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COPY NO. 21

SWNCC 59/2

2 July 1946

Pages 33 - 62, incl.



STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

STRATEGIC AREAS AND TRUSTEESHIPS IN THE PACIFIC

Reference: J. C. S. 1619 Series

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure, a memorandum for the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee from the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, is circulated for consideration by the Committee.

ALEXANDER D. REID

B. L. AUSTIN

RAYMOND E. COX

Secretariat

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E N C L O S U R E

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington 25, D. C.



SM-6153
28 June 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE:

Subject: Strategic Areas and Trusteeships in the Pacific.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that the following be transmitted to the Secretary of State with the request that he present it to the President:

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff have further considered from a military point of view the position of the United States in respect to United Nations trusteeships in the Pacific. They reaffirm their previous determination that vital security interests require permanent retention by the United States of exclusive strategic control of the Japanese Mandated Islands, Marcus Island, and parts of the Nansai Shoto - Nanpo Shoto. There is appended hereto a tabulation (Appendix "A") containing detailed data on the areas under consideration.

"In respect to the Japanese Mandated Islands, from a military point of view, the United States should assert and retain exclusive sovereignty over that territory.

"In respect to Marcus Island and designated parts of the Nansai Shoto - Nanpo Shoto, the terms of a trusteeship should include the following provisions, of which any compromise would impair the security of the United States and its possessions:

"a. The United States to be the sole administering authority.

"b. The entire trusteeship to be designated as a strategic area.

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Dept. of State letter, A. G. 21973

By ALC:HC, NARS Date 3-12-75

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"c. No limitation to be placed on the utilization of all or any part of the area for U.S. security purposes.

"d. U.S. right to exclude any areas utilized for military purposes from inspection by or report to the United Nations (UN) or any of its agencies."

There is appended hereto as Appendix "B" a study by Joint Chiefs of Staff agencies on which the Joint Chiefs of Staff base the foregoing.



For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/s/ A. J. McFarland

A. J. McFARLAND,
Colonel, U. S. Army,
Secretary

Appendices: "A"
"B" - J.C.S. 1619/1

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APPENDIX "A"



I. MANDATED TERRITORIES IN THE PACIFIC

<u>Area</u>	<u>Included Territories</u>	<u>Mandatory</u>
<u>New Guinea - Bismarck Archipelago</u>	N.E. New Guinea Admiralty Islands Bismarck Archipelago Green Islands Buka Bougainville Tauu Nukumaru	Australia ("His Britannic Majesty for and on behalf of the Government of Australia" --- Art. I, League of Nations Document, 21/31/14C)

<u>Central Pacific</u>	Marianas Islands (less Guam) Palau Islands Caroline Islands Marshall Islands	Japan ("His Majesty the Emperor of Japan" --- League of Nations Document, 21/31/14E)

<u>Nauru</u>	Nauru Island	Britain ("His Britannic Majesty" --- League of Nations Document, 21/31/14A) (Administered by Australia by British Commonwealth Agreement)

<u>Western Samoa</u>	Savaii Island Upolu Island	New Zealand ("His Britannic Majesty for and on behalf of the Government of the Dominion of New Zealand" --- League of Nations Document, 21/31/14B)

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II. AREAS TO BE DETACHED FROM JAPAN

(Paragraph 8 of the Potsdam Declaration of 26 July 1945.)

<u>Area</u>	<u>Included Territories</u>	<u>Captured from Japan and now occupied by</u>
<u>Nansei Shoto</u>	All islands in the chain between Kyushu, south of 31° N. Lat., and Formosa, including Borodini Gunto and Okino-Daito Shima	United States
<u>Nanpo Shoto</u>	All islands in the chain between Honshu and the Marianas, comprising the Izu Islands, the Ogosawera Gunto, and the Kazan Retto, to include Parece Vela	United States
<u>Marcus Island</u>		United States
<u>Kurile Islands</u>	All islands in the chain between Hokkaido and the Kamchatka Peninsula	U. S. S. R.
<u>Karafuto</u>		U. S. S. R.
<u>Formosa</u>		China (U. S. assisted)

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APPENDIX "B"

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (G)
Dept of State letter, Aug. 1973
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J. C. S. 1619/1

24 May 1946

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

STRATEGIC AREAS AND TRUSTEESHIPS IN THE PACIFIC

- References:
- a. J. C. S. 1619
 - b. J. C. S. 570/40
 - c. J. C. S. 698/1
 - d. J. C. S. 656
 - e. J. C. S. 656/1
 - f. J. C. S. 570/50

Report by the Joint Staff Planners, in collaboration
with the Joint Strategic Survey Committee

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine, from the military point of view, the position of the United States in respect to United Nations trusteeships in the Pacific (J. C. S. 1619).

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM AND DISCUSSION

2. See Appendix "B".

CONCLUSIONS

3. Vital U.S. security interests require retention by the United States of exclusive and unlimited strategic control of the Japanese Mandated Islands, Marcus Island, and parts of the Nansei Shoto and Nanpo Shoto.
4. Retention of strategic control of the Japanese Mandated Islands, Marcus, and certain islands of the Nansei Shoto -

<u>DISTRIBUTION</u>	<u>COPY NO.</u>		<u>COPY NO.</u>
Admiral Leahy	1	General Norstad	11
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General Eisenhower	2 & 5	General Everest	13
General Spaatz	4	General Lincoln	14
General Handy	7	Captain Campbell	15
Admiral Ramsey	8	Secy, JCS	16
Admiral Sherman	9	Secy, JSSC	17
General Hull	10	Secy, JPS	18
		Secy, JWPC	19

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Nanpo Shoto area is most feasible by:

- a. Assumption of unlimited and exclusive sovereignty over the Japanese Mandated Islands.
- b. Establishment of strategic trusteeship over Nansei Shoto, except for those northern islands of the Nansei Shoto adjacent to, and formerly part of, a prefecture of the main Japanese Islands, with the United States as sole administering authority.
- c. Establishment of strategic trusteeship over Nanpo Shoto, except for the Izu Islands as far southward as Sofu Gan, with the United States as sole administering authority.
- d. Assumption of unlimited and exclusive sovereignty over Marcus Island.

5. Security requirements in the Nansei Shoto - Nanpo Shoto area may be satisfied by the establishment of a trusteeship with the United States as administering authority, in which Okinawa and adjacent small islands and Iwo Jima are designated as strategic areas.

6. There is no objection to retention under Japanese sovereignty of those northern islands of Nansei Shoto adjacent to and formerly part of the prefecture of the main islands and of the Izu Islands of the Nanpo Shoto to include Sofu Gan to the southward provided they be permanently demilitarized.

7. U.S. security interests are best served by the continuation of control by members of the British Commonwealth of Nations in those areas in the Pacific now administered as mandates by members of that Commonwealth, if these should be offered for trusteeship.

8. There is interest, from the military point of view, in the determination of which nations shall be considered as "states directly concerned", and hence parties to the trusteeship

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agreement, in respect to any proposed trusteeship in the Pacific.

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APPENDIX "A"

D R A F T



MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR
AND THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the following be transmitted to the Secretary of State with the request that he present it to the President as representing their views:

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff have further considered, from the military point of view, the position of the United States in respect to United Nations trusteeships in the Pacific. They reaffirm their previous determination that vital security interests require retention by the United States of exclusive strategic control of the Japanese Mandated Islands, Marcus Island, and parts of the Nansai Shoto - Nanpo Shoto. There is appended hereto a tabulation (Appendix "A")*, containing detailed data on the areas under consideration.

"In respect to the Japanese Mandated Islands, from the military point of view, the United States should assert and retain exclusive sovereignty over that territory. These islands should not be offered for trusteeship, and there appears to be no reason why such action could logically be insisted upon by any power. Their strategic importance to the United States is obvious, because of their location astride our line of communications to the Philippines, Japan, and western Asia, and because they constitute an integral part of the strategic base system for the defense of the Western Hemisphere.

"The preparation of the native populations of the Mandates for eventual independence -- the basic purpose of the trusteeship system -- cannot be advanced logically as a valid argument against assumption of full sovereignty by

*Annex "B" to Appendix "B", with Tab (Map).

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the United States. The native populations of these islands are relatively small, are widely dispersed, are of diverse tribes and races, and are in a low state of political and economic development. In short, the backward state of their development and lack of cohesion clearly indicate that they will be wholly incapable of assuming an independent status or even that of self government at any time in the foreseeable future.

"It is not considered that a request for sovereignty over the Mandates will violate either the spirit or the letter of the President's previously announced position that 'Outside of the right to establish necessary bases for our own protection, we look for nothing which belongs to any other power', and that 'The United States would insist that it be sole trustee of enemy Pacific islands conquered by our forces and considered vital to this country's future security. Other former enemy islands now held by us but not considered vital to this country will be placed under United Nations Organization Trusteeship to be ruled by a group of countries named by the UNO.' It is observed that no nation owns -- has sovereignty over -- the Japanese Mandates, and that there is a very fundamental difference between 'sole trustee' and 'United Nations Trusteeship'. It is believed that the USSR is the only power which might object, solely for ideological reasons, to the sovereignty over these Mandates passing to the United States. Such a Soviet position in this regard should be open to serious question, since the USSR has in fact assumed sovereignty over Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Eastern Poland, although without U.S. recognition, and apparently proposes to assume full sovereignty over the Kuriles.

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"In the event that international political developments place the United States in such a position that consideration must be given to the establishment of a trusteeship over all or any part of the Japanese Mandated Islands, such action could be militarily acceptable only under terms adequately guaranteeing U. S. interests. Such terms would include these provisions:

- a. The United States to be the sole administering authority.
- b. The entire trusteeship to be designated as a strategic area.
- c. No limitation to be placed on the utilization of all or any part of the area for U.S. security purposes.
- d. U.S. right to exclude any areas utilized for military purposes from inspection by or report to the United Nations (UN) or any of its agencies.

Under such circumstances, there would be no military objection should the United States agree to abide by the provisions of Article 76 of the United Nations Charter; to report to the UN on political, economic, social, and educational matters affecting the inhabitants; to permit inspection by officially designated representatives of the UN of areas not excluded from such inspection by reason of U.S. military security.

"Any compromise of the above-lettered conditions would constitute a compromise to the security of the United States and its possessions. A proposal for strategic trusteeship of the Japanese Mandated Islands, with the United States as administering authority under the conditions indicated above, accordingly represents the maximum militarily acceptable application of the trusteeship concept. Should there develop, during any stage of the trusteeship negotiations, a persistent

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"In addition to any specific terms included above, consideration should be given, in drafting any agreement for trusteeship by the United States, to including the following general provisions:

a. The right of the administering authority to set up such system of administration for the trusteeship as it may deem suitable.

b. The right of the administering authority to establish fortifications and to maintain military, including naval, personnel, ships and aircraft in the area shall not be limited by the trusteeship agreement, nor otherwise limited except with the consent of the administering authority.

c. The administering authority will report to the United Nations on political, economic, social, and educational matters affecting the inhabitants of the area, will consult with the Trusteeship Council on such matters, and will permit visits of inspection to the area by officially designated representatives of the United Nations to observe the compliance of the administering authority with the provisions of Article 76 of the United Nations Charter.

d. The administering authority shall not, however, be required to make any report upon nor submit to any inspection of any fortification or military installation in any strategic area held under trusteeship.

"In respect to these areas which may be offered for trusteeships by the United States the preferable position, from the military point of view, should be modified by political considerations only with the clear understanding that when the minimum acceptable position, from the military point of view, is reached in negotiations, the United States must hold fast to that position and attain its essential

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security objectives by continued occupation alone, if such objectives cannot otherwise be attained.

"In respect to the Pacific areas presently under mandate to members of the British Commonwealth, the United States should, from the military point of view, lend support to continuance of the present mandatories as the administering authorities in the event those areas are proposed for trusteeship under the United Nations. If Australia should desire to offer the Admiralty group for trusteeship, it would be of advantage to the United States for her to designate Manus and the adjacent small islands as a strategic area.

"Our interest in the Kuriles, in respect to trusteeships in the Pacific, is the implication of the precedent which would be set by the USSR in the assumption of full national sovereignty by any state over areas to be detached from the sovereignty of Japan.

"There is interest, from the military point of view, in the determination of which nations shall be considered as 'states directly concerned', and hence parties to the trusteeship agreement, in respect to any proposed trusteeship in the Pacific. The recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to parties to such trusteeship agreements in respect to areas presently under mandate or to be detached from Japan are contained in Appendix "B".*

*Annex to Appendix "A"

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Appendix "A"

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
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ANNEX TO APPENDIX "A"



RECOMMENDED PARTIES TO TRUSTEESHIP AGREEMENTS

1. For the former Japanese Mandated Islands:
 - a. Preferable: U.S., U.K.
 - b. Acceptable: U.S., U.K., Australia, New Zealand.

2. For the Nansei Shoto
 - a. Preferable: U.S., China, Philippines.
 - b. Acceptable: All signatories to Japanese Peace Treaty, less Japan.

3. For the Nanpo Shoto:
 - a. Preferable: U.S., U.K., Philippines.
 - b. Acceptable: U.S., U.K., Philippines, Australia, New Zealand.

4. For areas mandated to members of the British Commonwealth:
 - a. Australian Mandate (Northeastern New Guinea, Bismarck Archipelago, Admiralty Islands, Bougainville, Buka)
 - (1) Preferable: Australia, U.S.
 - (2) Acceptable: Australia, U.S., U.K., New Zealand, The Netherlands.
 - b. New Zealand Mandate - Western Samoa:
 - (1) Preferable: New Zealand, U.S.
 - (2) Acceptable: New Zealand, U.S., U.K., Australia, France.
 - c. British Mandata - Nauru Island:
 - (1) Preferable: U.K., U.S.
 - (2) Acceptable: U.K., U.S., Australia, New Zealand.

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Annex to Appendix "A"

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APPENDIX "B"

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM AND DISCUSSION

1. Article 77 of the United Nations Charter prescribes that territories in the following categories may be placed under trusteeships:

- a. Territories now held under mandate.
- b. Territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the second World War; and
- c. Territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration.

Pertinent extracts from the Charter dealing with the Trusteeship System are contained in Annex "A".

2. Areas in the Pacific which may be proposed for United Nations trusteeships under categories a and b above are listed in Annex "B". There has as yet been no public indication that any other areas in the Pacific, which would fall under category c above, are to be offered for trusteeships.

3. Although there was some discussion during the recent session of the United Nations General Assembly in London and various proposals introduced regarding the determination of "states directly concerned" in the negotiation of trusteeship agreements, no definitive action has been taken by any organ of the United Nations which would define, or provide an approved formula for the determination of, the "states directly concerned" in any particular trusteeship agreement. It is generally presumed that this determination is to be made by the state submitting a particular trusteeship agreement for consideration of the United Nations.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff stated in the Appendix to Enclosure "A" of J.C.S. 570/40 (page 210):

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
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"The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that all Japanese Mandated Islands and Central Pacific islands detached from Japan including the Bonins and the Ryukyus should be brought under exclusive United States strategic control." The system of bases approved in that paper was formulated with the foregoing statement as a cardinal assumption.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff stated their position regarding the Japanese Mandated Islands in a letter to the Secretary of State dated 11 March 1944 (Enclosure to J.C.S. 698/1). This action confirmed their policy as stated on 11 January 1944 (Appendix "A" to J.C.S. 656/1).

6. The President, in connection with the celebration in New York of Navy Day, on 27 October 1945, stated:

"We have assured the world time and time again -- and I repeat it now -- that we do not seek for ourselves one inch of territory in any place in the world. Outside of the right to establish necessary bases for our own protection, we look for nothing which belongs to any other power."

At a press conference on 15 January 1946, the President further stated that:

"The United States would insist that it be sole trustee of enemy Pacific Islands conquered by our forces and considered vital to this country's security. Other former enemy islands now held by us but not considered vital to this country will be placed under United Nations Organization Trusteeship, to be ruled by a group of countries named by UNO."

The Japanese Mandates belong to no other power, have no sovereign country. The words "sole trustee" have a very different meaning from "under United Nations Organization Trusteeship" and

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are not used in Chapter XII, International Trusteeship System, Charter of the United Nations.

7. Some public discussion by various U.S. delegates on the subject of trusteeships of Pacific islands occurred in London just prior to the opening of the United Nations General Assembly meeting in January 1946. As a result, Secretary of State Byrnes, then in London, requested permission of the President on 15 January 1946 to make a public statement, if such was considered necessary, to the effect that the United States considered that the former Japanese Mandated Islands should be placed under a United Nations trusteeship. Secretary Byrnes was informed on 17 January 1946 that the President approved the above statement only if it was considered necessary to make such. No statement on this subject was made by Secretary Byrnes.

8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff on 22 January 1946 informed the Secretary of State (J.C.S. 570/50 - SWNCC 249/1):

a. That they considered it essential to our national defense that the United States have strategic control of the Japanese Mandated Islands by assumption of full U.S. sovereignty; and that the United States have strategic control of the Nansai Shoto, Nanpo Shoto and of Marcus Island through trusteeship agreements designating those islands as strategic areas.

b. That they assume that there will be no question of trusteeships raised or considered in respect to Pacific Islands which were, on 6 December 1941, under the sovereignty of the United States.

9. The foregoing views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were furnished Secretary Byrnes in London with the additional caution that the President wished to avoid any public statement on this matter if at all possible at that time, since he desired to work out a plan whereby the U.S. security interest would be adequately protected.

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10. Under the United Nations system, "trusteeship agreements" (including strategic trusteeship agreements) are negotiated and agreed to by the states "directly concerned", the agreement in each case designating the administering authority and including a statement of the exact terms under which the territory will be administered. All of this is done by usual diplomatic negotiation outside the United Nations and consequently is not subject to any veto power in the Security Council or to pressure, from states not directly concerned, exercised through the General Assembly. After the agreement is satisfactory to the states directly concerned, it is then submitted to the United Nations for acceptance, upon which it possesses the nature of a recorded and authorized international treaty or agreement.

DISCUSSION

11. The keystone upon which the entire U.S. base system in the Pacific, as approved by J.C.S. 570/40, is built, is the assumption that all Pacific islands formerly under mandate to or sovereignty of Japan, less Formosa and the Kuriles, will be brought under exclusive U.S. strategic control. Such strategic control can be gained either by acquisition of sovereignty or by being granted a United Nations trusteeship, in which the United States is the sole administering authority, over these territories, collectively or severally.

12. The purpose of U.S. strategic control over the subject Pacific islands is twofold:

a. To provide for the establishment of military bases thereon, considered necessary for the security of the United States.

b. To prevent the military utilization of these territories by any other nation.

The most positive means of ensuring the fulfillment of these two objectives would be for the United States to acquire

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sovereignty over the subject islands. The United States, however, is committed to promoting the principles of the United Nations, and, in all instances where applicable and where it will not seriously affect her security, should offer for trusteeship those former Japanese islands which she now controls.

13. Japanese Mandates. United States domination of the western Pacific and protection of the line of communications to the Philippines depends upon complete strategic control of the former Japanese Mandated Islands. Thus, in the case of these islands, both objectives of paragraph 12 must be fulfilled. Militarily, the desirable method to attain these objectives is by acquisition of sovereignty over this territory. The native populations of these islands are relatively small, widely dispersed, of diverse tribes and races, and in a low state of political and economic development. In short, it is highly improbable that, even in the broadest sense, they could be considered as being capable of assuming an independent status or even that of self-government at any time in the foreseeable future -- the basic purpose of the trusteeship system.

Acquisition of full sovereignty by the United States would prevent possible efforts, during processing of trusteeship agreements through the United Nations, to weaken U.S. strategic control by dividing the area into more than one trusteeship or by preventing designation of the entire Japanese Mandated area as a strategic area.

In view of the USSR's recent proposal that she be given a unilateral trusteeship over Tripolitania, it is extremely doubtful that the United States would be successful in obtaining an exclusive trusteeship over the Japanese Mandates. The USSR, in all probability, will be granted, at most, participation in any trusteeship established over Tripolitania, and may be denied any status other than that of an interested party. With this as a precedent, she would strongly oppose any decision to grant an exclusive trusteeship over the Japanese Mandates to the United States.

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Even though a strategic trusteeship over the entire area were guaranteed to the United States, there is no certainty that the required exclusive U.S. control could not later be jeopardized through elimination of the veto power in the Security Council, followed by modification of the terms of trusteeship in a manner contrary to U.S. interests. Also, there is the possibility that, as a result of some crisis or impasse, the United States might be forced into a compromise, for reasons of expediency, which would nullify exclusive U.S. control of the area.

The moral leadership of the United States would not be compromised by an open assumption of U.S. sovereignty over the Mandates, accompanied by an honest statement of the vital U.S. interests which impelled such action. Such action would be similar to Russia's attitude toward the Kuriles. An offer of the islands for trusteeship, under terms which actually retain all the attributes of sovereignty for the United States, would, by its very deviousness and apparent cynicism, be far more of a threat to U.S. moral leadership in the United Nations, and would set a bad precedent of tricky legalism which might cause later repercussions inimical to the United States.

As the United States may be depended upon to fulfill its obligations to the natives under the provisions of Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter in respect to the inhabitants of non-self-governing territories, the assumption of full U.S. sovereignty over the Mandates cannot be justly considered a failure on the part of the United States to comply with the trusteeship provisions of that Charter. Such action by the United States should rather be considered as the best method, under the provisions of the United Nations Charter, to ensure the well-being of the natives.

From the military point of view, there would be no impairment to the security interests of the United States, even though full sovereignty over the Japanese Mandates should induce similar

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action by other powers in respect to mandates now held by them, or even in respect to other areas detached from Japan. No conceivable threat against U.S. security can be envisaged in the assumption of sovereignty by the members of the British Commonwealth over their present mandates in the Pacific, Africa or elsewhere. Nor would similar action by France or Belgium pose a threat to the United States. As to other areas to be detached from Japan, we must expect that the USSR will consider the status of the Kuriles as well as Sakhalin not open to any action other than assumption by her of complete sovereignty.

14. Nansei Shoto - Nanpo Shoto - Marcus Island area. Because of the variations in native populations, terrain features, and locations of the various island groups, this area should be considered in three parts:

a. Marcus Island is designated in J.C.S. 570/40 as a secondary base area, essential for the protection of, and for access to primary bases. In this case, Marcus covers the northern flank of the Marianas-Hawaiian gap. Thus, both objectives of paragraph 12 above must be attained in respect to this territory. Since Marcus Island is uninhabited and, so far as is known, has no intrinsic economic value, the primary objective of trusteeships--the welfare and benevolent guidance of the native inhabitants--is nullified in this instance. Thus, a trusteeship for Marcus Island would have no meaning, as there would be no one for whom to hold it in trust. Acquisition of sovereignty by the United States appears to be the best solution in regard to Marcus Island.

b. Nanpo Shoto. The Bonin - Volcano Islands are designated in J.C.S. 570/40 as a secondary base area. However, except for possible air warning installations, Iwo Jima of the Volcanos group (southernmost) is the only island intended for military base development. This position protects the primary base in the Marianas. Of the Nanpo Shoto, the Bonins

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Dept. of State letter, Aug. 10, 1953

By ~~AL/NL~~ WARS Date 3-12-75

(Ogasawara Gunto) and Volcanos (Karzan Retto) are sparsely populated by natives of British, American, and Hawaiian origin, decendants of an early whaling colony, whereas the Izu Island (northernmost) natives are of Japanese stock. Except for Iwo Jima, only the first objective of paragraph 12 above must be attained in the Nanpo Shoto. However, because of the British and American origin of the inhabitants of the Bonins and Volcanos, it does not appear that there could be any question of their mistreatment by an American administration and because of the sparseness of the population, their preparedness for independence is not foreseeable in the future. Thus, a U.S. trusteeship over the Nanpo Shoto, with the Volcano and Bonin Island groups designated as strategic areas, appears the preferable solution from the military viewpoint, but the strategic area could be reduced to only the island of Iwo Jima, if necessary, and still be acceptable. Moreover, the United States has no particular military interest in the Izu Islands, and, because of their geographical and cultural nearness to Japan, these could be left demilitarized under that government, if such action appears propitious.

c. Nansei Shoto. Although the Ryukyus Islands of the Nansei Shoto are designated as a primary base area in J.C.S. 570/40, only the island of Okinawa (and small off-lying islands) is now planned for military base development. There is a considerable native population, Oriental in origin, customs and mentality, with well-established economy in the Ryukyu Islands. The administration of such territories was the purpose for which the trusteeship system was designed. Thus, it appears that the desired position from a military viewpoint would be a U.S. trusteeship over the Nansei Shoto, with Okinawa, including small off-lying islands, designated as a strategic area. As in the case of the Nanpo Shoto, the northern islands of the Nansei Shoto adjacent to, and

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formerly part of, a prefecture on the main islands could be left demilitarized under Japanese Government, if such action seems propitious.

15. British Mandates. The U.S. military interests would best be served by the maintenance of the status quo in the south and southwest Pacific. From the military point of view, the United States should therefore lend support to the continuance of the present mandatory states as administering authorities for those territories now under mandate to the members of the British Commonwealth and proposed for trusteeships under the United Nations. For economic reasons the United States should avoid becoming involved as a co-administrator in any of these territories. If Australia should desire to offer the Admiralty Group for trusteeship, it would be of advantage to the United States for Australia to designate Manus and adjacent small islands as a strategic area.

16. Other areas. In event the Kurile Islands are proposed for trusteeship, the USSR should be designated as sole administering authority in implementation of the Yalta Agreement. There are at present no indications that either Karafuto or Formosa will be offered for trusteeship.

17. The determination of the parties to the agreement or "states directly concerned" in regard to any proposed trusteeship in the Pacific is of interest from a military point of view. The preferable and acceptable conditions, from the military point of view, in respect to parties to such trusteeship agreements in regard to areas presently under mandate or to be detached from Japan are set forth in the Annex to Appendix "A".

ANNEX "A" TO APPENDIX "B"



EXTRACTS FROM CHAPTER XII OF THE CHARTER
OF THE UNITED NATIONS (INTERNATIONAL
TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM)

(Text copied from "Report to the President
on Results of San Francisco Conference",
dated June 26, 1945.)

Article 76

The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the Purposes of the United Nations laid down in Article 1 of the present Charter, shall be:

- a. to further international peace and security;
- b. to promote the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement;
- c. to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to encourage recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the world; and
- d. to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters for all Members of the United Nations and their nationals, and also equal treatment for the latter in the administration of justice, without prejudice to the attainment of the foregoing objectives and subject to the provisions of Article 80.

Article 77

1. The trusteeship system shall apply to such territories in the following categories as may be placed thereunder by means

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of trusteeship agreements.

- a. territories now held under mandate;
- b. territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War; and
- c. territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration.

2. It will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which territories in the foregoing categories will be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms.

Article 79

The terms of the trusteeship for each territory to be placed under the trusteeship system, including any alteration or amendment, shall be agreed upon by the states directly concerned, including the mandatory power in the case of territories held under mandate by a Member of the United Nations, and shall be approved as provided for in Articles 83 and 85.

Article 81

The trusteeship agreement shall in each case include the terms under which the trust territory will be administered and designate the authority which will exercise the administration of the trust territory. Such authority, hereinafter called the administering authority, may be one or more states or the Organization itself.

Article 82

There may be designated, in any trusteeship agreement, a strategic area or areas which may include part or all of the trust territory to which the agreement applies, without prejudice to any special agreement or agreements made under Article 43.*

*Article 43.

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces,

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Dept. of State letter, Aug. 24, 1973
by ALH/MS, NARA Date 7-16-75



Article 83

1. All functions of the United Nations relating to strategic areas, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the Security Council.

2. The basic objectives set forth in Article 76 shall be applicable to the people of each strategic area.

3. The Security Council shall, subject to the provisions of the trusteeship agreements and without prejudice to security considerations, avail itself of the assistance of the Trusteeship Council to perform those functions of the United Nations under the trusteeship system relating to political, economic, social, and educational matters in the strategic areas.

Article 84

It shall be the duty of the administering authority to ensure that the trust territory shall play its part in the maintenance of international peace and security. To this end the administering authority may make use of volunteer forces, facilities, and assistance from the trust territory in carrying out the obligation towards the Security Council undertaken in this regard by the administering authority, as well as for local defense and the maintenance of law and order within the trust territory.

Article 43 (cont'd)

assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.

3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

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9, 1973
Dept. of State letter, Aug. 10, 1973
BY ALH NARS Date 3-10-75

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Article 85

1. The functions of the United Nations with regard to trusteeship agreements for all areas not designated as strategic, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the General Assembly.

2. The Trusteeship Council, operating under the authority of the General Assembly, shall assist the General Assembly in carrying out these functions.

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ANNEX "B" TO APPENDIX "B"
(Tab (Map) attached)

I. MANDATED TERRITORIES IN THE PACIFIC

<u>Area</u>	<u>Included Territories</u>	<u>Mandatory</u>
<u>New Guinea - Bismarck Archipelago</u>		
("German New Guinea and the groups of islands in the Pacific Ocean lying south of the Equator /German possessions/ other than German Samoa and Nauru" --- League of Nations Document, 21/31/14C)	N.E. New Guinea Admiralty Islands Bismarck Archipelago Green Islands Buka Bougainville Tauu Nukumaru	Australia ("His Britannic Majesty for and on behalf of the Government of Australia" --- Art. I, League of Nations Document, 21/31/14C)

<u>Central Pacific</u>		
("All the former German islands situated in the Pacific Ocean and lying north of the Equator" --- League of Nations Document, 21/31/14E)	Marianas Islands (less Guam) Palau Islands Caroline Islands Marshall Islands	Japan ("His Majesty the Emperor of Japan" --- League of Nations Document, 21/31/14E)

<u>Nauru</u>	Nauru Island	Britain ("His Britannic Majesty" -- League of Nations Document, 21/31/14A) (Administered by Australia by British Commonwealth agreement)

<u>Western Samoa</u>		
("Former German Colony of Samoa" --- League of Nations Document, 21/31/14B)	Savaii Island Upolu Island	New Zealand ("His Britannic Majesty for and on behalf of the Government of the Dominion of New Zealand" --- League of Nations Document, 21/31/14B)

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II. AREAS TO BE DETACHED FROM JAPAN
(Paragraph 8 of the Potsdam Declaration of 26 July 1945.)

<u>Area</u>	<u>Included Territories</u>	<u>Captured from Japan and now occupied by</u>
<u>Nansei Shoto</u>	All islands in the chain between Kyushu, south of 31° N. Lat., and Formosa, including Borodini Gunto and Okino-Daito Shima	United States
<u>Nanpo Shoto</u>	All islands in the chain between Honshu and the Marianas, comprising the Izu Islands, the Ogosawera Gunto, and the Kazan Retto, to include Parece Vela	United States
<u>Marcus Island</u>		United States
<u>Kurile Islands</u>	All islands in the chain between Hokkaido and the Kamchatka Peninsula	U.S.S.R.
<u>Karafuto</u>		U.S.S.R.
<u>Formosa</u>		China (U.S. assisted)

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Dept. of State letter, Aug. 10, 1952

By ~~ALLIANCE~~, NARS Date 3-16-75

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Dept. of State letter, Aug. 10, 1952

By ~~ALLIANCE~~, NARS Date 3-16-75



TAB TO ANNEX "B" TO APPENDIX "B"

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Tab to Annex "B"
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
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
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VIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

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TAB "B" TO ANNEX "B" TO APPENDIX "B"


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
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Tab "B" to Annex "B"
to Appendix "B"

(page added by Corrigendum - 13 July 1946)



A	C
B	D



28,567
 9,878
 23,286
 9,862
 14,237

PHILIPPINE SEA

C H I N A

9,862 NATIVES

28,567 NATIVES

0 NATIVES

9,878 NATIVES

170

180

150



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
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CLASSIFIED
NO. 11652, Sec. 925 and 926 of the
Dept. of State letter, Aug. 24, 1950
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AREAS WHICH HAVE ZERO NATIVE POPULATION.

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS

3,591 NATIVES

9,862 NATIVES

5,976 NATIVES

Miao Shina, Fens
Ogetawery, Gaito
Chah, Shina, etc.
Ria to Shina
Kazan Fello, etc. to Shina
(Verrier, H) - Marshall Is Shina

PHILIPPINE SEA

MARIANAS


PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

MARSHALL ISLANDS

120° 130° 140° 150° 160° 170° 180°

40° 30° 20° 10°

CLASSIFIED
NO. 11652, Sec. 925 and 926 of the
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HAWAIIAN ISLANDS

19,000 natives (1900)

19,000 natives (1900)

19,000 natives (1900)

5,876 NATIVES

MARSHALL ISLANDS

10,000 natives (1900)

10,000 natives (1900)

10,000 natives (1900)

23,286 NATIVES

9,862 NATIVES

CAROLINE ISLANDS

9,862 natives (1900)

9,862 natives (1900)

9,862 natives (1900)

23,286 NATIVES

PHOENIX ISLANDS

23,286 natives (1900)

23,286 natives (1900)

23,286 natives (1900)

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

10,000 natives (1900)

10,000 natives (1900)

10,000 natives (1900)

PHOENIX ISLANDS

23,286 natives (1900)

23,286 natives (1900)

23,286 natives (1900)

180° 170° 160° 150° 140° 130°

30° 20° 10° 0° 10°