and fowl owned by private farmers. In very few instances have the guilty men been arrested or charged and in the few thus far the stiffest penalty has been a few days assignment to burial or sanitary details.

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Entirely aside from the reputation this troop behavior gives the United States among occupied and sometimes friendly peoples (In Sicily it was often said that we were worse than the Fascists and Germans,) it is obvious that:

a. It much increases the difficulty of Civil Affairs operations by deepening the anger and mistrust of the natives against us so that crime and circulation control, camp management, the development of local resources, and the supplying of labor and services for our combat and garrison units are thwarted and delayed.

b. It destroys food, clothing, equipment and material so necessary that United States goods must be shipped in to replace the stuff destroyed.

c. It tends to initiate and foster native hoarding and black-markets in goods and currency as well as secret trading between troops and natives which, if permitted to grow, necessitate the augmentation of Civil Affairs personnel by a large number of price control, rationing, currency control, and investigative and enforcement officers and enlisted men.

8. Civil Affairs administration is found to be shaped in large measure by the attitudes, habits, and behaviour of the people administered. In the Saipan Camp, Japanese civilians were at first difficult to manage because;

a. They were frightened. They had been told we would kill them. Their chief fear was that we would bulldoze them under alive. It is assumed by some intelligence and Civil Affairs officers that the large number of civilian suicides were motivated not so much by adoration of the Emperor and the wish to die as a logical choice between dying a quick, clean death in the sea, being blown up by grenades or shot by a friend, and on the contrary being raped, beaten and buried alive by Americans.

b. As soon as initial Japanese civilian fear is replaced by wary confidence from being sheltered, clothed and fed, it seems to be succeeded by a hope that the Japanese fleet will return and rescue them. As day by day no Jap planes or ships appear and our own come in increasing numbers and airfields are cleared, roads built, quarries are opened, and quanset huts rise, the hope dwindles to either a dull passive acceptance or a growing desire to make the best of it, to live, to work and to enjoy. They figure that approximately 80% of the Japanese had arrived at this stage by D - 90. Especially active and contented are the peasant farmers, the fishermen, and the craftsmen who are busy at familiar work, living with their families, fet enough to be productive and reproductive, and with expectation of better shelter, some cash in the pocket, and some recreation.

c. On Saipan, the Koreans for the most part hating or indifferent to their Japanese masters, shared their fears of Americans to only a small degree, and, once interned in the camp, adjusted themselves more easily to the new situation and resumed normal living. So much did they do so in fact that our people got the impression they were a lazy, no-account group, an opinion contradicted by the labor officer and others.

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d. d. The Chamorros' attitude and behaviour, after initial fear was wiped out, was markedly different from those of either oriental group. Instead they were friendly, honored, active, glad to have us in, and were soon looking forward in quite American fashion to learning skills, trades and professions and working permanently for our bases.

9. In refugee and custodial camps, Civil Affairs organization and administration is made most or less difficult by campsite location. On Saipan the camp was located on a flat land, with slow or little drainage. Moreover, base development units have crowded closer and closer in on Civil Affairs areas. This has already made it necessary to move the hospital to a considerable distance and may soon result in moving the whole camp of 17,000 plus persons with all structures, supplies, latrines, kitchens and equipment.

On Tinian, while the camp is well located from several points of view, it is over 3 miles to the nearest water point; it is over far from worksites of base development; it is placed on shallow soil above hard coral limestone, so that latrines, a critical matter in dense camp populations, have to be dynamited out.

On Guam, one camp into which the Japanese herded all civilians during our attack, still has several thousand people in it, down in a dense hot jungle ravine, extremely muddy and unsanitary. Another was located high on the bare shoulder of a small mountain. It's only advantages are a beautiful view and the headwaters of a stream. Part of a Sea Bee unit had to be assigned to try to make a road to the camp but with its best output the road still is sometimes impassable. Moreover, the stream, polluted by camp laundry and bathing, flows down to an Army Engineers unit part way below and from them to a Sea Bee unit on the beach. This camp, too is over far from worksites.

10. From the beginning, the language problem was found to be acute, on Saipan and Tinian. Civil Affairs did not have nearly enough interpreters. Some vital activities were practically suspended because nearly all interpreters initially were busy with the surgeons. All hands, after analysis of this problem, recommended that:

a. Enough interpreters be assigned to Civil Affairs to carry the load.

b. That interpreters be permanently assigned to special units and functions such as Public Health, Public Safety, Supply, Finance and Economics instead of being pooled. The reasons given to support this recommendation are that interpreters are at best poor, and that they are most effective if they can begin and continue to work at their interpreting in the special lingo of a special field. Pool interpreters are thought never to reach competence in any special or general fields.

11. Internal camp organization is still uniform in all camps, its development depending on the commanding officer, on the qualities, abilities and numbers of personnel. In one camp the Public Safety Unit is responsible for camp organization and administration, in another the Welfare Officer, in another executive. All hands recommended that more

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Careful planning, organization of Civil Affairs teams, units and detachments be done in advance and that teams, units and detachments be trained as such in the staging areas.

12. Administrative relationships between Civil Affairs and combat and garrison outfits were extremely variable and loose. In one camp, close association of the camp commander and the commander of a Sea Bee unit achieved remarkable results in terms of materials, supply, equipment and services at all stages. In another, the Chief Civil Affairs Officer had such close liaison with all nearby units that he had the loan to Civil Affairs of 3 Marine officers, 1 Army officer, 5 Nisei interpreters, 4 Navy Negro Messmen, a Sea Bee detail to operate a water filtration and purification unit, 21 Navy enlisted men, 22 Marine MP's, and some miscellaneous Navy motor mechanics. In another camp the Civil Affairs effort was thwarted by lack of liaison and cooperation. G-2 blocked the publication of a camp paper. The MP's arrested soldiers attempting to enter the camp to get at the women but no report was made to Civil Affairs of the outcome. One Marine outfit turned all of its surveyed clothes, shoes and equipment over to the camp and another refused to do so and burned large stocks of clothes and shoes instead. Again all hands recommended closest coordination in planning, training and staging with firm decisions, orders, designations of responsibility and authority at all echelons and levels.

PUBLIC HEALTH

1. The elements of a full story of the Civil Affairs public health problem on Saipan cannot be gathered up. Some of them have been given in correspondent and photographic reports in papers and magazines. Some are recorded in official Civil Affairs reports on file in CinCPAC. The following comments are additional and supplementary to these.

2. In no previous Civil Affairs operation in any theater has the public health problem been as acute as at Saipan. It is estimated that from assault to security, between 5,000 and 7,000 men, women and children died from gunshot, shrapnel, disease or suicide. Before July 15 it is estimated an additional 1,600 died in collection points or in the camp hospitals. Of these, approximately 20% more were wounded. Since 15 July, while the death rate has gone down steadily it is still high, recent figures showing approximately 17,000

15 July to 31 July	3.25%
1 Aug to 15 Aug	2.62%
16 Aug to 31 Aug	1.88%
1 Sept to 17 Sept	1.67%

The latter figure represents a total of 286 deaths among approximately 17,000 persons in a period of 17 days at about D + 75 to D + 90. In a single month in this period the doctors gave a total of 33,830 medical treatments, 19,585 surgical treatments with 771 deaths. In this late period causes of death were:

Diarrhea	305,	Dysentery	34,	Tetanus	10,
Malnutrition	237,	Pneumonia	25,	Premature birth	9,
Wounds	42,	Beri-Beri	14,		

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The rest were made up of gas gangrene, shock, thrombosis, anemia, peritonitis, toxemia of pregnancy and other causes.

3. On Tinian between 35% and 40% of all civilians brought in were sick or wounded. Tinian had during August 13,513 surgical and 10,126 medical treatments or a daily average of 762 treatments in a population of approximately 10,000. Their percentages of causes of death were roughly the same as at Saipan except that tetanus was three times that at Saipan.

4. On both islands this situation was so unforeseen that shortages were acute in personnel, equipment and supply.

a. On Saipan they had 5 collection centers for civilians on the beach. They had 1 Civil Affairs medical officer. Because our wounded men demanded that women and children be tended to first, some Marines were unattended for as much as 24 hours. Combat unit doctors were assigned to Civil Affairs for the emergency. As a result, the doctors recommend that at least 4 Civil Affairs doctors be assigned to each beachhead where civilian population is dense. They recommend also 4 well trained hospital corpsmen and 4 sanitary corps enlisted men to each doctor, the latter to dispose of the dead, of surgical debris, to provide clean water, and dig latrines. They further recommend that a small enlisted housekeeping unit accompany each beachhead medical unit to carry the doctor's personal gear ashore so that he may carry only surgical kits and medical supplies, to set up medical officer and enlisted tents, dig their foxholes or slit trenches, and prepare food and hot coffee for them so that their entire effort may go into medical and surgical care of sick and wounded. They recommend that at the earliest possible time the Civil Affairs labor officer recruit and assign native nurse's aids and orderlies to supplement United States personnel.

b. Equipment shortages showed up in surgical and especially forceps and obstetrical instruments, splints, stretchers and motor transport; trenching tools for digging latrines, and spray equipment for spraying latrines and offal; water tank trucks and purifying unit. They got no chlorinator until D + 15. Also they were short tarps and tents with flies for shelter of patients from rain and sun. In the later stages, large size laundry equipment to wash blankets is needed in addition to small machines for towels and sheets as are also ample spare parts for X-Ray.

c. Supply shortages appeared most acutely in bandages, dressings, adhesives, plasters, sulphur powders, boric acid, yellow oxide of mercury, tetanus antitoxin, penicillin, oxygen, and vermifuges. Some of these items are still in short supply. Further, it has been found that food supply must be so organized that hospitals for civilians can be furnished with adequate liquid foodstuffs such as canned milk, soups, fruit juices, cocoa, bouillon base, and supplementary vitamins. About half of the patients must be on liquid diet and ordinary field rations do not provide for it.

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LABOR

1. One of the important services Civil Affairs performs for combat, supply and garrison forces is the recruiting, classifying, and assigning of native labor. In the operations under consideration, this aspect of duty was not adequately planned and provided for with trained personnel. Moreover, Civil Affairs is still feeling its way into the problem and there are valid lessons to be learned from their attempt.

2. In the assault stages, all available native labor is needed for many types of jobs. Important among these are:

- a. Digging straddle trenches and latrines.
- b. Burial details.
- c. Cleaning up bivouac areas.
- d. Unloading and stacking supplies, beach stevedores.
- e. Unloading and stacking ammunition.
- f. Salvage details.

These jobs are critical. Landing units put drastic pressure on Civil Affairs to get and organize the labor to do them. Without planning and personnel it becomes chaos. During first 10 days they had to assign one United States guard to each work squad of 10 or less to protect them from the trigger happy, fresh troops coming ashore. All units wanted more labor than they could get. This developed conflict for labor among Hospitals, Engineering, Signal Corps, Quartermaster, Ordnance and Salvage with Civil Affairs in the middle. Most units assumed that a starved, small and sometimes sick civilian could do the same amount of work as a healthy G.I. Such mistakes were also made as assigning a distinguished Buddhist Bishop to a stevedore gang. Much of the work had to be under forced draft because it was heavy, filthy or dangerous. Civilians on salvage parties were shot by Japanese snipers, some on burial details were blown up by booby traps attached to bodies. Promises of payment, extra food and the like have little force in this situation.

3. After the establishment of the camp and transfer of civilians to it, other problems emerged:

- a. Identification of labor by bright clothes or tags is essential as laborers were occasionally being shot by our patrols at D + 90.
- b. Civil Affairs MP's are necessary to accompany all work parties.
- c. Screening and classifying must be started at the earliest possible moment, preferably at the collection points and be carried on continuously, refining to locate workers with special needed skills.
- d. The Saipan plan called for organization of work gangs of 20 laborers each and each under a foreman selected by the Civil Affairs labor officer. This was found to be unworkable since some jobs called for units of only 5 and others for over 100. Moreover, efficient foremen couldn't be selected until a unit had been on the job for several days and it was found best then to let the employing unit select.

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Par 3, cont'd

e. It was found necessary to send a Civil Affairs Officer, preferably an interpreter, to start new gangs with employing units in order to instruct the employing units on how to handle oriental labor, how to deal with them only through their foremen and leaders, to collect essential command and designation words in English and translate these into romanized Japanese so that commands, warnings, and designations could be given by United States Officers and enlisted men to the workers.

f. Latrines, water supply, and field mess facilities have to be provided in advance for civilian labor at the worksite. Without these, obvious trouble develops.

g. Where possible, it is found best to assign the same workers day after day to employing units. By D+75 this procedure had worked so well that a few small native worker villages were being authorized and growing up around worksites. Native laborers were in these units being treated like our garrison forces, housed in pyramidal tents, furnished cots with mosquito netting, given their own mess.

h. Careful public relations is necessary. Native workers must be previously instructed on what they are to do, how they will be treated and paid. A near riot developed in the Japanese camp, Saipan, because this was not observed in the case of the recruiting of young women for nurse's aids and dietary work in the hospital kitchens. This type of job demands a thorough physical strip examination, urine and feces analysis. Because of this, scuttlebut said the girls were to be used as prostitutes instead of hospital help and there was hell to pay.

i. Because many employing units need labor for 3 8-hour shifts, 7 days a week, much careful organizing had to be done to meet the following problems:

(1) Meal hours had to be staggered through day and night and kitchens wupplied and staffed round the clock. At first it was difficult to get a night shift in the kitchen, but this was cleared by labor rescreening the cooks and finding among them an adequate number of ship's cooks who were used to working at night.

(2)MP guards and motor transport for workers had to go on a 24 hour schedule.

(3)At first there was difficulty with young men trying to seduce absent workers' wives at night. Labor partly solved that one by assigning all the bachelors in camp to night shift labor.

j. It is essential that firm authorization and instructions be given to all Civil Affairs labor officers and employing units in advance.

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Para 3 j, cont'd

- (1) Authorizing using units to employ and pay native civilian labor.
- (2) Authorizing Civil Affairs only, to recruit, classify, train and assign native labor on a priority set by the island commander.
- (3) Setting initial wage for common, semi-skilled, skilled, and professional civilian labor. On Saipan rates were 30¢, 50¢ a day and \$20 per month.
- (4) Authorizing Civil Affairs to import trade goods to sell to native labor so that payment can be made as early as possible and workers have something to buy such as clothing, cigarettes and personal gear. On Saipan no payments have been made by D+95 and labor was restless and questioning. First payment was to be made on D+98 but Civil Affairs Public Safety was concerned because trade goods stores would not be open for a week beyond payday and they were expecting an outbreak of gambling, theft, robbery and possible violence as a result.
- (5) Instructions to give labor special treatment over and above that given to non-workers such as a third meal each day, instead of the usual two, an issue of cigarettes, and wherever possible, one day off in seven by staggering. There was some conflict between employing units and Civil Affairs Labor and Public Health. The latter was insisting that greater efficiency is attained on the job, less sickness and accident, less malingering and much better morale.

k. Instruction of employing units is necessary in the fact that native labor is not necessarily dumb because it is foreign and does not speak English. A considerable number of expert skilled workers were found in all camps. For example, 23 skilled electrical men are employed by Signal Corps at the radio station on Saipan. This observer read a letter from the officer commanding asking for their permanent assignment to that job, requesting an increase in wages, commending them on attitude, integrity and ability to work, and declaring that they were as good as, and in some cases better than, his trained enlisted men.

1. It is clear that handling of native civilian labor must be done by skilled labor officers. Native labor, like that anywhere in the world, soon learns all the tricks. They learn what details are hard, dirty and dangerous, what are lighter and pleasant. They learn how to pull wires, play sick, hide out or show up to avoid the one and get the other. Unlike Prisoners of War, it is difficult to discipline or coerce them. If they are needed and presumably friendly, getting tough does not pay. To get them properly assigned to keep them going, to make them produce is a duty demanding the highest skill, training, patience and personality.

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4. While comparable figures are not available for Saipan, some indication of the effectiveness of organized Civil Affairs labor management is found in the fact that on Tinian, use of a total population (men, women, and children) of 10,674, a total of 44,556 man days of civilian labor were furnished to the combat and garrison forces in the month of August alone.

SUPPLY

1. Assault shipments of Civil Affairs supplies were landed all along the beach, were scattered from hell to breakfast and an estimated 10 per cent lost to other outfits. Civil Affairs enlisted men were scattered and many had not landed. No Civil Affairs transportation got to the beaches until D+11. The Supply officer rounded up some natives, some bullocks and bullock carts, a few Jap trucks still running and worked 20 hours a day trying to find, load, unload and stockpile supplies. As soon as Civil Affairs jeeps arrived, he covered all beaches and sideroads and found more stuff unguarded and with no checkout system. They took in ten tarps (large) and agree that they should have taken in a hundred. The ten were ordered used to shelter sick and wounded and civilian women and children. In consequence, much of the rice, beans and sugar brought in to keep the people alive was rained on and spoiled. While they were trying to find and save United States Civil Affairs supplies, they got many phone calls telling them of captured Japanese dumps found. To secure these they had to scramble fast before the troops got at them and tore them apart and ripped open rice bags, split open cases, shot open cans. As in Sicily, there was much wastage because of lack of plans and personnel to sieze, guard, sort, and stow. The estimated supply loss on Saipan from these causes was approximately 150 tons of foodstuffs alone.

2. The make-up of Japanese dumps is of interest and importance. They follow a pattern. Cases of canned goods are laid on the ground to form a flooring. A row or two of cases is stacked on the outside edge of this floor to form a wall. In the center are placed medical supplies. Around these a small amount of ammunition. The dump is then built up internally with foodstuffs, pickled onions, soy and other sauces, dried fish, and the whole piled with stacks of rice in tough sacks, covered by a large tarp of excellent quality. In the dumps they have found more than 80 items of foodstuffs, the majority of these of first rate quality. Again, an interpreter was needed at once to go with Japanese civilians to open a sample or samples of each item, find out what it was and how used, and identify the external markings so that stowing, issuing, inventory and accounting for supplies can be done efficiently without further destruction. At request of this observer, the Saipan supply officer and the interpreter are making up a list of captured stuffs useful to Civil Affairs with a description of their packing and external identifying markings.

3. Supply echeloning at Saipan planned for the assault, second and fourth echelons did not work at all. A fragment of supplies ordered came in the ~~fixt~~ assault echelon. All the rest arrived together at approximately D+90, the time of the 8th echelon. If the Japanese had been able to destroy their dumps and caches, the Civil Affairs situation would have been extremely

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Par 3, cont'd

critical, as it was on Tinian where very few small stores were found. Tinian was saved by shipping some excesses from Saipan in an LST. Guam was about as well off in captured stuff as Saipan. New dumps were still being found at D+45 on Guam.

4. The same luck in capture held in clothing. Most of the 17,000 civilians at Camp Lusupe would have remained naked or nearly so for 90 days or until United States clothing could be brought in. They captured, however, large quantities of uniforms and accessory clothes at the Japanese Naval supply depot, including 30,000 pairs of shoes in small sizes 3 to 6. Enemy uniforms are useable for civilians if so altered by removal of collars, tabs, insignia and the like as to make them unmistakably not uniforms.

5. The acute shortages that appeared and have persisted include the following:

- a. Tarps, tents and bolt canvas of all kinds.
- b. Lumber for essentials such as latrine seats, etc.
- c. Screening. Cloth and cloth netting are found unsuitable as they go to pieces at once in the tropics.
- d. Tools of all kinds, power and hand, nails, hinges, hasps, wire, flat stock, screws, electric light and small power units, paint, brushes, dyes. So acute was the shortage of tools that Civil Affairs took a requisition for 50 crowbars and 24 each hammers and saws to each military unit in the island and got 1 crowbar and 6 each hammers and saws. The shortage of nails was so acute that the Marines tried to requisition from Civil Affairs salvaged nails that had been burned and slowly retempered by the Civil Affairs Chamorro and Japanese blacksmiths in the camp.

6. At the earliest practicable time it is essential for the supply section to set up methods of warehousing, inventory, issue and accounting. On Saipan this was well done by D+90 as follows:

a. By planning, modified by experiment, Civil Affairs Supply and Public Health arrived at an adequate minimum diet of available foodstuffs which, however, revealed deficiencies in vitamins and minerals. This was to average about 1.33 lbs per person per day, balanced to include .75 lbs. of rice, .25 lbs of meat or fish and .33 lbs in vegetables, sauces, pickles, etc. No distinction was made between men, women, and children, it being properly assumed that adults would eat more than the 1.33 lbs and children less. However, it is to be noted that workers were given three meals a day to all others two and, further, that children up to six years of age and others on doctor's orders were issued one drink of half-and-half canned United States milk and water, warm, each day on Saipan and twice each day on Tinian to overcome malnutrition and build resistance to disease.

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b. Each morning, each Shuku Sha Cho (House leader) informs the supply officer of the number (usually around 100) living in his "house". Totals are made up for each Suiji (communal kitchen) and the supply truck draws the proper amount and delivers it to each kitchen before noon.

c. The supply officer makes a daily report on all food issues, and a weekly and monthly recapitulation on per capita daily consumption. He warns that it is not practicable to have an overall form for the reports since there are more than 80 items, only a few of which are issued each day. These reports are further broken down into Japanese captured foodstuffs; vegetable, meat, and fish produced locally by the camp dwellers; and United States supplies.

d. Only by early establishment of the procedure described in the above paragraph can the supply officer take the next important step by establishing and watching his supply levels on each item in order to predetermine how long each will last and how early it will be necessary to reorder.

e. Another process of importance in the supply problem is that of salvaging partially spoiled goods. A considerable number of workers in all camps observed were assigned to this job of inspecting rice, the outer portion of which has been wet or sunburned or dirtied with oil but part of which might be saved; of sorting out cases of canned goods that had had a shot or bayonet put through them, to destroy punctured cans, and save those untouched. It was found, to the disappointment of the combat garrison force supply officers, that, despite the heavy wax packaging on American rations, they were not standing up under tropical heat and moisture but were moulding. Large quantities of these United States rations were turned over to Civil Affairs and the salvage process applied to them, the cans of meat and other unspoiled items being removed for use and the rest buried or burned or sunk in the sea. Moreover, the supply officers recommend that bulk United States items such as rice, beans and sugar be hereafter always packed in cloth bags inside water-proof paper bags waxed at both ends.

7. Supplies of clothing are handled by the same methods as foodstuffs except that agreements are needed between Civil Affairs and other military units to have all surveyed military clothing turned over to Civil Affairs for civilian relief instead of being destroyed.

8. Supplies of tools and materials for work are divided into two sections, construction and agricultural. There are one blacksmith shop for retempering and sharpening and one tool shed for each section. All tools are issued to workers each morning ~~and~~ a checkout system and returned and checked in at night.
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SALVAGE

1. Salvage is of the utmost importance to Civil Affairs. All Civil Affairs officers in the islands without exception recommend that trained salvage units with full necessary equipment be assigned to Civil Affairs and move in immediately behind the line of battle. It is assumed that if this is done, Civil Affairs can do a more effective job of serving the combat and garrison forces, can better control civilians, and can reduce by many tons the supplies and equipment required in the later stages of military government.

2. Civil Affairs salvage includes not only the captured enemy foodstuffs and clothing referred to under Supply but hundreds of other important items such as:

a. Engines and machines. On Tinian a repairable 25KW generating set was salvaged and furnishes the camps with light and a little power. On Saipan (see above) marine diesels were broken, bulldozed and destroyed.

b. Motor transport. On Saipan over a hundred Japanese trucks were recovered of which about half were useable, and of the remaining half a quarter could be kept running. (See transportation below) Also, motor equipment, tools and supply.

c. Fishing craft, engines and gear. (See Fishing, below)

d. Tools and construction materials. Practically all Civil Affairs tools, both agriculture and construction, on Saipan were acquired with great effort by officers, enlisted and civilian salvage parties, pawing over the debris of industrial plants, homes and sheds both in Garapan and on the farms, scouring for and picking up nails, pliers, chisels, sickles, saws, plows and the like, loading them into jeeps or 6x6 trucks and taking them to the camp blacksmiths where all had to be retempered, sharpened, set, fitted with new handles, the latter involving another salvage hunt for suitable wood.

e. Building materials of all kinds, beams, lumber, corrugated iron sheets, thatch straw, palm leaves for matting, dunnage.

f. Farm animals. (See Agriculture, below)

g. Firewood and captured Japanese petroleum, oil and lubricants.

h. Paints and preservatives.

i. Medical supplies.

j. Bicycles, radios, sewing machines, and repair equipment and tools for these.

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LIGHT INDUSTRY

1. Closely associated with Supply and Salvage, Light Industry is established in all camps and most successfully at Saipan. On the main road through the camp, across from Economics and Supply headquarters, have been built a row of small shops. Labor has selected from the camp classification:

a. A cobbler, who has been furnished by salvage, the blacksmith, and the carpenter shop with cobblers tools, bench and lasts. They could use several more to repair the shoes for a camp of 17,000.

b. A carpenter shop with several carpenters and a cabinet maker repairing, refinishing and making furniture, latrine tops, fly traps.

c. A paint shop, principally for making "Off Limits" and other signs, much and immediately needed, and painting local police helmets and the like.

d. A bicycle, radio, watch, and sewing machine repair shop. Salvage has brought in a number of bicycles, a few radios, and nearly a hundred American "Singer" and Japanese imitation sewing machines. By disassembling, soaking in oil, cleaning and cannibalizing, they were able to put together a battery of these machines. However, acute shortages of thread, machine and hand needles, scissor, buttons, and repair tools have developed.

e. A large shop with sewing machines and sewing tables. To this were distributed part of the sewing machines, and the rest were loaned to women about the camp. To the sewing shop, Labor assigned all women classified as skilled seamstresses, dressmakers and tailors. In a 6 weeks period they had produced:

1000 armbands	45 boy's shirts
370 women's skirts	200 boy's shorts
59 women's dresses	66 canvas sun hats
95 girls dresses	25 longvisored caps
54 child's dresses	20 boy's suits

and had halved and hemmed a large number of captured double blankets.

AGRICULTURE

1. Agriculture on Saipan, again important to supply for our forces and civilian refugees and internees, got its start with the airforce and aviation engineer officers clamoring for Civil Affairs to get the livestock, cattle, hogs, caribou, goats and chickens off the airstrips. Since no livestock activity had been planned because intelligence had reported little or none on the island, the Chief Civil Affairs Officer had to assign a Naval Lieutenant, the only one with any farm experience in his boyhood, to agricultural duty. With one enlisted man, at tremendous effort, and often under fire and with very little transportation, they have rounded up 437 cattle, 183 hogs, 150 goats. The catching of chickens, more

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than 800 of them so far, was in a large measure a rat-race between this officer and the troops who caught and cooked them when they could. A considerable number of animals were shot and had to be interred by the burial detail. Others were wounded and had to be treated or butchered. The catching of this livestock was only the beginning of the many problems, such as:

a. Salvaging and scrounging lumber, wire, and posts for corrals, barns, pens, styes and coops. Organizing a work party to build these. Not a single post-hole digger was found. Areas had to be selected and assigned where the Japanese soldiers could not get at the animals at night and where the farmers could get at them in the day time.

b. Cattle sheds and corrals were finally managed as were chicken coops. But, materials were too short to build goat pens high enough to keep them in so that all the goats finally had to be turned loose again. The Japanese hog farmers warned that their previous method of keeping all hogs separate in individual pens was the only feasible one. The Army veterinarian disagreed and ordered them penned together. They shortly developed a disease, perhaps hog erysipalis, of which 70 out of the 183 died. A special veterinary unit was sent out from Pearl Harbor to investigate and slaughtered a number more in an attempt to identify the disease. The hogs have now been put back in separate pens and the Civil Affairs officer is trying to keep enough for breeding to restock the island. Animal health, medical supplies and veterinary personnel is important.

c. Feeding and watering livestock is most difficult. The grazing and water areas are shrunken and restricted both by the military unit demands for bivouac and work areas and by the Japanese snipers and stragglers. Pasturage is very short. Limited shipping denies the possibility of bringing in animal feed.

d. A difficult problem arises in relation to all livestock since it is movable and private property. Its destruction by anything but combat operations is illegal, its use, unless requisitioned and paid for, is likewise illegal. The Civil Affairs legal staff has warned the Agriculture officer of this fact. The latter is now trying to establish the ownership of livestock insofar as it can be learned within the camp, and where established, to mark the cows and hogs with ownership identification. It is expected, however, that quarrels over ownership will have to be adjudicated and that a considerable number of claims will be filed against the United States for compensation. In forward areas of dense agricultural population these problems will become acute and must be planned for.

e. In view of the livestock problem encountered on Saipan (as in Sicily and Italy) it is considered essential that careful planning be done, that Civil Affairs livestock units be sent in in the early phase, that veterinary units be attached.

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2. Next to the emergency of capturing livestock, the most immediate problem of agriculture was the harvesting of ripe crops. This job too must be provided for in planning and the activity started as soon as any ripe crop area is cleared of action. By recruiting voluntary male and female labor from the 13 camp kitchens, by providing them with tools, baskets, sacks, transportation and M.P. guards, the Agriculture officer has been able to furnish between 30,000 and 40,000 lbs of sweet potatoes, egg plant, onions, water cress and other salads as well as a considerable quantity of ripe fruit. In this connection it is important for Civil Affairs planners in agriculture to know not only the cultivated field and fruit crops but the wild native foods as well.

3. After or during the harvesting of ripe crops, the more quickly farms and gardens are cleared, plowed, harrowed and planted the better for both troop and civilian supply of fresh foods. This requires:

a. The allotment of farm and garden land near camps and the protection of other farm lands insofar as is practicable from unnecessary intrusion by garrison force activities.

b. The provision of Civil Affairs officer and enlisted personnel skilled in farming and gardening for supervision.

c. The selection and assignment of civilian farmers and gardeners and their families to these projects by the Civil Affairs Labor officer.

d. Machinery, equipment, and farm and garden tools, both through import and salvage for breaking, cultivating and planting the land. It is clear that one tractor or half-track with gang plows and harrows could have stepped up agricultural production by more than a month over hand labor and cow or caribou plowing.

e. Provision of seed by importation, by salvage from local seed stocks, and by collecting seed from overripe crops.

f. Provision of fertilizers.

g. Provision of insecticides, fungicides and sprayers to control pests and blights.

4. On Saipan by D+90 three principal farm and garden projects were well under way as follows:

a. A 300 acre arable plot had been set aside for farms. About half of this was unfortunately hillside and difficult to work. It is clear, however, that combat and garrison forces generally need or prefer flat farm land for air fields, bivouac and other establishments. This land was platted into 2.5 acre allotments. Farm families, selected by the labor officer, were assigned plots by drawing in a lottery. The results were wholly satisfactory since the oriental peoples are used to gambling and take the consequences well because of their belief in fate. To each farm family was issued 1 cow or caribou, 1 plow if any was yet available, enough

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hand tools for family operation, seed, salvage and dunnage materials for construction of a family shelter, and minimum essential housekeeping and cooking equipment.

b. A 2 acre seed and nursery plot for the entire project operated by an expert seed and nurseryman discovered in the camp by the Labor and Intelligence officers. He grows small plants and tree seedlings, some from United States, some from captured seeds, and some dug up on field trips, under guard, and transplanted.

c. A woman's garden of 5 acres to which about 100 women, also selected by the Labor officer, go daily to work. They are issued hand tools and seed. They clean up and plant and cultivate intensively. They have to be guarded by an officer and enlisted man and the area fully posted to keep the troops off of them, despite the fact that to a fresh eye they lacked any feminine attraction.

d. Two children's gardens totalling 12 acres, divided among the Japanese children and the Chamorro children. The youngsters, like the women, picked up small hand tools in the early morning after breakfast, marched to the gardens under the supervision of the Education and Agriculture officers, assisted by native young men and women, and on arrival at the gardens, half played games while the other half sickled, cleaned up, dug, hoed and planted. At the end of 40 minutes or so, the workers played and the players worked.

6. It is expected that within another few weeks these five activities will produce enough greenstuffs to adequately supplement the camp diet, and that thereafter production will increase to availability for part of the base forces. In this connection, one problem on Saipan is not yet solved, that is as to whether farmers and gardeners will be paid a wage and all produce go to Civil Affairs for issue as relief supplies or to sell to base forces, or the farmers be paid no wage but sell to both Civil Affairs and base forces under Civil Affairs supervision.

FISHING

1. Another important supplement to supply in all Pacific and oriental areas is fishing. As has been demonstrated in the South Seas, a few tons of fishing gear and a few small craft can produce many tons of fresh, dried and salted fish, both for troops and for civilian supply.

2. On Saipan, fishing was in a bad way. The 12 diesel-powered fishing sampans of 18 to 22 tons each were sunk in 6 to 10 feet of water by our naval shellfire before D-Day. Shore fishing installations were bombed or shelled and levelled. Fishermen's homes, containing hooks, tools, nets and gear, had been burned to the ground. Although an expert Civil Affairs fishing officer went in on the assault phase, he was assigned to other pressing duties. When these lightened, he asked permission to do what could be done to get ready for fishing. Because the Civil Affairs plan said that no fishing would be permitted until D+60, and because this was

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mininterpreted to mean no preparation for fishing, he was denied permission to start until that time.

3. The fishing officer proceeded as follows:

a. Through the Labor officer he gottogether all fishermen in the camp, all Japanese, the boat captains, their engineers and crews. He asked them through an interpreter if they thought it possible to raise and repair any of the sampans. They said no. He told them he planned to furnish all materials and to fget them gear. They still said no. He told them he planned, if boats were raised, to send them out with their old captains, engineers and crews insofar as they could be gotten together. They said yes.

b. He borrowed an LCVP from the Port Director (since no smallcraft were assigned to Civil Affairs) and took out several of his leading Japanese fishermen. At each sunken sampan they tied up. He led the way, stripped, put on underwater goggles, dived and swam around and in each craft, among slime, rotted line and net, and diesel oil. On return to the deck, he and the Japanese divers compared what they had seen. They thus determined that, of the 12 crafts, 4 certainly and one possibly could be raised, repaired and set to fishing again.

c. By scrounging and salvage they gathe ed materials, picked an unused shore site with a concret ramp into the water, installed a marine railway on the ramp, built a shelter for carpenters, net and gear men, and machinists, in 3 sections. By borrowing an LCVP frequently they began making underwater temporary repairs on the hulls of the selected sampans. Midway in this effort a Marine outfit moved in to bivouac and ordered them off the shoresite. They found another less satisfactory and with no ramp, get permission to occupy it, moved shelter and all gear to the new location and started again. Again after a few days they were ordered out. They selected a new and still less satisfactory stie and moved again and have since been undisturbed.

d. They completed underwater hull repairs on four sampans. They rigged steel cable underneath the hulls, attached them to empty gas drums, raised the hulls so that the gunwhales were above water line, borrowed a pump and pumped them out and towed them into the new base where they had hand dug four slips in the sand to berth them.

e. The carpenters went to work with salvaged lumber and did an excellent patch job on the hulls, some with stems and posts smashed, all with shellholes. The engineers and machinists set up shop on a partly sunken Japanese dredge and by extaordinary scrounging, salvage, makeshift welding of parts and skilled forge work got a diesel engine completed and installed. They painted the hull in black, bright blue and the wheel and engine house in red so that it could be easily identified. They got her running. Meanwhile, the netmakers had completed the sewing, buoying, and leading of the nets, the gearmen had salvaged hooks from their burned

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homes and the blacksmith had retempered them and they had manufactured lures from the lead casing of Japanese electric cable and camp chicken feathers and paint. They had made stout line out of ravelled net. Peles were a problem because Saipan is stripped of its bamboo. They found what they could and by splicing, joining and winding managed to get about 25 peles together.

f. On D / 93 they launched the first repaired sampan. On B / 94 at 0330 they started out for the first fishing. Their first difficulty was getting bait. They found that the small bait fish had been destroyed or frightened into changing location by inshore bombing. In one spot, however, they found enough. Even with a late start and at the end of the tuna and bonito season, they caught over 800 lbs of fish, in the first two days.

FINANCE

1. Finance in the assault phase on Saipan was a matter of danger, confusion and frustration. Safes and cash drawers in banks, postoffices and public offices were blown and rifled just behind and sometimes within our lines. Finance officers, notified by G-2 of money being found trundled wheelbarrows and pushcarts full of currency through patrol posts to waiting trucks. Under fire, they salvaged what they could of cash and records and, again, with few personnel and little transportation they went in again and again in various stages, salvaging and mopping up. From one place they brought in 4.5 truck loads of currency and records. They got an order issued by the commanding officer to have all found currency turned in or reported at once to Civil Affairs and all records turned in or reported to G-2 so that they could be sorted and pertinent Civil Affairs and fiscal documents turned over to Civil Affairs. The order required also that the exact location of where the money and documents were found be reported so that ownership might be provisionally established, a requirement of the utmost importance to avoid the filing of many claims, the ensuing arguments over ownership, the establishment of the difference between public and private, enemy, friendly alien or allied ownership. While this problem was proportionately small in the Marianas, it is a miniature of that to be met in the larger land masses ahead and the lessons learned from the little show may become of giant magnitude in the larger. This order was obeyed in full by only four outfits of the many on the island. A fifth turned over a hundred thousand yen to an enlisted man at the Civil Affairs office without evidence as to who turned it in or where it was found. The finance officer found only 8 safes uncracked in the island. For two of these he got the combinations and opened them and is using them in the Civil Affairs Office. The other 6 were blown by a squad of sappers furnished him by G-2. This experience convinced him that in any large operation, one or more locksmiths or expert cracksmen should be taken in by Civil Affairs.

2. The situation on these islands is quite different from that in the European theater where not only was the local currency declared legal tender at once but military currency like and exchangeable for local currency

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was taken in in quantities. Hence there is an immediate operating fund for Civil Affairs out of both military and captured currency and for the United States forces who are supplied with it and instructed to pay and purchase only in these currencies. On the contrary, in the islands all seized or captured currency is not legal tender, all of it has to be accounted for, ownership determined, and all of it shipped to Pearl Harbor or Washington. The only legal tender is American currency, bills and coin, Hawaiian overprint. Because of too little experience with this situation, policy was unclear and procedure confused. The following problems arose:

a. What authorizations are made to pay civilian labor by Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Civil Affairs and out of what funds?

b. Is Civil Affairs authorized to pay farm laborers for producing food, or handicraft workers in the dumps for articles to be sold in PX's and Ship's Service?

c. Who is to keep records for payment of labor and requisitions, the using and requisitioning agency or Civil Affairs?

d. If Civil Affairs keeps the records, the job is made complex and difficult by the fact that the methods of record keeping differ with each service, and in some areas as in Saipan there are three different racial and national groups.

3. Another fiscal problem is how to bring in money for Civil Affairs operations. The finance officer Saipan brought in only checks and assured himself that Army would have currency to cover. Finance officer Tinian brought in currency and could not go ashore for 9 days beyond the time he was due because no one on shipboard was willing to guard his currency. The finance officer Guam landed with his currency and had to sit on and guard it for several days because there was none other to guard it.

4. Conversion of local privately owned non-legal tender into legal tender currency is likewise something to be carefully planned and demanding skilled personnel for execution. On Saipan the amount authorized to individual conversion was set at \$50.00 and was found to be too high since \$25.00 would have covered 92% of the cases. The time of conversion, set at 8 days was too short since many civilians still have or think they have currency buried in the hills in sniper zone. In all, over 300,000 yen was turned in in the 8 days and converted by one officer and one enlisted man. A group difference has appeared. Evidence indicates the Chambores have turned in most of theirs but the Japanese have not because some still have faith the Japanese forces will return and rescue them, and they are eager to buy cigarettes from the troops who are equally eager to have Japanese currency as souvenirs.

5. Captured stamps are likewise a problem. Full sheets of regular and special stamps are a prize stamp collectors item. The finance officer is beset by requests, by no means all from enlisted men, for complete sample sets of all found.

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6. Postal savings are proving more complex than planning had conceived. Amounts are small, accounts are many, ownership spreads all over the Pacific. A whole set of accounts and much money owned in Truk and Guam and on their way there from Tokyo were captured on Saipan. Again the knotty question of ownership, public or private, enemy, friendly or alien or ally.

7. The question of value, ownership and possible claims arises also in the matter of bonds and stocks, hundreds of which are now in possession of the Civil Affairs Finance officer Saipan. He has as yet no notion of how to proceed with them and has taken no steps to find out since he has not enough personnel to carry on with the other financial duties. Hence, they are loosely stowed and piled in a storeroom in the Civil Affairs headquarters building.

TRANSPORTATION

1. As indicated in the reports above of other Civil Affairs activities, transportation has been one of the most difficult of military government problems. This has been so in these island operations, as it was in Sicily and Italy, because:

a. Civil Affairs was not allotted enough American vehicles, transport personnel and repair equipment to carry out even at minimum efficiency the duty assigned to it.

b. American vehicles assigned to Civil Affairs in part arrived for past planned echeloning.

c. Too great dependence was put on the possibility of Civil Affairs making use of captured enemy vehicles, repair shops, parts, tires and civilian mechanic personnel.

d. Tropical conditions of sun, rain, mud, dust and bad roads gave even the best United States equipment such a beating that some jeeps and trucks lasted only a week and unanticipated shortage rapidly appeared in spare parts. Failures in United States equipment appeared in approximately the following order:

1. Mufflers and tail pipes.
2. Carburetor,
3. Air cleaner and hose.
4. Radiator hose.
5. Spark plugs.
6. Fuel pumps.
7. Battery cables.
8. Distributor wires.
9. Valve caps and corse.
10. Bolts, nuts and lock washers sheared off in surprising numbers.

Further, because of mud and sand, vehicles used off main roads at all had to wear chains at all times and chains, links and repair equipment for them were soon in short supply.

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2. Japanese vehicles are or were found to be poor in quality, for the most part imitations of Ford, Chevrolet and Studebaker, so closely imitated in many parts as to be interchangeable. Warning was given, however, that while American parts worked well in Japanese vehicles, Japanese parts soon broke down and fouled up American machines. Not even spark plugs of Japanese make should be used in United States engines. Further, among all the trucks captured, there was not one free of shell or bullet holes in addition to cracked glass, smashed fenders, bumpers or broken bodies, and not one that had a tight radiator. They are all right hand drive so that when first driven by enlisted men, a number were wrecked. Japanese oil was found of fair quality and in a pinch useable in our machines.

PUBLIC SAFETY.

1. Because of the unexpected character of the Civil Affairs operation on Saipan, the destruction, the organization into camp concentration instead of community life, no skilled planning was done on camp organizations and no trained personnel for camp management was assigned to Civil Affairs. Therefore, most of the duties that should have been done by such personnel were assigned to Public Safety. They appointed the Taichos (leaders of a thousand) the house leaders and all other minor officials in the camp. They concerned themselves, in addition to rather light police duties, with such things as reporting births and deaths, posting signs, inspecting leaky roofs, trying to find a signal or siren loud enough to wake or warn the whole camp, the proper places to hang clothes lines, the issue and use of soap, toilet paper, Kotex, needles, cloth and razor blades, wells, water and grease traps, teaching natives to urinate in sump pipes, gathering firewood and all the other big and little matters involved in camp regulations of any sort, their promulgation and enforcement. They posted proclamations. They trained camp civilian police in each of the three camps. They distributed garbage and refuse cans. They searched the houses for hidden tools. They worried about the fire and typhoon hazards. They managed the identification and pass system. They prepared and prosecuted the many petty crimes and violations before the Military Summary Court. They distributed corrugated iron for roofing, surveyed the outside fences, set out parking areas, maintained some liaison with Military Police. In 90 days they had had 6 cases of civilians shot, escaping from the camp, one case of assault with intent to kill, one Chamorro pimp attempt to get some soldiers into the Korean women's quarters and the rest of 85 total cases were petty theft and camp regulation violations. Further comment is reserved, pending Lt. Mosch's report on his present observation of the situation.

LEGAL

1. No report on the legal system since the Civil Affairs Legal Officer was in the sick bay with dengue fever and others reports were fragmentary and considered unreliable.

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INTELLIGENCE AND CENSORSHIP.

1. The only Civil Affairs Intelligence officer on Saipan was so fouled up with censoring the letters of the officers and enlisted men and with office detail that there is no report. Lt. Feit has been instructed on the present observation trip to contact G-2 and N-2 and get the full picture of both activities for this headquarters.

EDUCATION AND RELIGION

1. Education and Religion as functions of Civil Affairs are, in ignorance, considered of little importance. On the contrary it is demonstrated on Saipan and Guam, as in Sicily and Italy and as in enemy occupations of allied territory that they are among the most powerful of influences for or against Military Government and to lift or plunge morale among refugees and internees. This was demonstrated in many aspects of the operations in Sicily and Italy where the power of the Catholic Church and of the universities and schools made their mark, sometime for good, sometimes not, on the military government and through it on the United States. In miniature, on Saipan, a powerful effect was noted on the entire Chamorro group when six nuns were brought in from hillcaves, were fed, were housed in special quarters, were permitted to hold services each morning at dawn. Similarly, things went much better in the Japanese and Korean camps when the Buddhist priest was taken off of stevedoring and put at pastoral duties, the holding of services and the religious burial of the dead. In contrast, it is clear that the Japanese understood why Civil Affairs refused any State Shinto worship and any singing of their religious songs which are fundamentally political in nature and a worship of the Emperor who leads the war against us.

2. In another way, but with equal power, education has its effect. There are few parents, oriental or western, free men and women or in internment and refugee camps who do not wish for their children the most and the best of growth in health and learning. In consequence, workers of all kinds and levels are more efficient for our forces and in the rehabilitation of their own lives if they believe that their youngsters are being developed and taught whether the learning be from books and teachers, from recreation such as swimming, movies, games, or from practical and technical teaching as in gardens and shops. The enthusiasm of the Chamorro was marked and a lift to their spirits and cooperativeness when Civil Affairs made it clear that they would provide training for native Chamorro teachers so that they could teach the young, a thing the Japanese had never allowed. Hence, a program of both religion and education is being developed rapidly and well by a Civil Affairs officer versed in these matters to the general and practical benefit of the combat and service forces.

REPORTS, DOCUMENTS AND FORMS.

1. A considerable mass of reports, documents and forms used, developed and discarded by Civil Affairs in the three islands, has been brought

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back by this observer who was designated courier for the purpose. These have been logged in the Section security log and have been distributed to the heads of the Civil Affairs departments concerned.

MALCOLM S. MAC LEAN,
Lieutenant Commander, USNR,
Chief of Section.

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