

MEMORANDUM

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2101

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

SECRET

April 21, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KISSINGER

FROM: JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE *JH/HDR*

SUBJECT: Negotiating Instructions on the Future Status
of the Marianas District of the Trust Territory
of the Pacific Islands (Micronesia)

At Tab I is a draft memorandum from you to the President making recommendations on the Under Secretaries Committee memorandum to him (attached) on draft instructions for our upcoming negotiations on the future status of the Marianas District of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI). As you will recall, our negotiating with the Marianas separately from the other five TTPI districts resulted from the request of the Marianas, who have long wanted a closer permanent relationship with us than the other five districts have.

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Your draft memorandum to the President differs with the USC recommendations only on the question of U. S. land requirements in the Marianas -- which is probably the major potential sticking point in the negotiations. We believe that we should not try to acquire the entire island of Tinian and to remove Tinian's population to nearby Saipan. First, our own evaluation of our military needs is that the acquisition of all Tinian for our exclusive use is not essential. Second, we believe that our floating such a request with the Marianas representatives would so stun them, given their expectations, that we would from the outset endanger our major immediate objective in these negotiations: to complete the Marianas negotiations in a way that will have the maximum beneficial effect on the negotiations with the other five districts, which have been stalled since last fall.

Recommendation:

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Concurrence:

Mr. Kennedy *RTK/dhr*
Mr. Odeen *PO/dhr*



SECRET HR 9/14/99

GDS Dec 31, 1981

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Negotiating Instructions of the Future Status of the Marianas District of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Micronesia)

At Tab B is a memorandum to you from the Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee asking your approval on their proposed instructions to your Personal Representative for Micronesian Status Negotiations, Ambassador F. Haydn Williams, for negotiations on the future status of Marianas District of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI). The draft instruction proposed by the USC is at Tab A. As you will recall, our negotiating with the Marianas separately from the other five TTPI districts resulted from the request of the Marianas, who have long wanted a closer permanent relationship with us than the other districts.

The USC memorandum asks your approval on six points in the negotiating instructions:

1. Negotiating objectives. The USC-recommended primary objectives are to seek a close, permanent political relationship with the Marianas that will bring them under U. S. sovereignty and satisfy our security requirements; to establish a stable political system there; and to satisfy U. S. obligations under our trusteeship agreement with the U. N. Our secondary objectives would include completing the negotiations in a way that will have the maximum beneficial effect on the negotiations with the other five districts, would keep our financial obligations in reasonable bounds, would keep simple our political and other relationships with the Marianas, and would secure majority approval in the U. N. Security and Trusteeship Councils. I have no objection to this statement of objectives.

2. Political status to be offered the Marianas. The USC recommends that we offer a commonwealth arrangement -- the other options being integration with Guam, integration with Guam but with safeguards against Guam's domination of the less developed Marianas, and unincorporated

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HR 9/14/99

GDS Dec 31, 1981

territorial status. Commonwealth offers the best prospects for early agreement with the Marianas -- since the Marianas favor this on the grounds that it will give them maximum internal political control and will confer greater prestige -- and would be supportive of those in the other five districts who support Free Association and oppose independence.

All four options insure our primary objectives. Commonwealth would allow future integration with Guam, if both desired it. If the Marianas decided they wanted rather to negotiate any of the other three options, Ambassador Williams would be authorized to do so, but would have to return for further instructions in the unlikely event the Marianas wanted some looser relationship with us than commonwealth. I agree with the USC recommendation.

3. Military land requirements. The USC recommends that Ambassador Williams first try to secure our maximum land requirements: the purchase or lease of the entire island of Tinian, relocating its 800 inhabitants to Saipan, plus the acquisition of certain facilities and areas on Saipan and of the small uninhabited island of Farrallon de Medinilla. The USC fallback on Tinian -- the potentially serious sticking point -- would be first to modify or withdraw our requirements on Saipan, second to leave Tinian's population on the island but still to acquire the entire island, and last to acquire only three-quarters of the island (which the USC memorandum calls the "minimum and essential requirement"). The consequences of the last two fallbacks would be to reduce the military maneuver room on Tinian (from almost the entire island of 26,000 acres to about 19,000 acres), and to leave us with some of the usual potential off-base relations problems with a native population.

We have serious doubts about taking all of Tinian, and a recent report from the State Department Political Adviser in the TTPI, whose past assessments have proved largely accurate, confirms these doubts as to the advisability of even trying to secure the Marianas' agreement to vacate Tinian's population to Saipan. (The report arrived after the USC memorandum was submitted.) The report (Tab C) confirms that such a negotiating request would be a complete surprise to the Marianans, would scotch Tinian's hopes to benefit economically from the U. S. military presence, and by greatly stimulating suspicions would set the Marianas negotiations back seriously from the outset. This would endanger our major immediate objective in the Marianas negotiations, and would also impact adversely on our negotiations with the other five districts. Equally important, our own evaluation of our military needs is that acquisition of all Tinian for our exclusive use is not essential.



OMB recommended that our land acquisition be held to the least amount required for military purposes. I recommend that Ambassador Williams take a position that fulfills at least our essential military land requirements on Tinian but does not attempt to remove its inhabitants to Saipan, and that satisfies our essential military land needs on Saipan and Farrallon de Medinilla.

4. Financial arrangements. The USC recommends that Ambassador Williams offer the following financial assistance, making clear that this assistance is subject to Congressional approval:

-- Direct grants of up to \$12 million annually for the first five years, after which our normal budgetary procedures would apply. This level would be considerably above the annual \$7 million in direct assistance the Marianas now receives, and well above what we plan to offer the other five districts.

-- Federal programs and services, to be determined subsequently but which would be expected to be above the approximately \$2.5 million the Marianas now receive in such programs.

-- Short term assistance to cover transitional costs, to be determined through negotiation.


-- Land acquisition and relocation costs, to be determined through negotiation, but on which Ambassador Williams would consult closely with the concerned Departments.

OMB recommends that direct grants be held to the minimum consistent with mutual agreement on program needs, and that any specific amount be approved by the Director of OMB. [Direct grants must also take account of our need for an early and generous settlement. Your approval of the overall level would cover OMB's second point.]

I have no objection to the USC recommendations. We believe that overly stringent financial restrictions would contradict the impression of generosity which we are trying to create.

5. Interim arrangements. The USC recommends that Ambassador Williams be authorized to negotiate with the Marianas on the implementation of the agreement as soon as possible, and prior to the termination of the Trusteeship as a whole if necessary and feasible. I have no objection.

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6. Congressional consultations. The USC recommends that Ambassador Williams be instructed to consult with Congress on the substance and implementation of this agreement. I have no objection.

At Tab A is the USC's draft instruction from you to Ambassador Williams with our suggested changes ad discussed above.

Recommendation:

That you approve the draft instruction to Ambassador Williams as amended.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

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Draft Instructions for President's Personal Representative

1. General

You are authorized to undertake on behalf of the U. S. Government negotiations with representatives of the Mariana Islands with the objective of arriving as soon as possible at an agreement providing for the Marianas' close and permanent association with the United States satisfying the following U. S. objectives:

Primary Objectives

-- To fashion on a priority basis a close and permanent political relationship with the Mariana Islands District which will extend U. S. sovereignty to those islands and satisfy U. S. security requirements. The latter include: denial of the area for military use by third parties; U. S. control over the foreign and defense affairs of the Mariana Islands; and the right to establish military bases in those islands.

-- To ensure establishment of a stable and friendly Marianas political unit through reasonable satisfaction of the political and economic aspirations of the people of the Marianas.

-- To satisfy U. S. obligations under the Trusteeship Agreement through an act of self-determination leading to self-government for the Marianas.

Secondary Objectives

-- To structure the status arrangements with the Marianas in such a manner as to have maximum favorable impact on the negotiations with the remaining five districts of Micronesia.

-- To keep United States' financial obligations to the Mariana Islands within reasonable bounds and relevant to the character of our future relationship.

-- To keep U. S. political, economic, and administrative relationships with the Marianas as simple as possible while accomplishing the above objectives.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines

By KTR, NARA, Date 9/14/99

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-- To establish a relationship with the Marianas which will (in addition to meeting U. S. obligations under the Trusteeship Agreement) obtain United Nations approval, or at least that of a majority of the Security Council and of the Trusteeship Council.

2. Status

You should seek initially to reach agreement with the Marianas on a commonwealth arrangement providing internal self-government under a locally drafted constitution. This arrangement should provide for U. S. sovereignty, full U. S. control of defense and foreign affairs, and access to the Federal Court system.

Should the negotiation of a commonwealth arrangement appear impractical because of a clear preference in the Marianas and on Guam for a union of the two areas, or because of a strong preference in the Marianas for unincorporated territorial status, you may negotiate either status.

You should resist pressure from the Marianas to negotiate any status other than a territorial relationship. If pressed, you should note that your instructions are to negotiate a territorial status in response to the Marianas' expressed wishes and that discussion of any looser form of association would logically call into question the desirability of conducting negotiations with the Marianas separate from the rest of Micronesia. If, nonetheless, Marianas negotiators continue to resist territorial status, you should seek further negotiating instructions.

3. Land

The U. S. military and non-military land requirements will be satisfied by arrangements providing for purchase or long-term lease by the U. S. Government to take effect as soon as possible. You should make a serious effort to obtain the optimum land requirements in the Marianas outlined by the Department of Defense and endorsed by the Under Secretaries Committee. Recognizing it may not be possible to negotiate this optimum land package, the alternatives are listed in descending order of priority and desirability.

a. Alternative 1

Tinian

- Purchase or lease entire island (26,200 acres) and relocate the population off the island.



Saipan

- Conclude a Joint Use Agreement permitting U. S. military land rights on and access to facilities of the civil airport.
- Purchase or lease 500 acres adjacent to the Isley Field runway. The land can be leased back for agricultural purposes.
- Purchase or lease 320 acres at Tanapag Harbor.

Farallon de Medinilla Island

- Purchase or lease the entire island (229 acres). (The purchase or lease of Farallon de Medinilla Island is considered an essential part of all negotiating alternatives and variants, but will not be repeated below.)

If necessary, the following variants to the above alternative should be explored thoroughly in an attempt to obtain all of Tinian (with the population to be relocated off the island) and to obtain certain acreages or land or access rights on Saipan.

(1) First Variant of Alternative 1


Tinian

- Purchase or lease the entire island (26,200 acres) and relocate the population off the island.

Saipan

- Conclude a Joint Use Agreement permitting U. S. military landing rights on and access to facilities of the civil airport.
 - Purchase or lease 500 acres adjacent to the Isley Field runway. The land can be leased back for agricultural purposes.
 - Obtain access and use rights to Tanapag Harbor (320 acres).
- As part of this proposal, the Marianas representative would be asked to agree that any subsequent development of Tanapag Harbor would meet criteria set by the Department of Defense to insure that the Harbor could be used by U. S. forces. The U. S. Government would be willing to furnish planning advice for any subsequent development. The U. S. Government will negotiate any pay rental fees for any usage at the time of U. S. Government use.

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(2) Second Variant of Alternative 1

Tinian

- Purchase or lease the entire island (26,200 acres) and relocate the population off the island.

Saipan

- Conclude a Joint Use Agreement permitting U. S. military landing rights on and access to facilities of the civil airport.

- Obtain access and use rights to 500 acres immediately adjacent to the Isley Field runway to develop some type of military installation for servicing equipment and similar purposes, whenever the need arises. Any interim civil development would have to meet criteria established by the Department of Defense. In turn, the U. S. Government would furnish planning advice and would reassure the Marianas that in the event a military installation was built on this land it would be a high employer. The U. S. Government would negotiate and pay rental fees for any usage at the time of U. S. Government use.

- Obtain access and use rights to Tanapag Harbor (320 acres). As part of this proposal, the Marianas representative would be asked to agree that any subsequent development of Tanapag Harbor would meet criteria set by the Department of Defense to insure the Harbor could be used by U. S. forces. The U. S. Government would be willing to furnish planning advice for any subsequent development. The U. S. Government will negotiate and pay rental fees for any usage at the time of U. S. Government use.

b. Alternative 2

Tinian

- Purchase or lease the entire island (26,200 acres) and relocate the population off the island.

c. Alternative 3

Tinian

- Purchase or lease the entire island (26,200 acres), but offer to lease back the southeast corner for population relocation (about 7,000 acres).

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The U. S. Government would be willing to sign long-term leases, but would insist on controlling the uses the land can be put to and would not be obligated to leaseback to anyone not currently a resident of Tinian.

d. Alternative 4

Tinian

- Purchase or lease minimum needs (18,515 acres) and relocate population to southeast corner of island.

[The following is my recasting of the USC memorandum's section on land requirements which reflects my recommended changes in the USC approach to this aspect of the negotiation:

3. Land

The U. S. military and non-military land requirements should be satisfied by arrangements providing for purchase or long-term lease by the U. S. Government to take effect as soon as possible. You should make a serious effort to negotiate the land requirements defined under Alternative 1 and its variations in order to satisfy our priority land requirements on Tinian.

a. Alternative 1

Tinian. Purchase or lease the entire island (26,200 acres) but offer to lease back the southeast corner for population relocation (about 7,000 acres). The U. S. Government would be willing to sign long-term leases, but would insist on controlling the uses the land can be put to and would not be obligated to lease back to anyone not currently a resident of Tinian.

Saipan

-- Conclude a Joint Use Agreement permitting U. S. military landing on and access to facilities of the civil airport.

-- Purchase or lease 500 acres adjacent to Isley Field runway. Part or all of the land could be leased back for agricultural purposes.

-- Purchase or lease 320 acres at Tanapag Harbor.

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Farallon de Medinilla Island. Purchase or lease the entire island (229 acres). The acquisition of this island is to be included in all of the following negotiating alternatives.

Variants on the Saipan negotiating alternative:

(1) First Variant of Alternative 1

Tinian

-- Purchase or lease entire island (26,200 acres) and relocate population off the island.

Saipan

-- Joint Use Agreement permitting U. S. military landing rights on and access to facilities of civil airport.

-- Purchase or lease 500 acres adjacent to Isley Field runway. Land can be leased back for agricultural purposes.

-- Access and use rights to Tanapag Harbor (320 acres). As part of this proposal the Marianas representative would be asked to agree that any subsequent development of Tanapag Harbor would meet criteria set by Department of Defense to insure that Harbor could be used by U. S. forces. The U. S. Government would be willing to furnish planning advice for any subsequent development. The U. S. Government will negotiate and pay rental fees for any usage at the time of U. S. Government use.

(2) Second Variant of Alternative 1

Tinian

-- Purchase or lease entire island (26,200 acres) and relocate population off island.

Saipan

-- Joint Use Agreement permitting U. S. military landing rights on and access to facilities of civil airport.



-- Access and use rights to 500 acres immediately adjacent to Isley Field runway to develop some type of military installation for servicing equipment, etc., whenever the need arises. Any interim civil development would have to meet criteria established by Department of Defense. In turn, the U. S. Government would furnish planning advice and reassure Marianas that in event a military installation was built on this land it would be a high employer. The U. S. Government would negotiate and pay rental fees for any usage at the time of U. S. Government use.

-- Access and use rights to Tanapag Harbor (320 acres). As part of this proposal the Marianas representative would be asked to agree that any subsequent development of Tanapag Harbor would meet criteria set by Department of Defense to insure Harbor could be used by U. S. forces. The U. S. Government would be willing to furnish planning advice for any subsequent development. The U. S. Government will negotiate and pay rental fees for any usage at the time of U. S. Government use.

b. Alternative 2

Tinian. Purchase or lease the minimum essential U. S. land requirement (18,515 acres), and relocate the population to the southeast corner of the island.


Saipan and Farrallon de Medinilla Island. Same as under Alternative 1.

c. Alternative 3. The same as Alternative 2, except that the Saipan requirements would be omitted. Whether this alternative would be used as a fallback from Alternative 1 or 2 is left to your tactical discretion.]

4. Financial Arrangements

You may propose sufficiently generous financial arrangements to make territorial status attractive to the Marianas, though the arrangements should encourage the Marianas' eventual economic self-sufficiency. Guaranteed minimum levels of direct assistance, based upon mutually-agreed program needs, can be in the range up to \$12 million. In addition, the U. S. expects to extend federal programs and services to the Marianas as appropriate. You may commit the U. S. to short-term assistance to cover any extraordinary transitional costs. You are authorized to

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negotiate, in coordination with interested agencies, land purchases or leases at reasonable rates, taking into account current land values in the Marianas District. It is important to make clear to the Marianans that all financial arrangements are subject to Congressional authorization and appropriation.

5. Interim Arrangements

Once an agreement on future status has been reached with the Marianas, the U. S. Government will seek to implement its terms, particularly those relating to separate governance of the District, as soon as possible, consistent with the need for Congressional approval. In your discussions with members of Congress you should outline the advantages of early implementation and explore Congressional receptivity to available alternative methods.

6. Congressional Consultation

You should keep the U. S. Congress informed of significant developments in the negotiations with the Marianas.

7. Responsibilities

Within the foregoing terms of reference, you are authorized to devise and implement the negotiating strategy best designed to achieve U. S. objectives in the negotiations and to determine the composition of the U. S. Delegation and appropriate procedural arrangements, taking into account the responsibilities and interests of the Departments of State, Defense, Interior, and Justice. All U. S. Government agencies and departments will provide you necessary assistance in seeing these negotiations carried to fruition.

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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTONNSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE~~SECRET~~

April 13, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Negotiations on the Future Status
of the Marianas District of the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

I attach a staff study (Annex A) prepared by the Interagency Group for Micronesian Status Negotiations and submitted through Ambassador Franklin Haydn Williams to the Under Secretaries Committee. The study provides options and recommendations for the negotiation of a permanent association with the Mariana Islands District of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, together with proposed negotiating instructions for Ambassador Williams.

The points requiring your decision are these:

(a) Approval of the negotiating objectives (pp. i-ii of the summary; pp. 10-11 of the study), which are fully concurred in by the Under Secretaries Committee, except OMB (See Annex B).

(b) Approval of the type of status to be offered the Marianas (pp. ii-iv of the summary; pp. 12-22 of the study). The Under Secretaries Committee recommends that Commonwealth status be offered initially, but that Ambassador Williams be authorized to negotiate unincorporated territorial status or integration with Guam if the Marianans should prefer either of these.

(c) Approval of the type of military land acquisition proposals to be presented to the Marianas (pp. iv-ix of the summary; pp. 31-34 of the study). The military land options

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9/14/99

CONFIDENTIAL

P 130510Z APR 73

FROM: CINCPACREP/GUAM/TTPI

TO: SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Marianas Status Negotiations: Tinian

References: A. STATUS LNO 73C
B. STATUS LNO 54C

1. At the risk of being repetitive, I should like to stress what I believe will be the adverse reaction to our interests throughout the Trust Territory if we should take the position at the next round of the Marianas Status Talks that we need the entire island of Tinian for military use or reservation, thereby necessitating removal of the people from the island.
2. As stated in the last paragraph of reference A reporting my recent visit to Tinian, I found no hint there of the existence of any suspicion that we might have in mind anything other than a sharing of the island with the local residents who look forward enthusiastically to the coming of the military and to participating in presumed benefits of a military presence in the form of utilities, markets, etc. According to the mayor, they are even prepared to move to another part of the island in order to leave the port area for military use. But I am sure they would be stunned to learn that we expect to move them off the island entirely and take over the entire place.
3. This astonishment would be shared by the Marianas Status Commission and the people of Saipan who also have no inkling of our intention. As reported in reference B, their strong desire, and what looks most attractive to them, is the sharing of the benefits, as noted above, of the military presence. The Commission's attorney Jim White has made this very explicit to me (reference B); the Commission does not foresee or desire a military facility completely isolated from the community. There is a friendly feeling about all this which creates a favorable atmosphere in which to work out details.

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HR
9/14/99

GDS Dec 31, 1979



4. It seems to me entirely possible, however, that our surfacing of an important but completely unexpected demand for all of Tinian might well cause the Marianas Status Commission to decide to recess the talks pending further study. Even if they should decide to carry on, hoping to lower our demands through negotiation, the situation would, I believe, be soured.

5. The other districts, which will have their own way of looking over the Marianas' shoulders at the talks, will have received the message, and may well decide to do some reconsidering of their basic intentions for future relations with the U. S. At this moment the Marshalls District is clearly teetering on the brink of requesting separate talks with the U. S., and out of the shadows of Palauan politics comes a hint of separatism in a bill to draw up a constitution for the "Future State of Palau" (STATUS LNO 84C). Truk is witnessing a hard-fought battle between the advocates of independence and close or free association with the U. S. (STATUS LNO 81).

6. As I see it, these factors in the Micronesian status picture point to the certainty that our round with the Marianas will be closely observed by the other districts, and that particular focus will be on the land aspect and the U. S. military needs. The way in which we handle this aspect and the nature and extent of our proposals will have implications either to help or hurt us in our relations and interests in the other districts, especially Palau.

7. I do not presume to judge our essential military needs, but I do raise a warning from where I sit as to the likely high price which a demand for all of Tinian will cost us.

Trent

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Nov 14, 1973

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**MEMORANDUM
OF CALL**

TO: _____

YOU WERE CALLED BY— YOU WERE VISITED BY—

OF (Organization) _____

PLEASE CALL → PHONE NO. CODE/EXT. _____

WILL CALL AGAIN IS WAITING TO SEE YOU

RETURNED YOUR CALL WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE

*TJB said he want
you to take action
on this*

RECEIVED BY	DATE	TIME

STANDARD FORM 63
REVISED AUGUST 1967
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
GPO : 1969-O-48-16-80841-1 822-889 63-108



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