

# Eugenie Anderson, 87, First Female U.S. Ambassador, Dies

By DAVID BINDER

WASHINGTON, April 2 — Eugenie M. Anderson, who in 1949 became the first woman appointed a United States Ambassador, died on Monday at her home in Red Wing, Minn. She was 87.

Mrs. Anderson had been active in the Democratic Party on the state and national levels when she was appointed Ambassador to Denmark by President Truman.

Her interest in international affairs had been stirred by a trip to Europe in 1937, where in Germany she first saw a "totalitarian state in action," as she recalled.


On her return she spoke frequently on foreign affairs on behalf of the League of Women Voters at a time when much of the Middle West was strongly committed to isolationist policies.

She joined the Democratic Party in part to oppose Republican isolationists in her election district and worked with Hubert H. Humphrey in the successful effort to eliminate a Communist faction within the Minnesota party. That effort culminated in the Democratic-Farmer Labor Party fusion in 1944.

She took part in the establishment of Americans for Democratic Action, formed by the party's anti-Communist liberal wing in 1947. She was a delegate to the Democratic National Convention in 1948, a National Committeewoman, and a campaigner for the re-election of President Truman.

"She was a prime force in moving along a good Democratic Party," said Orville Freeman, the former Minnesota Governor.

After her service in Denmark, President Kennedy appointed her in 1962 to head the American legation in Bulgaria, which was then a Commu-



The New York Times

Eugenie M. Anderson, described in a New York Times caption as a "housewife of Red Wing, Minn.," was sworn in by Raymond Muir as Ambassador to Denmark in 1949; Secretary of State Dean Acheson stood by.

nist ally of the Soviet Union.

The Government of Prime Minister Todor Zhivkov repeatedly made life uncomfortable for her mission, to the point of organizing a rock-throwing demonstration against the legation.

When the Bulgarian police tried to prevent her aides from passing out literature at the American display in the annual Plovdiv fair, Mrs. Anderson grabbed a handful of leaflets and distributed them herself.

She retired from the post as Ambassador in 1964.

President Johnson appointed Mrs. Anderson to represent the United States on the United Nations Trusteeship Council and a year later she served on the United Nations Committee for Decolonization.

Helen Eugenie Moore was born on May 26, 1909, in Adair, Iowa, one of five children of Rev. Ezekiel A. Moore, a Methodist minister, and his wife, Flora Belle.

She concentrated in music as a student, and attended the Juilliard School in New York; her original hope was to become a concert pianist.

She is survived by her husband of 67 years, John Pierce Anderson, an artist; a son, Dr. Hans P. Anderson of LaCrosse, Wis.; a daughter, Johanna A. Ghel of Madison, Wis.; six grandchildren and eight great-grandchildren.

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
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Gift of Personal Statement

By Eugenie Anderson

to the

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In accordance with Sec. 507 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended (44 U.S.C. 397) and regulations issued thereunder (41 CFR 101-10), I, Eugenie Anderson, hereinafter referred to as the donor, hereby give, donate, and convey to the United States of America for eventual deposit in the proposed Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, and for administration therein by the authorities thereof, a tape and transcript of a personal statement approved by me and prepared for the purpose of deposit in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library. The gift of this material is made subject to the following terms and conditions:

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Deceased 3/31/97

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Signed Eugene Anderson

Date 29 March 1971

Accepted Harry J. Middleton - for  
Archivist of the United States

Date March 13, 1975-

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LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY  
ORAL HISTORY COLLECTION

Narrator Eugenie Moore Anderson Address Tower View  
Red Wing, Minn. 55066

Biographical information: Former government official  
b. Adair, La., May 26, 1909; student Stephens Coll., 1926-27, Simpson Coll.,  
1927-28; Carleton Coll., 1929-30, Juliard Inst. Musical Art, 1930-32. Married  
John P. Anderson, Sept. 9, 1930. Am. ambassador to Denmark, 1949-53, Am. ministe  
to Bulgaria, 1962-65; U.S. rep. on UN Trusteeship Council 1965-68; asst. to  
sec. of state, Washington, 1968--, U.S. rep to Third session UN ad hoc commn. on  
prisoners of war, 1952; mem. Dem. Nat. Com. for Minn., 1948-49; del-at-large for  
Minn. Dem. Nat. Conv., 1948, 60, 68; Dem. Nat. Adv. Com. on Foreign Policy,  
1957-61.

Interviewer Dorothy Pierce

Position or relationship to narrator UT Oral History Project

Accession Record Number Ac 74-161

General topic of interview:

Anderson role and duties in the various assignments during her career in  
the government.

Date	Place	Length
<u>11/13/68</u>	<u></u>	<u>Tape I 37 pages</u>
<u>11/13-14/68</u>	<u></u>	<u>Tape II 39 pages</u>
<u>11/14/68</u>	<u></u>	<u>Tape III 27 pages</u>
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INTERVIEWEE: MRS. EUGENIE MOORE ANDERSON

INTERVIEWER: DOROTHY PIERCE

November 13, 1968

P: Mrs. Anderson, in August 1965, you were named the United States Representative on the United Nations Trusteeship Council with the rank of Ambassador. Do you currently hold this position?

A: No, I resigned from this position and, also, as special assistant to the Secretary of State, an office which I had held since April 1968. I resigned in September. My resignation actually took effect, I believe, October 4.

P: Why did you resign?

A: I resigned because I wished to devote myself completely to working in the campaign as a volunteer for Vice President Humphrey.

P: I believe you were also an alternate U.S. delegate to the 20th and 21st session of the UN General Assembly.

A: Yes.

P: In this capacity, did you attend any of the general sessions?

A: Oh, yes, I attended all of them. For most of them I served as a member of the US delegation to the United Nations and in that capacity I was the US representative on the Fourth Committee which deals with colonial question, African questions and trusteeship problems. I also served on the Commission for Southwest Africa, a special commission.

P: This was as an alternate, or is this as a member--the representative of the trusteeship council?

A: Both really. My work, specifically on the Trusteeship Council, only

involved one month each year. The Trusteeship Council only meets during late May and June of each year, but it's customary that the US representative on the Trusteeship Council represent the United States on these committees-standing committees-of the General Assembly which deal with related questions to trusteeship.

P: Then, as a member of the US delegation, your area would be a specialty as opposed to saying abreast of day-to-day meetings that occur when the General Assembly is in session?

A: Well, yes and no. Ambassador Goldberg was very anxious for all members of the US delegation, especially the leading members, to keep abreast of all the issues that were under consideration because we worked as a group and we made decisions as a delegation. So, while I did specialize in these questions of colonial issues, African issues, and trusteeship, nevertheless, I was involved in the other issues, particularly at the time of the Middle East crisis [and] the Southwest Africa issue--particularly those two.

But we had to be prepared to deal with everything, to represent the United States on various questions. I served briefly on the Security Council. This was, I think, in the summer of '66 when Ambassador Goldberg was away. Then, occasionally he would ask various members of the delegation to participate in the Security Council deliberations.

P: To continue with your background. First, before we go into these other areas a little more deeply, from 1962 to 1965 you were the American Minister to Bulgaria, and from 1949 to 1953 the American Ambassador to Denmark. At this time--at the time of your appointment--you were the first woman to hold the rank of US Ambassador, is that correct?

A: That is correct. I also happened to have been the youngest ambassador at that time, which was a surprise to me when I learned it. I was just forty years old. Today I think we have other ambassadors about that age, but at that time I was then the youngest.

P: When did you first meet Lyndon Johnson? And what were the circumstances?

A: I recall meeting Lyndon Johnson one time when I was visiting then-Senator Humphrey in the United States Senate, and Lyndon Johnson was at that time a Senator and the Leader of the Democratic Majority. I believe it was in the majority at that time. Yes, it was. This was only a very brief meeting in the corridor. Senator Humphrey and I had had lunch, and we were on our way to some meeting when Senator Johnson came by. I remember the meeting because he impressed me. He was obviously a very commanding personality. I remember the surprise that I felt that he also had so much charm which I hadn't read about or hadn't realized.

P: You are a very close friend with the Vice President, Mr. Humphrey.

A: Yes, I've known him since 1944, and I have worked closely with him for a good many years, and I suppose it was really his inspiration and leadership which kept me in politics in Minnesota. I did decide to go in before I knew Mr. Humphrey. He was, at that time, a professor at Macalester College when I first met him. In fact, I'm sure it was his leadership and friendship which made me remain active.

P: What later meetings have you had with Lyndon Johnson?

A: As I recall, my next meeting with him was after he became President. This was in December of 1963, soon after he had assumed office following the death of President Kennedy. I had been home for a few weeks on consultations, I believe, from Sofia. I was anxious to see President Johnson

before I returned to Sofia because I knew that the Bulgarians--it would mean quite a bit to my work there that I had seen the President and talked about the situation in Bulgaria with him. I think this was December of '63. I recall that it was very difficult to get an appointment because he was so busy, and he was signing a treaty with Mexico that day. Some treaty about some border question, I believe. And there were a number of other ambassadors that were also waiting to see him, and we waited and waited and finally we were taken to, I think, the old Indian Treaty Room. It is called the Indian Treaty Room in the White House, isn't it? And we witnessed the signing of the treaty and then he gave each one of us a pen which he had used to make one or two letters.

Then, I actually only had a very few minutes of conversation with him and had my picture taken with him. Frankly, I was rather disappointed that I didn't get to speak with him longer, but, of course, I understood that he was very busy and very burdened, and I remember that I felt very sympathetic with the enormous burdens that had so suddenly fallen on him. I told him this and also how confident I was in the way that he had assumed the leadership and had really taken command so quickly. I had been very much impressed by this, as I thought the people in Bulgaria had, too, and he was I think pleased to hear this. That was about the extent of our conversation at that time.

P: How well do you feel that you know Mr. Johnson?

A: Now?

P: Yes.

A: I don't feel as if I know him extremely well. You know, I've only seen him on a few occasions. I don't think that he would think of me as one

of his close friends or anything like that. In fact, I think only until a year ago did he--I think he barely knew I existed.

P: What happened a year ago?

A: He probably knew that I was a friend of Vice President Humphrey's because the Vice President frankly had really hoped that when I returned from Bulgaria in early-1965, that I could go on to another diplomatic post abroad. He had talked with the President about this a number of times in connection with my going to Canada--and I think the President was at that time quite sympathetic to the idea. I should go back and say that I served as the co-chairman of the Inaugural Ball at the Shoreham Hotel. That was, of course, in early '65, and I believe that was the second time that I saw the President.

P: How did you happen to have this capacity?

A: Well, I had just returned home from Sofia and I suppose that the President and the Vice President wanted to have sort-of public figures as the co-chairmen of these various balls. I don't know why, but I was asked to do this, and naturally I was very pleased to do it. I saw the President that night, of course, and in fact had the honor of receiving him as he came into the hotel as he got out of his car and came and was sort-of his escort. That sounds a little bit turned around but I was sort-of in charge of him while he was there at the Shoreham Ballroom at the ball. And, of course, he danced with me the first dance that he was there. I remember that evening as a very exciting evening.

Everyone felt rather worried about his rushing around to all these balls. I think that we all felt concerned about his health; I know I did. And I felt this was too much to expect of him to go to, I think, four

different ballrooms.

I felt that he was himself quite irritated when he first arrived at the ball. I think he was irritated because things were running behind schedule. And maybe he was getting a little tired of it and had more important things on his mind, I'm sure. I remember very well his first question when we got down into the sort-of reception room behind the ballroom. He quickly looked around, and said, "Who's in charge here?"

P: Was this question directed at you?

A: No, it wasn't. I think he knew that, while I was the co-chairman, there was a man really in charge. I mean, I hadn't actually had much to do with the arrangements, and he knew that. But I believe the man who was actually in charge was a man named Hoff--Mr. Hoff, and his wife, Florence Hoff.

P: What was he inquiring for?

A: I think he wanted to get in and out as quickly as he could, and I think that he just wanted to know how this was going to be managed. A lot of people had been waiting in this room to meet him and hoped to have a drink with him and hoped to have something to eat there, but it was obvious that he didn't have time to do that. We got him as quickly as possible out of that room and into the ballroom, and he shed his irritability--at least on the surface--and he appeared to be affable and was smiling. I remember that the Secret Service men had somehow let me know that they expected me to get him through the crowd as quickly as possible and into the other ballroom. There were two ballrooms there at the Shoreham and there was a long aisle that we walked down.

Mrs. Johnson was escorted by Senator Benton, as I recall, who was the

other co-chairman. He, incidentally, was also sort-of honorary. I believe we were sort-of honorary, actually, because neither one of us had been involved in the actual arrangements. So Senator Benton was escorting Mrs. Johnson, and I was escorting the President. And I remember that the only way in which we were really able to make our way through, because there weren't ropes, there were just Marine guards or some sort of uniformed people standing along the aisle keeping the people back. But the people wanted to press forward and we had to move very swiftly to get through and into the other ballroom and back again.

As I recall then we danced. I was rather disappointed that we didn't get to complete one dance because he was a very good dancer, but someone cut in which I was surprised. I didn't think anyone would dare to do that with the President. I can't remember now who it was. But, in any case, I think I then danced with the Vice President, who was there also. And it couldn't have been the Vice President who cut in, no, I'm sure it wasn't. I just don't remember who it was, but, in any case, it was rather amusing to think about it. So he stayed for maybe --I believe he danced with Mrs. Johnson, and danced with perhaps one or two other ladies, but he did not stay very long, and we escorted him back to his car.

Oh, I do recall when I was first escorting him from the car to the-- into the hotel that he seemed at that time to know that I had been serving in Bulgaria and told me that he knew what a fine job I had been doing for our country and that he appreciated it. I was surprised that he thought of that.

Then the next time that I saw him--well, perhaps I should say that I mentioned having been under consideration for an appointment as

ambassador to Canada, and I had understood that this was a good probability. But apparently someone in the--I don't know who it was--in the State Department, perhaps, who had other ideas, leaked this to Newsweek. And this was at the time when this was really dangerous because shortly after that time there seemed to be no possibility of my being appointed as ambassador to Canada. Frankly, I was disappointed because I had felt for a long time as if our relations with Canada were not the best, and I thought that, based on my previous experience, that I could do something to improve relations. But this didn't go through. What did happen was that the man who had been there for some time stayed on there.

Then shortly after Ambassador Goldberg was appointed to the United Nations to take Adlai Stevenson's place--I think that Ambassador Goldberg had been told that he could, more or less, select his own delegation and he asked me if I would like to be a member of his delegation. So I think, actually, that I was appointed at that time largely because of the recommendation of Ambassador Goldberg--and the Vice President, who thought it was a good idea.

I hadn't--before that--particularly thought of serving at the UN. Not that I wasn't interested in the UN but I was doubtful if I could afford to live in New York at the United Nations, because it's a very expensive post. Probably, if I had realized how expensive I couldn't have accepted the appointment because the salaries are not adequate and there is no housing provided.

This is, incidentally, one thing that I feel very critical about. Our Congress should enact legislation so that our delegation to the United Nations does not have to be chosen from people who are of means or who don't have to go into debt really in order to serve there. I know that the



State Department has submitted such legislation to Congress several times, and I believe it was largely blocked by Senator Morse--at least that was my understanding--who felt that this would open the doors somehow to Foreign Service people when they return from home assignments in Washington--that this would set a sort of precedent--that then they would feel that they should have housing allowances in Washington because Washington, also, is an expensive post as compared with posts abroad. However, I really didn't know too much about this. I was a little aware of it. I didn't realize what an expensive post it would be.

P: Do other countries make adequate provisions for their delegations living in New York City?

A: Oh, yes, yes, they do, because New York City is known as probably--next to Paris, or perhaps even more than Paris as the most expensive post in the world. And, of course, the chief of mission--the chief of our delegation--has a residence, an official residence, which helps a great deal, but other members of the delegation do not. Housing is very expensive in New York and one must have representational housing.

So to go on with the [interview] I presume you want to know when I next saw the President.

P: Yes.

A: Late in '65, I believe it was in late November or early December, I visited the Trust Territory in the western Pacific. I was asked to accompany a Congressional delegation. The chairman of the Congressional subcommittee which deals with the Trust Territory is Congressman Wayne Aspinall of Colorado. It was at his invitation that I was invited to accompany this Congressional committee on about a three-week tour of the

Trust Territory. I was very glad that I could accept this invitation even though it meant leaving the session of the United Nations General Assembly a few weeks early; but I felt--and Ambassador Goldberg felt--that it would be useful to my serving as the US representative on the Trusteeship Council if I could actually visit the Territory, which I did. I accepted the invitation, and my husband was able to accompany me, which I was pleased that he could. There were two other women on the delegation, Mrs. Ruth Van Cleve, the Director of the Office of Territories in the Department of Interior, and a woman Congressman from Illinois-- her name escapes me at the moment. There were, perhaps, about ten or eleven of us in all--other members of Congress, one or two staff members, from the committee, Mr. John Taylor, the late Mr. John Taylor, who had been the counsel to this committee for many years and was very instrumental organizing the tour. In fact, I suspect that it was his suggestion that I be invited because he was really interested in the Territory and knew that it would be helpful to the Territory and to US interests to have me informed about it.

P: What did you observe on this tour?

A: I observed so much that shocked me deeply.

P: Would you comment on it?

A: I wrote what was described as a hard-hitting report for the President when I returned. I hadn't seen the report which had been written by an Assistant Secretary of State or was he a Deputy Assistant--I believe Mr. Anthony Solomon early in the Kennedy Administration. Mr. Solomon is an economist; he had concentrated particularly on the economic affairs of the Territory. I am not an economist, but I was interested in discovering

later, after I had written my report and had been battling to get somebody to pay attention to it, that our conclusions were quite similar although I had a number of specific recommendations, immediate recommendations, to make that were somewhat different from his. My report, I presume, is still classified. It was classified as a secret report. I don't even have a copy of it myself. I presume that one could obtain it.

P: Can you briefly give me your conclusions?

A: Well, I would prefer not to because actually now this has been three years ago. I'll tell you some of my observations, but if you really want this for this record I would prefer that you get ahold of the report.

P: The official report.

A: Yes, the official document and include that with the record because I think that that would be the proper way to do it--to have it accurate. I would like to say, however, that, as soon as I returned to Washington or returned to New York, after the Christmas holidays--I arrived back home from the Territory just before the end of the General Assembly session in December. I must have arrived there about the eighteenth of December, or something like that, and the sessions probably wound up the nineteenth or twentieth. So I was just there for the wind-up of the session, and then I went home for the Christmas holidays.

I actually wrote the report during the holidays at home, and when I came back to New York I tried to make an appointment to see the President to present this report to him. I felt that it was very important that he should see it because I believed then, as I believe now, that the Trust Territory is enormously important to the security of the United States and to our future position in the Pacific. I did not feel that this was

adequately recognized by our officials, particularly by Congress, but I felt that the President himself probably wasn't aware of the importance--the strategic importance--of the Trust Territory.

P: What year was this?

A: This was January 1966 when I presented my report. It was late 1965 when I took--

P: took the visit?

A: Yes. I might say that, of course, by that time--the time I was in the Territory--the Vietnam War had heated up, and I think that I would have liked to go on to Vietnam. I wanted to at that time, but this would have meant probably another week or so of travel and, also, I was aware that there were so many people going to Vietnam I hesitated whether it was right for me to go at a time when I knew that military people there were very busy.

P: What does our Trust Territory include in the Western Pacific?

A: It includes the groups of islands--the Marshalls, Mariannas, and the Caroline Islands.

So I didn't go to Vietnam at that time, but I felt strongly that this territory--and the strategic importance of this territory was very much related to why we were in Vietnam, and I couldn't understand why Washington was not more concerned about this and not more aware of it because frankly I felt that the Trust Territory--If we make the right decisions now and engage in the right kind of political and economic development there for the people and with the people, then they will make the right choice about wanting to remain with the United States. But if we don't do a good many things--which we haven't done yet--then they might

well not want to cast their lot with the United States.

P: Did you see much anti-United States sentiment?

A: No, not much. In view of the circumstances, I was absolutely amazed at how much friendliness and warmth there existed for the United States and how much of a desire there was for a closer relationship with the United States. But I saw a number of disturbing factors which I think can change, are changing. The young people, for one thing, today are becoming educated. We are educating them. And they are in touch with the rest of the world now. They are no longer just living on these little remote islands-- they know what's going on other places and they want to be part of it. And some of them are quite sophisticated.

I was amazed at the political awareness that a number of the young leaders have and I feel that once you educate the people, you can't expect them to be content with their lot if their lot is as miserable in relationship to that of other US territories--to say nothing of the United States--as the Trust Territory conditions are.

I also felt that the Japanese probably have not forgotten their years in the Trust Territories. You see, Japan dominated and had the Trust Territories as one of their mandated territories between the First World War and the Second World War. They exploited the Territory, they had a great deal of industry there, and the economic conditions of the Territory were actually much better during the Japanese period than they have ever been under the United States.

It's true that we haven't tried to exploit the Territory, but so far as the daily lives of the people are concerned, they are not nearly as prosperous, nor as well off, today. Their homes were almost completely

destroyed by the war, and their homes have not been rebuilt. The housing is just shocking, and the economic stagnation is shocking. And there are so many--well, these are all conditions about which I reported.

But in any case, this situation being what it is, I feel quite certain that there will come a time when the Japanese will want to come back there. The Japanese are a nation that will return to power. They won't always want to be the way they are now and this area is one where lots of Americans died to secure this area because we thought it was in our interest, and I felt that our long-term interests were really threatened here.

So all these things I put in my report and I was very anxious to discuss with the President. I came to Washington several times, but I was not able to see him, which disappointed me very much. I could understand why he was very concerned about the war in Vietnam, and it was not possible for me to see him. I did see a member of his staff in the White House whose name escapes me at the moment. He realized the dynamite in this report of mine and the significance and the truth of it. He knew something about the Territory.

P: Could this have been Mr. Moyers?

A: No, it was not Mr. Moyers. I'm sorry, I just can't remember his name. It may come to me later. He left the White House perhaps about six months or so after I talked with him. He did bring this report to the attention of Mr. Udall. After all, the Department of Interior is the administrative agency for the Trust Territory. The Department of State is not. And it seemed to me that one of the problems here was that the Department of Interior, as well as the Congressional Committee, did

not realise the strategic significance, or the international significance. I mean, it's very involved with our international position. They thought of it just as, you know, just another US territory. That was my impression.

P: Do we have any future plans for these Western Pacific Trust Territories?

A: Yes, we have. We have lots of plans. And finally I might say--I'm afraid I'm talking too long.

P: No.

A: I finally was successful in moving things along to the point where the President, in August of '67, requested the Congress to--by joint resolution--to establish a commission for the future of the Trust Territory--a joint commission, a Presidential commission--which would be appointed by the President and which would be consisting of, I believe, four members from each house and then, I believe, five public members appointed by the President, either from the Executive or the public at large. This bill has passed the Senate. This was supposed to establish a commission which would consider the status of the Territory, the Trust Territory, and come up with recommendations after consulting with the Micronesians--you see, the Trust Territory people are mostly Micronesians--come up with recommendations as to their future status, presumably within about a year after the appointment of the commission. The President did do this. The Senate has passed this resolution, but the House committee has not yet acted on it. It did hold some hearings this last summer, but it hasn't acted.

P: Were you called to testify?

A: I was called to testify. In fact, I requested to testify, when I returned from the Territory and because quite a number of members of the committee--

the subcommittee on the Trust Territory--had been on this same trip and-- they, too, had seen for themselves how serious the conditions were and still are--so there was considerable interest in my testifying. For the testimony I prepared a briefer statement from my report, and this report, I think, was quite disconcerting to the chairman of the committee, Mr. Aspinall.

P: You submitted the report, but you did not testify?

A: Yes, I did. I was questioned. Yes.

P: And when was this?

A: This must have been about in February, I would say, of 1966.

But just to go back one step, after I was not able to see the President at that time, I did, of course, discuss this with the Vice President. And he was very impressed with the report--as I must say almost everyone who read it was impressed with it because of the seriousness of it and the obvious facts of the case which were supported by, for example, Mr. Solomon's report and others.

I might say that the military people were, and are, fully aware of the strategic significance of the Trust Territory, but I think that the military people in general were not fully sensitive to the political problems nor to the economic. However, I believe that if the military were to take a greater interest, this would help there to be action eventually taken because I think that the Congress is only likely to act to this committee if this can be related to strategic significance of the area for the United States, and this I tried to emphasize in my report both because it's true and because I also felt that this is the only way that you can get action--is for people to be aware of it.



P: In your judgment, what should the future status of these Trust Territories be?

A: I think it's very important that the Trust Territory continue as a territory of the United States. I mean, I think that it would be completely impractical and not feasible--impossible--for them to ever achieve a viability and maintain any independent status because there are no economic resources, at this time. There may be great economic resources there under the oceans and as a tourist area. This is something that if only people would see this, it's just a tremendous undeveloped resource. But in any case I think that it should be.

Of course, in the terms of our trust agreement, it has to be decided by the people of the territory in some sort of plebiscite. We have a treaty obligation with the United Nations, so they have to be the ones to decide. But I believe that if--well, I believe that they should have a much closer association with the United States, and I believe that they really want to, particularly if we act fairly soon.

Whether they should be a territory like Guam or whether they should eventually become a state like Hawaii, this is a possibility. I think at this moment it is not possible to say which or exactly what form. It may be like Puerto Rico as a first step, but in any case I am persuaded that only if some kind of close, permanent relationship is developed will there be the possibility of the United States maintaining its position in this very vital area.

Now, I should say that, at the time, I did feel very disappointed because the President wasn't able to see me. While I understood why, still I felt that if only I could see him and talk to him and if he would

just see my report that he would be able then to do something and would want to because I knew that he understood our interests in the Pacific. But I felt as if everybody in Washington at that time was beginning to be concerned only about Vietnam, and I felt that this was a great pity because I felt, well, here's another situation where if we don't act now, then sometime in the future, we may find ourselves once again in the desperate predicament. And I felt then, as I feel now, that we could lose this territory, or we could have to fight for it, God forbid, if we don't do something now when we still could do it peacefully.

P: To whom would we lose this territory?

A: Possibly Japan. I'm looking ahead a long time right now. Japan, of course, has no military capacity, but I don't believe that you can always expect that Japan will be in its present state.

P: Did you see any evidences of Communism?

A: Japanese interests?

P: Well, no, Communist propaganda appealing.

A: No, Japanese interests--I saw evidence of nostalgia for the Japanese times, especially on the islands where the Japanese had had their center, their capital, Truk. And I saw a number of evidences that the Japanese want to come back, to use this first for tourist area and fishing and things like that. You know, it's step by step, they are trying to sort-of reestablish their relationship, a relationship with Trust Territories. Did I see evidences of Communism?

P: Appealing to these more politically aware young people.

A: Well, every time, of course, that the trusteeship council meets, the Soviet Union makes a great pitch to try to tell these people--there are

always some Micronesians who attend the Trusteeship Council, and the Soviet Union always tries to indoctrinate them and propagandize them, you might say. I don't think they make much of an impact on the Micronesians who come to the Trust Territory, because they are actually very sophisticated and quite knowledgeable and they are not taken in by this. But I feel that it's only a matter of time before there will be some possible penetration either by radio, which is now possible--they already do now get radio from everywhere, they receive radio reports- and wherever you have some discontent, problems--nationalistic problems unresolved-- I think that there is a susceptibility or will be. At the present time, I didn't see what you might call evidences of it. Occasionally, we got a report at the UN that someone writes from the Trust Territory who obviously has been propagandized by the Soviet Union but I don't consider this serious. I think the greater danger to the future of the Trust Territory is not so much from the Soviet Union as it is from Japan.

P: Do you know if the President ever saw your report?

A: No, I don't know if he did. I did discuss it with the Assistant Secretary of State, of course, Mr. Sisco, who tried to be helpful. I did not get to discuss it with the Secretary of State. Several times a meeting had been arranged, a high-level meeting. I can't tell you how many times I arranged for meetings between the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Interior, someone from the White House, someone from Defense I think even the Secretary of Defense and every time we had a meeting set up, the date, the hour, everything, some crisis--usually related to Vietnam--came up. People were called to the White House, the meeting fell through, and we never succeeded in getting this meeting. I really felt that there was just fate seemed to be against the Trust Territory and against my efforts.

The President--finally--I think he must have kept getting messages somehow that I wanted to see him and that I wanted to discuss this. He finally asked the Vice President to sort-of assume responsibility for this, and for me to report to him, which I was glad to do, and I did keep him informed; but, of course, the Vice President was in the rather awkward position of not really having any authority over the members of the Cabinet involved. He was quite aware of this and knew they were quite sensitive to it, and since, in order to get the kind of action on this that one would have needed, you would really have had to have, you would have had to be able to prod the Secretary of State and Defense and Interior to action.

I think the man that did the most prodding effectively on the Secretary of Interior was this man in the White House who was a special assistant to the President, whose name still eludes me. I think that he, perhaps, really shook up Secretary Udall because one of the things that happened soon after--I think it must have been perhaps the spring of 1966--was that the High Commissioner for the Territory who had been there for a number of years who had previously been--he was a civil servant--he had previously been in Alaska and other places, a man by the name of Will Goding. He was transferred from the Trust Territory. I think that it was realized from the report and from my persistence that there were so many problems there that, perhaps, it would help if there were a new commissioner.

Actually, I did not--I deliberately avoided going into the administration of the Territory in my report. While I saw numerous situations which I thought were just shocking and were really the responsibility

of the High Commissioner, I knew that if I focused on that, that my report would never get anywhere because people would think that it wasn't any of my business--the administration of the Territory. And I knew also that it would arouse the hackles, you might say, of the Department of Interior, which I understood full well was the most sort-of entrenched and old-fashioned Department in Washington--being very candid. So I had deliberately avoided any direct criticism of either the High Commissioner or the administration, although I did believe very--rather subtly--say that I felt that the administration needed a different type of administrator throughout. I felt that the people, the personnel, should be development-minded people and not the old line, not the old type.

P: It's a wonder you haven't been named High Commissioner by now yourself.

A: Well, in any case, Mr. Goding was perhaps retired, I think--I don't know. And I did make an effort to then get a young, vigorous person appointed as High Commissioner. I looked very hard for the right kind of person. I finally thought I found one in the Peace Corps, a young man by the name of Ross Pritchard, who would have been willing to go, but by the time I found him, or perhaps even before I found him, it had been decided by others. I rather think the governor of Hawaii, Governor Burns, heard about all this and he wanted to have a voice in the selection of the High Commissioner. And his candidate who came to see me at the United Nations, Bill Norwood--Mr. Bill Norwood--was named, and I think that he is an able man and a conscientious person. I think he's doing the best that he can under the circumstances. I think he has had many problems since he came there. But in any case, perhaps, this is enough about the Trust Territory.

When the President did send his request to Congress, I felt that that was an important step, and the President did this on the recommendation of the Department of State. We had to have numerous meetings with the Department, and inter-departmental meetings. Once again, I had great difficulty in getting the State Department officials, also, to focus on this. Just think, it took two years to even get this far.

One of the first things that was accomplished, I think, as a result of my report was that the appropriations were increased. The ceiling was raised that next year, and the appropriations were increased considerably-- I think from seventeen million five hundred thousand dollars to almost twenty-five million dollars--and the ceiling was raised so that it could be doubled--could go up to thirty-five million dollars. That was accomplished, and a new administrator, who was an improvement, and perhaps the most important thing of all was that the Peace Corps--I recommended that the Peace Corps should be involved there. There had never been a Peace Corps in a US Territory before.

P: That's sort of a commentary on the state of the welfare.

A: Yes. It was so much needed, and the Peace Corps is the, I think, the second largest group in any single country. I believe there are the most in India, but the Trust Territory, at my last knowledge, had about five hundred volunteers in the Territory. And on the whole this has been, I think, a plus, a gain, and while there have been a few problems as one could expect I think Mr. Norwood feels that the Peace Corps is making a very positive contribution there.

P: Do you attribute the resistance, not only from the standpoint of submitting your report, but in getting changes and the length of time that it took--

do you attribute this to administrative problems within the State Department, the lack of awareness of either the Congress or officials, or the state of these Trust Territories, or to another factor?

A: I would say it's a combination of things. I do think that the Vietnam War--while it should have speeded things along--I felt, because it should have made people more sensitive to the importance of everything in the Pacific. But I feel that everyone, including the President, the Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary of State, everyone involved on the Executive Branch, excepting the Interior, which is another problem--Interior people--but they were just so focused on the Vietnam War that this always seemed to have a very low priority. This might have been true even if we hadn't been so involved in the war, I don't know. Apparently, no one had ever paid too much attention to it. But this, I think, was the first thing.

The second factor is the fact that this Congressional Committee sort of considered the Trust Territory as its bailiwick--not exactly a pork barrel situation but I remember that the remark of the chairman of the committee when I went to testify that time in 1966--that Mr. Aspinall said rather indignantly, "Well, it looks to me as if you are trying to take this away from us."

P: As if they owned it.

A: Yes, after all, this Territory did not belong to a Committee of Congress and that I thought this was indicative of the attitude which this committee had, at least some members of it.

I also felt that the Department of Interior still had the same attitude, by and large, and that existed fifty years ago toward territories

and just wasn't really aware of the strategic and international significance of this question, I did feel that Mrs. Van Cleve was more enlightened but she didn't seem to be able to get the attention of Mr. Udall. Or--I don't know--there was some breakdown there and I didn't fully understand it. And Mr. Udall had a good many other responsibilities. I suppose there again it was a matter of priorities.

P: Is the United States in an awkward position holding Trust Territories when we have certainly, clearly opposed colonial-type claims?

A: I think we are increasingly in the difficult position that the United Nations--unless we soon really have a plebiscite in the Trust Territory to get the Trust Territory out of the United Nations. I think that it is in our interest to do this, because we are under attack there, not just propaganda attack which we expect from the Soviet Union, but the African countries, of course, with their very passionate belief in independence for all people; and we are dedicated to this, too. We not only are dedicated to this proposition that people should determine their own futures and their own form of government, but we have this treaty. You really have to live up to the treaty, but there isn't any deadline on the treaty.

There is approaching a time when action will have to be taken because there now is only one other country that has a trust territory in its administration and that is Australia with New Guinea. So I think for reasons of our standing in the world, not only vis-a-vis the communists, but vis-a-vis the newly-independent countries of Africa and Asia, I think it is in our interests to let the people decide. Also, I think if we give them the choice soon, then there is just no doubt that they will choose to stay with the United States. But if we delay too long, then we



might not get the answer that we want.

P: What is the resistance to doing this immediately?

A: I think it's primarily with the Congress, with the House of Representatives, specifically with this committee.

P: And why would it be in their interests not to go ahead and proceed?  
It would change the status; it would bring it closer to the United States.

A: I think that up until the present time there has not been the kind of relationship--steady pushing from the Executive, I mean. I don't mean that the Executive can do everything. I know that the President and the White House have to make a choice between the things that they just must have from Congress and the things that they feel can wait a little while. But I think that if the President were to decide that this is a matter of real priority, I would think that it would be possible--by working with State and with Defense.

One of the things that I had thought would be desirable would be to get a White House sort-of a responsibility for this to get it through, because as long as you had these inter-departmental problems it was so hard to get anything done. I thought if you had someone really assigned to do this from the White House, then you might be able to get the action more quickly. And I still believe that eventually this will have to be done. I don't know, maybe the next US representative on the Trusteeship Council will push as much as I have, but I rather doubt it. I almost made myself unpleasant at times I think by trying to get people to, you know, do something about this thing. So I think it's going to require some more top-level attention.

Now, I think I've talked much too long about this Trust Territory

problem, but you can see that this is still quite--

P: You have some very strong views on them and I wanted to get them.

A: Yes, I have indeed.

P: I'd like to continue on to other issues that, of course, occurred with the Trusteeship Council, and you've mentioned Southwest Africa, and I believe there is a World Court decision on that. Did you participate in that activity in that area?

A: Yes, I did. Shortly after that decision, I believe, the World Court, which as you probably know, meant that the question of the future of Southwest Africa--or its relationship to South Africa--was thrown out of the World Court. The question was considered, it didn't have a legal [basis]. The countries that brought the case--Ethiopia and Liberia weren't considered as having a legal status, or a legal standing to bring it to the court. This question then came up in the next General Assembly, and because of my being the US representative on the Trusteeship Council and the delegate who was concerned with these questions, I was the US representative on the special commission on Southwest Africa.

Before that time, however, I had participated with Ambassador Goldberg. I was his representative directly on an informal group of mostly western countries, although we were joined at times by Japan, Australia and the Commonwealth countries on trying to achieve a resolution on Southwest Africa, the question of Southwest Africa, which would be more or less unamiously adopted by the General Assembly. We had many meetings of this sort-of an ad hoc group and also many meetings with the African group which was working on the same question. This was one of the most interesting sort-of phases of my work at the United Nations because

it involved working with all these different countries and groups in a more active way than we normally did on the Fourth Committee, and there was also much more interest on the part of the entire delegation in this question. Ambassador Goldberg was particularly interested in it.

I learned a good bit about his negotiating skill during that time and I felt as if I myself became a better negotiator, at least in the multi-lateral sense. I had done quite a bit of negotiating in Bulgaria and Copenhagen, but it was quite different then negotiating with just one country. There must have been involved in these negotiations maybe as many as, at times, twenty or twenty-five different countries represented. This was a very interesting period for me, and I felt that Ambassador Goldberg and I played a rather important part in getting the United States to, in the first place, develop a resolution which we could support and, in the second place, in getting the approval of the Secretary of State and of the White House--or the President because he was directly concerned with this--to support a resolution which was then passed. I think, one hundred and fourteen different countries voted for it, and two countries voted against it--Portugal and South Africa. And there were a few countries that abstained including the United Kingdom and France.

This was sort of a milestone for the United States. It was the first time in all the many years of resolutions on Southwest Africa that the United States had ever been able to vote for a resolution, and I think that the African countries felt that the United States was taking a more enlightened and a more progressive attitude toward the problems of the African countries as a result of our position on this. The resolution, of course, did not commit us to any future action.

It only recognized what had actually happened and it also recognized, or declared, that since South Africa had failed to live up to the terms of its mandate that therefore the Southwest Africa, the territory of Southwest Africa, henceforward should come under the direct responsibility of the United Nations. And it established a commission which would consider what the next step should be and how the United Nations should carry out these responsibilities. This commission then was established following that, and I served on this commission as the US member, I believe, in an indirect capacity. I wasn't the chief US representative. President Johnson, I think very wisely, appointed a Republican as our member on this commission.

P: Why do you say that?

A: He was the former Attorney General, Bill Rogers, William C. Rogers, and he had been a delegate to the session, I believe the twentieth session of the United Nations General Assembly. I think it was wise of the President because if anything were going to come from this commission on Southwest Africa there would have to be the acceptance and the cooperation of the business community in this country which tended to be opposed to any change in the southern part of Africa, particularly in this area where we have some economic interests. They are not very great but we do have some, and there are two or three individuals that have sizable economic interests in Southwest Africa. I think the President probably felt that by having a man that he knew was dedicated to human rights and the principles of equality, but still at the same time was from the-- well, he was a member of the Eisenhower Administration--that he would carry weight with getting the more conservative element to accept whatever

might come. However, I think that Mr. Rogers was willing to do more than the State Department actually was. He became rather--well, shall I say--disenchanted and frequently didn't come to some of the meetings, so I was sort of his deputy and I attended in his place, and I attended the sort-of caucuses and things for him a good bit of the time.

P: Were there other major issues that occurred while you filled this position on the Trusteeship Council that we haven't covered?

A: You mean related to the--

P: Trust Territories.

A: Well, there were a number of other issues. I felt that the United States was not very directly involved with other issues. I did go with the committee of twenty-four on its African tour in 1966, but I felt, on the whole that one of the problems for me in this position was that the United States--at the present time--does not feel that its interests in Africa are really very immediate. I think that we, of course, are more interested in the northern part of Africa, relationships with the UAR and the Middle Eastern countries, and concerned about Algeria and Morocco and other countries in the northern part. But I felt that by and large the United States' interest in Africa--well, I think frankly it's still under the shadow of the past. We still tend to, too much, to follow the UK which, after all, is disengaging [from] Africa, practically disengaged--

P: From the world.

A: Yes. And I know that Ambassador Goldberg worked very hard in trying to get the United States to take a more active and progressive approach to our problems particularly, for instance, in relation to the Portuguese colonies and questions of Southern Rhodesia, which was one of the

important issues. I guess I should have thought of that first actually because the question of Southern Rhodesia came up in '65 and continued as an issue throughout the time I was there. But we never went beyond the British position on Southern Rhodesia, but on Southwest Africa we did. That was the first time that we, you might say, broke with the British on the Southwest. But on Southern Rhodesia we, I think, felt that because they were the ones who really, after all, had the responsibility they had to be the ones to make the major decision and we usually supported what they did. But I think Ambassador Goldberg worked on this whole complex of questions more than previous representatives had, and I must say that I worked closely with him. We did the best that we could, but we both felt that there isn't very much movement in this area so far as the United States is concerned.

P: I'd like to go on to another area unless you think we--

A: No, I think we--

P: I'd like to draw on your long career in foreign service and discuss some problems in the State Department administration. Do you think that Foreign Service officers--their careers and appointments--have been managed by the administrators without field experience?

A: I don't know if I could say that exactly. I did feel when I first went abroad to represent the United States, and I felt this once again when I was in Sofia, that probably there is a rather small group in the Department that has a good bit of power over the Foreign Service. I was never fully aware of just who this group was or exactly why they had this power. I think that many people felt that this power was exercised by a rather small elite, you might say, and that many of them had, you know, special

special concerns perhaps for themselves and others who had similar views.

P: Have you ever had experience, or I might say frustration, in seeking instructions from home and getting a rapid response, or were there delays?

A: Oh, I certainly did. I certainly did.

P: Do you recall a specific event?

A: Yes, indeed I do. Well, I had two problems when I was in Sofia, Bulgaria, which I think made me more aware of the problems with the Department than any which I had while I was in Copenhagen. I might say that probably there have been quite a change in that period. After all, I left Copenhagen in 1953, and it was almost ten years later when I was in Sofia. And I think during that time the Foreign Service had expanded a great deal, the State Department had expanded a great deal, and while it was a large organization while I was in Copenhagen, it was not the perfectly enormous bureaucracy that it became during that period--interestingly enough, the Eisenhower period. Not that I necessarily think there is a relationship, I don't know.

We oftentimes wonder how these things happen, and, of course, our responsibilities in the world enlarged during that time. There were suddenly many, many more countries and we had many, many more responsibilities, so I think if I were to really analyze why this happened, I suppose I would have to say that these were the major [ones]--our enlarged world responsibilities, the change in the whole world that took place after the Second World War.

But in any case, there was a great change, but I do think that my-- the years when I was in Copenhagen, I don't remember any seriously frustrating problems with the State Department. Oh, there are always

some problems, but by and large it seemed to me that there were no times when I felt as if I just had to go back and talk to somebody in order to get things straightened out.

In Sofia, the problems which I had concerned primarily the negotiations on the financial claims which had not been settled, the claims following the Second World War. When I first went to Sophia, in 1962, these claims had been under negotiation for more than two years in the State Department here in Washington. You may remember that we had no relations with Bulgaria between 1950 and 1960, so that when we resumed relations with Bulgaria in 1960, these negotiations were taken up here in Washington to try to get these claims settled. I don't know if you know what the claims are, but the United States' citizens in Bulgaria at the time of the War had all their properties seized by the Bulgarian government because we were the enemy, and the same converse of it was true here in this country--we seized Bulgarian property in this country. There was more US property in Bulgaria than there was Bulgarian here, so there was quite a gap between what they owed us. They owed us more than we owed them afterwards. There were quite a number of American individuals who had direct financial claims on the Bulgarian government. These talks have been going on for two-and-a-half years rather desultorily and on on again, off again.

Well, some progress had been made, but they seemed to have reached a point of stalemate, and soon after I went to Sofia perhaps three or four months after, I did come home on consultations, I think it was six months after--I believe in December. And I persuaded the State Department to let me try to see if I could negotiate this settlement because I



felt that possibly because I was new and because I had established by that time, fairly good relationships with the Bulgarian officials. And I knew that they were very anxious to get these settled and I felt that unless we got these claims settled, we couldn't do anything else. This was just sort of an obstacle against everything. So the Department did agree to let me try, and, of course, I was under quite strict instructions.

I had a very able assistant who was of Polish descent and who spoke Russian very well--he was my cultural attaché, Mr. Alexander Bloomfield. He had a Slavic background; he had grown up as a boy in Russia. He went to Russia when he was three years old and lived there until he was eleven. His father was a Polish industrialist who had gone to Russia. Then their family left Russia at the time of the Revolution, and then he had lived in Poland until he went to the university shortly before the War. But in any case he had what you might call just an inborn Slavic mentality, I guess you would say. He was very helpful to me as a special advisor and as an interpreter. And he worked closely with me during all the time that I was there because he was very interested in public affairs work, what I was trying to do--communicating with people. But he was also very helpful with me on these negotiations and we conducted these negotiations over a period of about, I would say, maybe four or five months, and we did succeed in reaching an agreement.

But during that time, there were several times when I felt that it was a little difficult to get the Department's approval for a little more latitude which I felt we needed. It wasn't too serious. The most difficult thing during that period was--it happened to coincide--this was in the spring of 1963 when--I should say first that among the outstanding

problems in our relationships, the most serious problems when I went to Sofia were the several American citizens that had been detained by the Bulgarians, imprisoned, and hadn't been allowed to either get out of prison or be in communication with the American mission, and others hadn't been able to leave the country. They were walking around, but they couldn't leave the country. And also there was this case--

P: How long had they been there?

A: Several years. There was this case of Mr. Michael Shipkov, who was a Bulgarian who had been an employee of the US mission, who had been arrested. In fact, it was primarily his arrest and his detention which sort-of led to the break in relations between the United States and Bulgaria. He was still in prison when I first arrived there, and I think largely because of my intervention the Bulgarians did release him from prison. I convinced them that if they wanted to improve relations they would have to let this man out of prison. And they eventually did after maybe a couple of weeks. But the other cases were Americans--this man was a Bulgarian. And the others were Americans, and so naturally we had a very strong interest also in their release, especially, one man whose name is Gerald Dorset. He had been an employee of the VOA at one time. He was a naturalized American. He had left the VOA and had gone to London for a visit and, while he was in London, because he became very homesick for Bulgaria and anxious to see his dear old mother, he was kidnapped actually by the Bulgarians and taken back to Bulgaria. Soon after he got there he was imprisoned, and he had been in prison for about two years when I got there. No one had seen him since. They had a trial soon after he was imprisoned, and someone had seen him then, but

no one had been able to advise him or really communicate with him. No one even knew for sure if he was still alive, I believe.

P: You were able to get in to see him, or to get advisers to him?

A: I didn't get into see him. He walked into the mission one day, into the American Legation and asked for asylum. And, of course, he--

P: He had escaped?

A: He had escaped. I shouldn't say he had escaped, he had finally been released. There was sort of an amnesty going on, but he had been told that he must never, never go to the American Legation. He was released to stay in the country, but he couldn't stand it. He wanted to return to the United States, and he had heard about me and thought that I might have more, perhaps more, influence in Washington and also more interest for humanitarian reasons in trying to help him. So he just walked into the Legation and asked for asylum. And this was--put some consternation into the State Department, I might say, because technically there isn't such a thing as asylum for an American citizen. I felt that it was very important because if we didn't recognize his citizenship, we never could get him out of the country. I felt that if I threw him out of the Legation, that it would be--I would never see him again and he might go back to prison. I felt that our only hope in getting him out of the country was treating him as if he were an American citizen which we regarded but which the Bulgarians did not. And so he came in in the morning, as I remember, and the consular officer was away that day and the DCM was away that day--

P: DCM:

A: Deputy Chief of Mission. And I asked one of my senior advisors to get the

man's history--his whole history--and, also, we wired the Department right away for instructions. And the instructions were not forthcoming immediately, and so I made the decision myself that we should keep him there at least overnight. I just felt it would be very dangerous to his safety to send him out again. He had made several suicide attempts while he was in prison. His nerves had been shot by this experience. It had been a terrible ordeal. And so we hid him in sort-of an attic of the mission, and we kept him locked up there for about six weeks, and we fed him. Members of the mission who lived in the building fed him. And we didn't even tell the Bulgarian government for about a week that we had him.

We didn't get instructions from the State Department for maybe twenty-four or forty-eight hours, and then that was one time when I felt, I really felt quite aggravated with the Department because it was a very non-committal instruction. On the one hand and on the other hand--but the net meaning of it was get rid of him, get him out of there, and this is going to create great problems. You must persuade him to leave, and I felt that I could almost see the group of people that, you know, drafted this telegram. By that time, I had gotten to know something about how the instructions are drafted and who signs them and how many clearances they have to have and everything. And I felt that this was terribly cautious and I didn't agree with it, but I felt that they didn't come down hard on one side or the other. I was rather glad in a way that they didn't because I felt strongly that a man's life was at stake here.

P: His U.S. citizenship in question--

A: Yes. That I felt that we had our whole case was that he was a U. S. citizen

that if we let him go, that this would be implying to the Bulgarians that we didn't think we had any rights over him, and that as a U.S. citizen--