

PACIFIC BASE ISSUE PUT UP TO TRUMAN

President and Byrnes Asked to Clarify Position of U. S. on Former Japanese Islands

OUR DELEGATES SILENCED

Cannot Discuss Trusteeship Agreements Until Stand Is Taken in Washington

By JAMES RESTON

President Truman and Secretary of State James F. Byrnes have been asked to clarify United States policy on the future of the Japanese mandated islands in the Pacific. This is necessary if the United States' delegation at the General Assembly is to play an effective part in the creation of the United Nations trusteeship system, it was learned last night.

It is understood that John Foster Dulles, United States alternate representative at the Assembly meeting assigned to the trusteeship question, has advised Warren R. Austin, head of the American delegation, Secretary Byrnes and the President that he cannot criticize the trusteeship agreements now before the General Assembly with any force unless he knows what position we are going to take about the former Japanese islands in the Pacific.

For example, the Union of South Africa is preparing to advise the General Assembly that it intends to annex Southwest Africa, a former German colony mandated to South Africa by the League of Nations after the last war. The tendency of the members of the United States delegation is to question the advisability of such a unilateral act and to establish the principle of no annexation without a United Nations investigation.

Face Peculiar Position

It was pointed out by members of the delegation, however, that they could not very well do that because, if those in the Navy Department in Washington who favor United States annexation of the former Japanese islands win the inter-departmental squabble in Washington, the United States would be placed in the position of demanding from others policies we were not prepared to apply to ourselves.

Mr. Dulles put this dilemma before the President and the Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, when he visited Washington on Oct. 9. He is also understood to have told Mr. Forrestal at that time that we had already delayed reaching a policy for so long that the ability of the United States to make up its mind on the island question was being widely questioned in other capitals.

Since then, and especially since the delegation started meeting here with members of other delegations, the need for a policy decision at the highest level has made an even greater impression on Mr. Dulles and he has again urged on Mr. Austin and Secretary Byrnes the necessity of reaching a decision on it.

so, Mr. Austin is unlikely to make any such commitment when he speaks at Flushing later in the week.

The Navy Department has in the recent past opposed a general United States declaration that we will accept trusteeship for all the former Japanese mandated islands because it is not sure that America's best security interests can be served within the trusteeship system, and because it wants to see the specific terms of trusteeship worked out before agreeing that the security job can be done under the United Nations.

Also, the President is still under considerable pressure by certain members of the House and Senate to annex some of the former Japanese Pacific islands or at least to insist on trusteeship agreements that are tantamount to United States sovereignty over them.

Assured At San Francisco

During the San Francisco conference, a subcommittee of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee—composed of Senators Tobey, Byrd, Eastland and Capehart—called on former Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius and asserted afterward that they had been assured that the United States would not accept to any trusteeship provision under which

peace conference under some form of United Nations trusteeship.

He made no such statement, however, and unless the President and Secretaries Byrnes and Forrestal are able to compose their differences within the next day or

a Big Five veto power could operate.

These Senators have taken the view that this assurance was not sustained by the Charter and they have expressed fears ever since that the United States could not honestly place the islands under trusteeship without violating either the spirit of the Charter or the imperatives of our own security.

This situation is naturally embarrassing to the President, but there is no evidence that the decision is being made any easier by being postponed. It was raised originally at the Yalta Conference. At that time, it was agreed that the Big Five should gather in Washington several days ahead of the San Francisco Conference to discuss it. The conflict of approach to the problem among the State, War and Navy officials became apparent at that time and no Big Five discussion took place until San Francisco.

Throughout that conference, the

question was debated on both Pennsylvania Avenue and Nob Hill but it was not resolved. It was allowed to drift again until the opening sessions of the General Assembly in London last January when public discussion and urging questioning by White House correspondents induced Mr. Truman to indicate that we would probably place the islands under some kind of United Nations trusteeship.

Now the dilemma is up again with only one difference, that the President is in a weaker position to solve it politically in Washington now than he was a year ago when the same arguments, the same problems and the same trusteeship questions were put

him for a decision.

Terms Must Be Approved

The difficulty of stating a United States policy in the Assembly has been illustrated not only in relation to the Southwest African question, but in relation to the British terms of trusteeship for Tanganyika, Togoland and the British Cameroons. These terms of trusteeship have to be approved by the Assembly before they can be put into effect and before the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations can be established.

However, in the original draft of the terms for Tanganyika, the British sought the right to establish economic monopolies in this territory and the same principle was written into the draft terms of trusteeship for the other territories they proposed to submit to the United Nations.

Officials in the State Department did not like this. The British wanted to be the sole judge as to whether the economic monopolies were in "the interests of the economic advancement of the inhabitants of Tanganyika." The State Department wanted the Trusteeship Council to have the right to decide whether or not the monopolies were in the interests of the inhabitants. A compromise was reached on this after considerable discussions with the British officials in London, but during these negotiations the State Department was not in a position to say that we would adopt an open-door economic policy in the Japanese islands.

British Changed Policy

Moreover, while the British have changed their policy at our request on the economic monopoly question, the State Department is still not in a position to say whether we will adopt for ourselves the policy we urge on others.

Mr. Dulles is understood to have brought this question to the point of decision by stating that he could not honestly go into the trusteeship committee meetings here and argue for principles of that the United States was not ready to say it would accept itself. The whole trusteeship system is being established now, he pointed out, and there are several things in the proposed trusteeship drafts of great importance to millions of native peoples that should be changed.

The United States, he urged, should be taking the lead in seeing that these terms of trusteeship are as fair as they can possibly be made, but, he observed, it is unlikely that they can be made any more liberal than we are prepared to make them for the territories we eventually hope to place under trusteeship.

President Urged to Speak

Before he came to New York to welcome the United Nations delegates, President Truman was advised of this problem. He was urged at least to make a general statement that the United States would place all Japanese mandated islands assigned to it at the Pacific