DEPARTMENT OF STATE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM TO: E - Mr. Solomon

FROM:

IO - Jo≰eph J. Sisco

SUBJECT: Status of U.S. Planning on the Future of

the TTPI

In the light of your continuing interest in developments regarding the TTPI, and your comments at the Tuesday staff meeting, I thought you would be interested in a brief summary of events which have occurred since the submission to President Kennedy of the report by the Survey Mission you headed.

As you will recall, NSAM 268 and its covering White House Memorandum called for:

- Necessary plans and programs to carry out recommendations in the Solomon report that are feasible and acceptable for implementation; and
- The views of the interested agencies on the fixing of a date for a plebiscite and its public announcement.

In late 1963 Defense and State submitted to Interior, the coordinating agency, their views on the plebiscite and necessary developments which should precede a plebiscite. Defense suggested holding a plebiscite in the TTPI no later than 1966. State suggested a 1967 date in order to allow sufficient time for the development of Micronesian self-government and to allow time for the capital investment program recommended by the Survey Mission to have its full impact.

Efforts by the Department of State to get a formal

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Interior reaction to NSAM 268 or a reaction to the State and Defense memoranda were unsuccessful. Discussions with John Carver and his staff in Interior produced various explanations: uncertainty about the Solomon recommendations; hostile Congressional climate; need to await the outcome of one survey or another; and differences within Interior as to what should be done. The question was even raised whether the basic Executive Branch policy toward the future of the TTPI continued into the Johnson Administration.

To our knowledge Interior took no further action on the State or Defense comments. No reply was ever made to NSAM 268. In mid-1965 the President abolished the TTPI Task Force on the recommendation of Interior without consultation with State. In a letter to me on October 8, 1965, John Carver stated that the Task Force was abolished "following submission of its report, and its report has been implemented in those major particulars in which it was desirable and feasible to do so."

In the meantime State and Defense began work on a coordinated plan designed to remove the Trusteeship and non-self-governing labels from the TTPI and the three U.S. non-self-governing territories (Guam, American The plan aimed at a Samoa, and the Virgin Islands). clear definition of a new relationship of the territories to the United States which would effectively terminate the international obligations of the United States rela-This action, of course. tive to their administration. assumed such political, economic and social development as may be required to make the procedure credible from an international point of view. Additionally, the paper approaches all four territories as a package since it would not be politically or practically feasible to move the TTPI to a status which would give that territory more or as much autonomy as that now enjoyed by the three more advanced non-self-governing territories.

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Our draft plan poses the problem in terms of the growing desire of the inhabitants for more self-government and a clear political identity for the future; the increased importance of the TTPI and Guam for military use and the consequent need to insure their continued availability; and the heightened interest in "colonialism" in the United Nations. It discusses the various alternatives for a new political status. It suggests a program which would involve a major Administration effort centered in the White House to accomplish the move to the new status.

Some of these ideas were informally discussed in June 1965 by Harlan Cleveland before an executive session of the O'Brian Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. They did not react. It will clearly be necessary to broaden the base of Congressional consultations, especially with the Committees on Defense and Foreign Affairs.

At this point the recommendations contained in our study have the formal support of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, Interior has expressed strong differences. An attempt this week to resolve the differences with Under Secretary Carver was unsuccessful, and we are still trying to find a basis of agreement with Interior.

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