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ORAL HISTORY COLLECTION

Narrator Eugenie Moore Anderson Address Tower View
Red Wing, Minn. 55066

Biographical information: Former government official
b. Adair, La., May 26, 1909; student Stephens Coll., 1926-27, Simpson Coll.,
1927-28; Carleton Coll., 1929-30, Juliard Inst. Musical Art, 1930-32. Married
John P. Anderson, Sept. 9, 1930. Am. ambassador to Denmark, 1949-53, Am. minist
to Bulgaria, 1962-65; U.S. rep. on UN Trusteeship Council 1965-68; asst. to
sec. of state, Washington, 1968--, U.S. rep to Third session UN ad hoc comm. on
prisoners of war, 1952; mem. Dem. Nat. Com. for Minn., 1948-49; del-at-large for
Minn. Dem. Nat. Conv., 1948, 60, 68; Dem. Nat. Adv. Com. on Foreign Policy,
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INTERVIEWEE: MRS. EUGENIE MOORE ANDERSON (TAPE #3)

INTERVIEWER: DOROTHY PIERCE

Nov. 14, 1968

P: Mrs. Anderson, why have not more women gone into foreign relations or foreign affairs, and why weren't there any sooner than your appointment in 1949?

A: I suppose one of the reasons why there haven't been more women diplomats is because of a woman's family responsibilities. This is true of almost any field that have been fields that have been primarily men's fields. That it's--that there are not very many women whose husbands are, you know, willing or able to either pursue their work in another country, or able to. My husband having been independent, so far as his livelihood was concerned, and his main interest was in art and photography which he was able to pursue abroad in one place almost as well as another. But I remember the time when I was first asked whether I would be interested in a diplomatic appointment, it was mentioned to me by one of President Truman's advisors that there weren't very many women that could be considered for this post because they would either have to be widows, or single women, or women whose husbands would be able to go with them. And not very many women fall into that category. So I'm sure that this has quite a bit to do with it. And, then, I think the other fact is that women have not been very much involved in this field in this country. They are beginning to be more interested and more involved but the number of career women has increased. But it's still--I think the number of career women has increased. But it's still--I think the number of career women at officer level in the State Department, for example, is only

about two percent of the total. So it's just rather a minority of women that are really interested, and it may be that this is partly because of conflicts in their personal or family life. I'm not quite sure. I haven't made a real study of this. I know that in my own case that I feel that if I hadn't had an unusual husband--very unusual--I couldn't have done this. I think that a woman's husband must be a very exceptional man for a married woman to pursue a career of this kind.

P: Is there any deterrent to a woman holding this position, particularly abroad--with the sort of stereotyped idea--this is of course, improving--with the idea that the woman's place is in the home and [that] this is sort of a masculine arena.

A: I suppose in some countries that this would be true. In some parts of the world might be true, for instance, in Arab countries or Moslem countries. [It] might be true in some particular places where women have not played much of a role in public. But I do believe that in most developed countries and in the developing ones, too--today; for instance, look at India where there is a woman Prime Minister--and in quite a number of countries I have been told that women are--. In the newly developing countries women are playing very active roles. So I don't feel that this is today a problem provided that you match the woman and her particular approach and abilities and talents with the country. I do think that there are some advantages to being a woman diplomat, at least a woman ambassador. It's a more complicated--it's a complicated life for a woman, especially a woman with a family. But I think that the advantages are that, in the first place, because it still is unusual that people are more interested in you. And I think that in this day

and age when we have to communicate with the whole population, an ambassador today, in my opinion, an ambassador of the United States shouldn't just confine himself or herself to the ruling few or to the top level. You really have to try to carry out a sort of people-to-people diplomacy yourself, and I think that a woman has a particular advantage in this, because, as I said, it is a little unusual still. And, also, I think that maybe women tend to have a little more warmth and more directness.

Possibly it's easier for women to be friendly in some situations where that's required, and I just think that-- Well, for instance, just the mere fact of imagery.

P: And according a certain respect to women in general.

A: Yes. Public image is important today in communications. For instance, when I went to Denmark, I think that the photographers, the press photographers, were far more interested in me than they would have been had I been a man. And I was--really, it was an enormous asset to have all these pictures constantly in the Danish press, not just about me personally but about the American ambassador, and this was very helpful.

I might say as an aside, I noticed that the Viet Cong sent a woman to head their delegation in Paris. I'm sure they did this because they knew she would get attention, and I think that--of course, obviously this isn't the only thing that an ambassador has to do. A woman has to be good at the hard side of negotiating and at the really serious business of representing your government with government officials. This isn't all people-to-people and it isn't all public relations, but this is an important part of it today. And I think women have an advantage in this.

I think also that women are playing an important--more important--role in most countries today, and I think that to neglect them--you know, to forget them--is a mistake. I just think that this is helpful. I also do feel that perhaps--. I don't think that women have any more love of peace than men. I think we all want peace, but I think that here again the public image may be that women are devoted to peace and it's harder to think of a woman warmonger--for people to get that picture of a woman.

P: What is your view of political appointments to major posts versus career foreign service officers in the same capacity? You've indicated to me in other areas that you felt that this had a certain advantage. Can you give me what you think are your assessments of this?

A: I think, here again, it really depends on the individual. I'm not sure if I fully understand your question. You mean, do I think that--

P: Well, appointments of people who have not served in a capacity of foreign service prior to their assignment versus a person coming up through the ranks and being a career foreign service officer.

A: I think it depends so much on the individual, and on the post, and on the time, the place. I think there are places where a non-career ambassador can be more effective than a career, and I'm sure there are some career ambassadors in other places and times that are more effective than a non-career would be. I really think it depends to a large extent on the individual, but I would say this, that I think our government is wise to continue to have, at least a goodly proportion of, its missions chiefs--ambassadors--from the non-career ranks. At the present time I think about sixty percent are career. I personally think that's

a pretty good proportion because I do feel that there are qualities of independence, and freshness, and involvement in the life of our country that a non-career representative can bring to his mission.

One thing we don't understand very well in this country, but in most European countries and also Communist countries, political ambassadors are regarded more highly than most career ambassadors, as a rule, because the governments consider that they are closer to the President and, therefore, more powerful and more important.

P: Would you attribute this as part of the reason for this type of appointment at what I would consider very desirable and attractive posts abroad, such as France or England--our appointments there. They tend to not be careerists.

A: This is perhaps not--no, that's not the case, excuse me, but most of our ambassadors to London and Paris are not from the career service because they are--those posts for one thing--

P: That's what I meant.

A: They are so expensive that a career person cannot afford to be assigned to those posts.

P: That's what I meant. Do you think this has a bearing on them. The effect that these would be considered on the scale as being very important posts and that they seem to be not careerists appointed to them?

A: I think that's part of it, but I think it's also partly the economic aspect. It's also traditional. These posts traditionally have been held by politically appointed ambassadors.

P: Do you think that this is in any way sort of a discrimination against careerists who bring to their appointment a long experience in foreign relations?

- A: I'm sure the careerists feel that way, and I suppose that there is some justification to their feeling that. You know, they have prepared themselves and if they know that they can never get to the top, or never could be assigned to the very--what are considered the top posts, that this might be a certain discrimination against them or a certain handicap.
- P: Perhaps even a deterrent to staying in?
- A: I suppose it could be, but I do think that the fact that sixty percent of our ambassadors are career shouldn't have to--shouldn't really close the doors to--.
- P: And you do feel that foreign countries view our appointments as an indication of our regard for them--in the importance with which we consider their country? I should rephrase that.
- A: Yes, I know what you mean. I think that there is a tendency to evaluate our appointments in that way. Maybe it's not possible to generalize, but--
- P: You had already mentioned to me that we had not covered all your meetings with Mr. Johnson. I didn't want to overlook these because I think that they have had some important bearing on your relationship with him and a trip to Vietnam was included in this area. Could you tell me a little bit about these? I believe it was three more meetings that you had with Mr. Johnson.
- A: Yes, I would like to. Last fall, I believe it was--must have been maybe fairly early in November--I had come to the conclusion that I really could not afford to stay in New York any longer. As I mentioned earlier, this was such an expensive post and I felt that this was beyond my means. I, also, had the impression that Ambassador Goldberg might not be remaining

there very much longer, and I thought it was appropriate that I did not stay after he left. I discussed this question with him on a number of occasions, and he had felt--he was very sympathetic and understanding of my predicament, economically. And he, as a matter of fact, didn't like to see me leave the service. He thought that I should be appointed to some post abroad where I could use the United Nations experience to help sort of. He thought one of the problems at the UN was that too many of our American Ambassadors abroad don't really understand the UN, and that if there were more American Ambassadors who had had UN experience that this could be helpful in our problems with various countries at the UN.

P: This is Mr. Johnson, you are talking about?

A: Mr. Goldberg. And so he had tried to--. I think he had spoken several times to Secretary Rusk, and to the President, about the possibility of appointing me to another post which--because actually to serve abroad is-- you are in a much better financial situation than in New York. But actually I guess I should go back and say that earlier in the spring of 1967 before the Israeli-Arab war erupted, there had been quite a bit of consideration of my going to Israel as our ambassador there. And then when that war erupted, of course, it wasn't possible to make any change or even consider any change, so that sort of fell by the wayside.

But in any case, after I realized that Mr. Goldberg felt that it just wasn't possible to find a suitable place for me, I was just going to resign. And Ambassador Goldberg thought that I should go and see the President and explain to him why I was leaving. So I did seek an appointment with the President and explained to Mr. Watson why I wanted to see him, and I got the appointment for, I think, it was about the middle of

November of '67, and I came to Washington.

I happen to remember that the day I came was the day that he had given one of his first major television speeches to the nation on Vietnam. It was the one in which he, himself, I think, felt sort of liberated by it. He had the microphone around his neck and he walked around, you know, and it was--. I was just so sorry that I missed it because I was coming--. I was on the plane at the time when he was speaking, but he was feeling very elated still when I saw him because I think he had just finished and he knew that he had done well, and I think he was feeling very pleased about it.

Well, I explained to him why I felt that I should resign, and he was very understanding about it. We had a good talk, maybe twenty minutes or so, and he asked me what I wanted to do when I told him that I would be glad to take some other post that I could afford but that I didn't feel I could this one. And I can remember one thing he said that amused me. He said, "Well, if you could have your ruthers, which would you rather do?" Be in this country or be abroad?" And I said, "I would really prefer to be abroad" because I thought it would be better for me financially and also, that my husband really preferred that to being in Washington.

And during the time that I was there, there was a letter being prepared--I think he had known that my resignation was in the mill--a letter accepting my resignation, and Mr. Watson brought it in for him to sign shortly before I was to leave. He had told me that he would keep in mind my interest in some other place and possibly he would get in touch with me later.

Just as I was about ready to go, I can remember while I was--while

he was signing the letter--I said, "Mr. President, if it should be possible during this time when I'm not doing anything in particular maybe in the next few months, I would like very much to go to Vietnam." I said that I believed very much in our policy, that it was right and that I felt that it had not been well understood in this country. And I had done some speaking about it, and I expect to do more, and that I thought I could be more effective if I had been there. And he said, "Well, that's a good idea." And he seemed quite interested in this, and I think, quite surprised, and immediately called in Mr. Watson again and said, "Tell Secretary McNamara that Mrs. Anderson should go to Vietnam. See what arrangements can be made about this." So I was pleased and thought probably after a couple of months I might hear from him or something about it.

When I got back to New York that night-- I stayed in Washington part of the afternoon; didn't get back to my apartment until about eight that evening--and there was a message that had been left for me to call the White House. I wasn't able to reach Mr. Watson that night, because he had--when I called, he had left his office and so I called the next morning. And Mr. Watson said, "The President wondered if you would like to go back to Vietnam with Ambassador Bunker. He's going on Monday. Could you be ready to make it?" This was Saturday morning. And, of course, I was absolutely dumbfounded because I hadn't any idea of going so soon, and it was just a week before Thanksgiving. And my family was coming to New York to spend Thanksgiving with us and I was thinking of that.

But also, there was a special session coming up of the Trusteeship Council, because of the independence of Nauru, which was pending. And

this was going to create sort of a minor problem in the Trusteeship Council, and the United States was a little concerned about this. And this was sort of uppermost in my mind--that I had to be there next week for that meeting. So my first reaction was negative. I said, "Of course I want to go, but I don't believe I can go right this week. I don't really think I could go this week. I hope that it can be arranged a little later." And he said, "Well, that's all right. I just knew you wanted to go and thought this might be a good time."

And so then almost as soon as I hung up the receiver, I began to feel that I had made a mistake and began to think about the Trust Territory meeting--the Trusteeship Council Meeting--that this wasn't really all that important and that somebody else could take my place. And that this might never happen again. And I also must admit that this was one of those times when I had a womanly conflict. I thought, oh dear, I won't get to be with my family for Thanksgiving. But I, once again, thought, well, this is something that maybe I just won't have this opportunity again. So I called back to Mr. Watson in a few hours. I thought it over a little bit. But I called him back and told him that I had thought it over and decided that someone else could take my place at the Trusteeship Council and I would really like very much to go and I thought I could be ready by Monday.

I didn't quite know how, but I knew the first thing I had to do was to get on the plane and go home and get my summer clothes and get my inoculations and everything because I thought it would be easier to get them from my own doctor in Minnesota rather than New York. So Mr. Watson said, "Well, fine, we're not quite sure whether you will be going on

Monday or maybe not until Tuesday," which I thought was a little bit better. But in any case I did go home right away that day, that evening.

My husband was, I think, both a little worried about me and, also, a little envious. I think he would have liked to go with me, and I would have liked to have him, but I didn't feel that I could exactly ask if I could take him because I didn't know anything about the plans.

And in any case I was very glad to hear from Mr. Watson on either Sunday or Monday, perhaps Monday morning, that Ambassador Bunker had decided not to leave until the day after Thanksgiving. So this meant that I had a little more time and also meant that I could be with my family for Thanksgiving. Even so, it was quite a rush to get ready for such a trip, in that sort of time.

P: Did you know then how long it would be?

A: I knew that it would be about a week or ten days, which was what it was--about ten days. I didn't know at first, I knew that there would be some other--well, the first day I didn't know who else would be invited to go. Then I learned on Monday that the President had asked two or three other women, also, to go on the trip. I knew one of them--Anna Lord Strauss, the former president of the League of Women Voters, formerly a delegate to the United Nations. Mrs. Norman Chandler, the wife of the publisher of the Los Angeles Times, whom I hadn't known before. And I understood that he had asked one or two more who weren't able to go. But in any case we did go.

P: Were you given any sort of instructions on this?

A: No, none whatsoever. People asked me about this when I came back. I think rather suspiciously. Just what was the purpose of your trip? And,

you know, I think they thought that I was given some kind of instructions, or had some kind of a special assignment. And I really think that the President, in the first place, appreciated the fact that I was interested and I wanted to go. And I think he also realized that it was useful for people to go.

There was a constant stream, I learned, of people coming out there. I knew that from reading the papers, but I didn't realize quite how many until I got there. And I felt that it was so valuable that I was convinced that there should be many, more such visits even though I realized it was an enormous burden on our officials there. We were able to really do what we wanted to do and I was especially interested in the revolutionary development program. I was also interested, especially, in the refugees, and the political developments.

P: What do you mean by the revolutionary development program?

A: Well, this used to be called "the pacification program" and it primarily--. It really is revolutionary and it is a development program particularly for the people in the villages.

P: Revolutionary with a small "r", wasn't it?

A: Yes. And this program was being directed by Ambassador Komer, and I had heard a good deal about it. I might say that as soon as I knew that I was going, I talked with the Vice President, who had come back from Vietnam not too long before that. He had been there several times, and he was delighted to hear that I was going. I asked his advice on what things in particular he thought I should try and see, and do, and people I should try and see. He had been so much impressed with the revolutionary development program, as I was, too. And so when I told the people in the

State Department--.

We came down for an afternoon of briefing before we left that evening, the day after Thanksgiving. We had a chance to tell the desk officer, the man at the head of the sort of task force, Freeman Matthews, the things that we were most interested in doing, and they had prepared sort of a tentative schedule for us and we were able to make one or two suggestions and some changes. But by and large they had planned a good schedule for us.

We did leave out--. Well, for instance, they had planned to have us go and spend the night on the aircraft carrier, and I didn't have any particular desire to do that. I thought that it would be sort of a waste of time because while we were there too short a time to do everything that would have been interesting, but the primary purpose of our going there was not to inspect our forces or not to see what, you know, conditions men were living in. But we did see quite a bit, inevitably, of what our people are doing there, and we were constantly accompanied by military people.

We flew everywhere, nearly everywhere, either by helicopter or small plane. We went to all the major regions of the country--went to Hue, went to the Delta, went to the Central Highlands, went to Tay Ninh. We stayed in Saigon overnight all the time, but we would fly out during the day. And we were all very energetic and very desirous of using every minute of the time that we could. We would go out in the daytime and then at night we would come back and we usually were invited out for dinner.

Dinners were arranged for us by various people, and we had a chance to meet lots of people that way. And we had some good briefings, both at the embassy and at the military headquarters. And I felt that I

really learned so much in that short time that it was just enormously valuable.

P: What were your observations upon returning from your trip?

A: I felt very much encouraged. I felt that, in the first place, the trip confirmed my belief that we really are making great progress on the political side, and on the social and economic development side. That, in spite of the war, that this was being vigorously pursued and that military progress seemed also to be noticeable, but this was not the primary thing on which I was concentrating. But I felt that the revolutionary development programs and what we were doing in the medical field--we visited the medical school. This made an enormous impression on me. It was something to see this most modern hospital with scientific methods and all being used in this country which was at war, this finest hospital in Southeast Asia. This has been built during the last five years with American assistance but by the Vietnamese. And, oh, we saw young people, you know, a number of these projects by young Vietnamese that were so impressive.

There was so much that refuted the propaganda in this country or the claim that one often hears that the South Vietnamese are not doing anything for themselves. I felt they were doing a great deal, and I felt that they were very energetic people--that they had an enormous desire for their independence, or they wouldn't have kept fighting all this time. I had believed this before, but to see them and to talk with them, of course, it really makes a very profound impression.

And I will say that the impact of the Tet offensive was very hard for all of us--. The Tet offensive was a terrible shock, of course, to all of us, but I felt, and I agreed, that it was most of all damaging in

this country. It was a shock to the South Vietnamese, but I think that it achieved its greatest impact in this country on the thinking of the people here about the war. However--

P: You mean that it was going poorly?

A: It shook the morale of the people in this country. It made people believe that we couldn't win and that we were right back where we had started. I think that was the general reaction of people in this country. I didn't feel that way, but I did feel that this was a great shock. How could this have happened? How could this have happened when things appeared to be going so well. This was a shock. There is no doubt. I thought we would recover from it, and I think we have. But there's no doubt that it was particularly damaging to the revolutionary development program. While the Tet offensive struck at the cities, it reacted especially--with a special force in the villages and on the revolutionary development program because the forces had to be brought in from the country to protect the cities. And so then the villages were left. And it was demoralizing to the people in the villages, and I think it was a great setback for the revolutionary development program.

Well, just to go back to President Johnson. When I returned from Vietnam, I went straight back to New York and called immediately to say I would like to come and see the President to report to him about my trip, and I was pleased that I got the appointment immediately. I was asked to come and see him the next day. It was the day before Lynda Bird was getting married, incidentally, and there was a good bit of merriment about his nervousness as the father of the bride. But I'll always remember that when he came--I believe I was brought into the room first,

and he came into see me. I believe he had been having a news conference or something. He smiled happily and said, "No sooner said than done, was it?" He was, I think, just as pleased as I was that it had been arranged for me to go.

And we visited quite a while, and he seemed to be very interested in my reporting to him. I brought a map showing him the places where we had been, and he told me that this was quite clever of me to bring this map so that I could get his attention and that I could tell my story to him. He said it reminded him of one time when he went to see President Roosevelt about something when he was first in Washington. That President Roosevelt had some papers or something that he started showing him and telling him about something, and he said "He talked the whole time and I was out of there before I ever had a chance to tell him what I came for." And he said, "So you've come well prepared." And then after we had visited and he asked me a number of questions--

P: What did he ask you about?

A: Well, he asked me about what impressed me the most. And he asked me about the arrangements that had been made--how everything worked out. And I told him that the thing that really impressed me above all was the performance of the Americans, of all kinds of Americans, civilian, military, high ranking, medium, low, everybody. I was so impressed. I had never been so proud of my fellow citizens--have never felt that I met so many people who were really so involved and so committed and believed so much in what they were doing. And I really felt a great pride in them.

And I, also, felt that there was such a great gap between the impression that people here have of the war and what it was really like.

And that I felt that the military side of it had been obsessing people here and that they just didn't know enough about the other side of the war, what was going on. And he seemed to be quite interested in all this. And then after we had talked for maybe twenty minutes or, perhaps a little longer, he asked me if I would be willing to see the press, and he called them in to his office and introduced me to them. Then he walked over to his desk and stood looking out the window and when I finished after they had gone, why he came and patted me on the shoulder and said, "Well, I see you can take care of yourself all right."

P: Were these unprepared remarks you made to the press?

A: Yes. But I had thought about it. I thought about what I wanted to say. I said to them many of the same things I had said to the President. I had written a little memo to the President the day before. His secretary asked me if I would send it down, and I did. They asked-- I told him that I would be very happy to do any speaking that came up. I wanted to be helpful any way I could. I thought it was important. And then he said, "Well, do all that you can. I think that it will be helpful." And I did make a number of speeches.

Unfortunately, then, after the Tet offensive nobody wanted to hear about Vietnam, which was a great tragedy. But I did quite a bit of speaking. I was told by one of my friends later that they felt that my trip and that of the other women should have been exploited more by the, I presume, by the White House, that actually maybe it was because I returned at the time of the wedding or something that there wasn't very much press about it. I forget who it was that told me. He said that if this had been really done properly that there could have been a good deal

more impact from it. I had my two press conferences in New York, but didn't amount to very much there either. And I felt they really felt I had a lot to say that I didn't ever--. I felt a little sorry that I wasn't able to communicate more, but--.

P: I believe you had one more meeting with the President.

A: Yes, I did. I should say that last spring, maybe perhaps in March, after I had returned to my home in Minnesota, the question arose about my coming back to Washington instead of going abroad. The Vice President had told me that after I had seen the President those two times last winter that he had concluded that I should not leave the government, and he wanted me to be in this country, however, until after the election. He thought it would be helpful to have me here.

He actually asked me if I would be willing to serve as the vice chairman of the Democratic National Committee, and I said that I didn't feel that I could do that. I thought that should be someone who had been more involved recently in politics, that I had been out of it a little too long and I just didn't feel that I was the best person to do it. And he asked me again--. I think I came again in the spring to see him, and I can't remember the exact date--but I again felt that this was something that I couldn't do and shouldn't do. I felt someone else could do it better. He was understanding about it and said, "Well, I'll have to find some other way to keep you here." And soon after that then the Secretary of State called me and asked me to come and see him. And I went in to see him, and he asked me if I would come here in Washington and be a special assistant to him. And then when I did come, I didn't see the President, for some time.

But this fall, after I had resigned, to devote myself wholly to the campaign, I did, I think, about the middle of October, I felt quite concerned because I felt that President Johnson could be so helpful to the Vice President's election. And I didn't know what the reasons were, but I felt that he was not enough involved, and I felt that the many people in public had the impression that he didn't even want to see the Vice President elected. I knew that this was not true, but I think that people, some people, didn't believe it. I mean, some people didn't believe that he really wanted him to be elected.

And I felt that he had a very important role to play and that no one else could do it except himself. And there were others who shared my view in the policy and strategy board that I was working on with Secretary Freeman, and they all agreed I think there was only one exception--most of them agreed wholeheartedly that we needed the President very much, and it was suggested that it would be helpful if I would go to see him and talk to him about this. And Secretary Freeman planned to do it also and then we did do so. I did see the President, and he was very receptive, and I might say very expansive. And I had more time with him that day than any time that I've had on any of these meetings, and he was very generous with his time in the other meetings. This time I was there more than an hour, and he talked to me at great length.

I had planned simply to come and ask him to help and explain why I thought his help was needed, but first I thought it would be a good idea to ask him for his advice in the campaign because, after all, this is the most experienced man in the country and I really respect his political judgment so much. So he was, I think, very glad to give me his views, and

so he did talk for, as I said, for, oh, it was over an hour.

P: Could you just briefly tell me what his views were on Mr. Humphrey's campaign?

A: Yes, he--. In the first place, he was, I think, anxious for me to understand that he did want to see the Vice President elected. I think he had been probably hearing from other people. He maybe thought that I thought this. I didn't say this at all; I knew that he wanted the Vice President elected, but I think that he was anxious for me to understand that he had been doing a good bit, and that he had played a very active role in his securing the nomination. And also that he had been helping in other ways that were not apparent. And he also explained to me in some detail about the matter of six hundred thousand dollars that had been raised by the National Committee which--

P: Supposedly had disappeared.

A: Couldn't be used, you see, because of legal complications. I hadn't ever heard of this six hundred thousand dollars. When he first started to talk to me about it, I was a little puzzled. This stupid article that occurred in some Rowland Evans' column, I believe, a few days later. He obviously knew what they were going to write and he had undoubtedly heard this kind of accusation which was utterly unfounded and untrue. But, in any case, I think this must have bothered him a good bit because he went into some detail explaining to me all about this money and why it couldn't be used and which lawyers had found that it was impossible for this money to be used for political purposes.

But then after getting past those things, then he did get down to specifics about what advice he would give to the Vice President, and I

thought that the first thing that he said was so understanding. I think he is a man of really great compassion and great understanding, and he said, "Well, first of all, when you see the Vice President, don't tell what he's doing that's wrong. Don't tell him about his mistakes if he's making mistakes. He needs support and he needs understanding. And he needs to be told and encouraged to be told that he is doing a fine job. You tell him those things and don't pick at him and snipe at him and tell him 'why didn't you do that?' and this and thus. He's out there on the firing line, and he needs his friends to support him. That's the first thing that you ought to remember." I knew that he wasn't just speaking to me as an individual because I had made it clear that I was not there just as an individual but I was also there as a representative of his group.

P: Did you have to clear this with Mr. Humphrey that you wanted to see the President?

A: Of course not.

P: I don't want to sidetrack you, but was Mr. Humphrey surprised?

A: No, but he was very pleased. He was very grateful. And I knew that Mr. Humphrey was himself wanted to see the President and expecting to see him a day or so after I did, but I wasn't quite sure whether Mr. Humphrey had yet asked the President to be more active in his campaign. I knew that he had decided that he wanted to ask him, but I didn't know whether he had actually asked him. But in any case this was the first very definite thing that he stressed.

And then he said the second thing is he's simply got to get on that tube. This is the most important single thing for his winning this election.

He said, "The old days of whistlestop and this rushing all over the country--this isn't necessary anymore and it doesn't even work anymore." And then he reminisced with me about when Harry Truman came to Texas in 1948. How he was one of the only, I think the only Texas politician that dared to get on the train with him when he entered Texas. And how Harry Truman was so lonely. He was sitting there in the car. He said he got up early. They were going to make a stop at some little town. He named the town, I don't remember the name of it, and said that he wandered into the next car, and there was the President sitting all alone. And he said--. He described him to me about how they whistlestopped across Texas and that every place they went there were these enormous crowds. And everybody had said that he didn't have a chance, and, of course, I think he was telling me this partly because he thought that there really was a real parallel with that time and this time, that if Humphrey would just get his message across that the people would really listen and would respond. But he said, "You can't do it that way this time." And he said, "You've just simply got to--he's got to get on television more."

And he said, "Now, his speech on Vietnam"--this was just a few days after that--"I didn't particularly like that speech myself, but it was a good speech, and I think it did him a lot of good. And he's got to do that again and again. You've just simply got to raise the money and if you can't raise it, you've got to borrow it. Then you can pay it back afterwards. I did that. I eventually got--. We eventually got the money paid back."

And he said that he thought that this was the other most important thing that he should do was he should also be a little more judicious in

his appearances on television and that this was a different kind of a medium--that is was difficult. He showed that he has a real understanding of the difficulties of the media, but he said that he thought this could be done.

I think that he talked also about the importance of getting the record of the Democratic Party across, of his concentrating on that, and of his remembering where the big majority of the American people are. That they are in the middle and they are not off on the sides where the McCarthy people are.

He said, "You should stop worrying about the McCarthy fringe. All they are going to do is cut up you. That's all they are going to do. There's not any real body of support there. And he should just forget about those people." I might say that I agreed with everything that he said. I had felt this for some time about that there were some people on the Vice President's staff that were far too much worried about the McCarthy support. Those were the main things that I recall. I'm sure there are a number of other things.

P: Did the President indicate to you--did he indicate to you why he had not spoken out?

A: Oh, yes, he said--I'm glad you asked that--because he said, "I will be glad to speak if the Vice President thinks it will be helpful." And he said, "I haven't wanted to do it until he thought that it would be helpful. I haven't wanted to be a load around his neck; but if he thinks it will be helpful, I'll be glad to go wherever he wants me to go and wherever I can help because I do want to help."

This was another thing he said. He said, "There are just three

people that can really help him in Texas. Maybe I can help some, but he can help himself, Lady Bird can help him, and then Muriel can help him." Oh, and then he said, "Congressman Jim Wright." And he praised Congressman Jim Wright very lavishly. He spoke about how much he could do for the Vice President. And he allowed modestly when I said I was sure that he could help him a great deal, that perhaps he could help some, and that he had and he would help more. He thought Governor Connally could be of some help to him. But I was very glad that he was so definite about saying that he would do everything he could and he certainly did.

P: Do you think that one of the reasons that he hadn't come out as publicly prior to that was because he felt he had not been asked?

A: I don't know; I'm not sure. I think he has a brilliant sense of timing, and I think he may have felt that--. I'm sure that the Vice President had asked him and they had discussed this before. I'm almost sure of it. I wasn't told that they had, but I just feel that they must have, and I felt that they probably felt that there would be a--that it might be better to wait for a while. Right after the nomination it wouldn't have been timely. He didn't indicate that he had not been asked. He just said, "If he wants me to, I'll do it."

P: And how did this meeting conclude?

A: Well, he was still talking as I was going out and I remember that I think it was Jim Jones that was still there, came in once to tell him that somebody had been waiting for almost an hour. It turned out that it was Secretary Freeman. The President said, "Well, I'm sorry, I didn't know that he was there." Well, in any case he really seemed to enjoy the conversation and I certainly did, too. And he was very encouraging to me.

I can't remember the exact conversation that we were having on the way out, but it was something that was rather amusing to him. I remember that he was chuckling a little and we ended in a good humor.

P: I'd just like to ask you one sort of concluding, and very broad, statement. Under the light of having served under really four Presidents almost--

A: Three.

P: Didn't Eisenhower come in there in one part of it?

A: No, you see, my resignation took place the day that he was inaugurated. So I served under three Democratic Presidents, which is unusual.

P: Yes. In the light of that, I would like to ask you a very broad question, both how you think Mr. Johnson compares with and how do you think he will stand up under history's judgment in his foreign policy, and his foreign relations.

A: I think that President Johnson will go down in history as one of our great Presidents. I think he's been a strong President, and I think that in times such as these that the United States must have a strong President who understands the need for strong leadership.

I think it was his tragedy to inherit this Vietnam War, which became a very unpopular war in large part, I believe, because of the medium of television, for the first time in history, brought the war into our homes every day. And I think that--I'm not sure if there was anything that could have overcome this handicap to get people to understand why we were in Vietnam and why we really could not afford to just lose everything that we had been fighting for there. I think that a great deal has been accomplished, by this war, in large part because President Johnson understood the larger goals and the long-term interests of the

United States. I think it will probably be some time before this is recognized.

I think it's also true that on the domestic side he has accomplished more really progressive social legislation in the fields of human rights, civil rights, and education and social welfare than any President that we have had for a long, long time. Perhaps it's been even more of a revolution than in President Roosevelt's time. But I think this, also, is not fully appreciated as yet, but I think that in the future it will be.

P: Have you seen contrasts with the three Presidents that you have served under? Differences?

A: Yes, enormous contrasts, I should say so. Each one was a different man, a different style, different ways of approaching problems and solving problems. I suppose this is another chapter.

P: Can you consider that one of them was more effective in his foreign relations?

A: I think that President Truman was a great builder, a great architect of our policies of collective security and development. I think that President Kennedy was able in a--to project an image of this country and of his own leadership that was enormously inspiring to people around the world. I think this was his greatest achievement--that and facing down Khrushchev in the Cuban missile crisis. I think that those were his major achievements, and that so far as international relations are concerned, I think that President Johnson's greatest achievements internationally will probably come to be recognized as his having held with the view that we are a global power and we do have interests in Asia and that you can't have peace in the world unless you have stability and peace in Asia--as well as

in Europe. I think that this was a--or will come to be recognized as a major achievement of the Johnson Administration.

P: Mrs. Anderson, do you have any further comments on any of the areas that we have covered?

A: At the moment, I think not. Thank you.

P: Thank you very much.