



UNITED STATES  
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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
Dear Mr. Cleveland:

At our luncheon on Thursday, March 1, I would like to discuss with you and with Mr. Paul Nitze and Mr. Carl Kayser, the usefulness and validity of certain proposed assumptions regarding our Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

These proposed assumptions are:

1. For security and defense reasons, the United States position of control over the subject islands should be no less strong or complete than it is at present. This would mean that either (a) the present U.N. trusteeship status be continued indefinitely, or (b) such trusteeship status be replaced with some closer union with the United States, e.g. a status analogous to Guam.
2. In view of (a) changed composition of the General Assembly of the U.N., (b) the increase in political self-consciousness of the Micronesians, and (c) the fact that our trusteeship will be the only one, or perhaps one of two, remaining in the world, it would be very much in the national interest if we had some viable alternative to continued trusteeship within, say, five years.
3. Since by definition such alternative should only be closer union with the United States as our goal, we should take such steps at once as will (a) prepare the Micronesians in such a manner that any choice they may make in five years might be accepted by the rest of the free world as an informed and meaningful choice made by a people fully capable of weighing the consequences, and (b) help make such choice the one favorable to us.
4. Steps to be taken at once toward this goal will include both broadening the scope and increasing the level of most of our programs in the health, welfare, and economic development field, but I would place first, both in importance and in sequence, the institution of the systematic and competent instruction in English from grade 1 of the school system. Subject to necessary congressional authorization and budgetary support, I would propose:

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- a. Beginning September 1962, and constructively completed by September 1963, provide state-side English speaking teachers for the 80 percent of the Micronesian elementary pupils within feasible reach of such program. This presupposes a building program costing, say \$9,000,000 with an annual operating cost of, say, \$3 million.
  - b. Adult education would be both the specific additional responsibility of most of such teachers, and also the inevitable result of their being located full time in communities not now having any Americans.
  - c. Apart from the specific immediate benefits to the Micronesians children and adults of such exposure for the first time to first class education, we would be working for two indirect but extremely important benefits (1) a common language for all Micronesians, and (2) direct personal exposure of the Micronesian families to Americans living and working among them for their direct personal benefit.
5. If assumptions 1, 2, and 3 above are correct, then I suggest that if we do not embark on a program of the general nature indicated in item 4, but rather continue at our present pace in the Trust Territory, we will not be prepared with any viable alternative to continued trusteeship for this area at that time, for the following reasons:
- a. The Micronesians will not be sufficiently advanced, both from the point of view of educational deficiencies and lack of a common language to make a meaningful and informed choice of some alternative to trusteeship status. At least such choice as they might make, particularly if favorable to us, would be vulnerable to attack by others on such grounds.
  - b. If we do not do more for the Micronesians in the health, education, welfare and economic development fields where the results show up directly in immediate benefits to the Micronesians, we might not be confident enough of the outcome of such choice by the Micronesians for us to risk the test. During the past 15 years of our trusteeship we have been laying the basis for subsequent building, but now we have got to start building.
6. If there proves to be general agreement on the above assumptions, now or subsequently, all agencies concerned will have to see that

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the executive branch makes the timely and forceful presentations that will be needed to secure congressional authorization for and funding of the necessary action.

Sincerely yours,

(sgd) Stewart L. Udall

Secretary of the Interior

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Copy to: Hon. Paul Nitze  
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