

4/23

Ambassador,

Mr. Wilson wants you to see this even before  
he proofs it.



*HW*

*Filed 5/2/73  
wabe/engels.*

*"ols of ekj 200 HAK"*

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ITEMS FOR DISCUSSION WITH HAK *1551002*

- I. Negotiations as a whole.
  - A. Now two tracks since decision to proceed separately with Marianas - one Marianas, other rest of Micronesia.
    - Most important military requirements in Marianas.
    - Fortunate that Marianas themselves want close and permanent association rather than looser association.
  - B. Need for new instructions as a result.
    - Separate Marianas not covered in any detail in old instructions.
    - New situation developing in rest of Micronesia as well.
      - Independence options issue raised at Ponape needs decision.
      - Fragmentation developments in Marshalls and Palau.
      - Relative importance of remaining U.S. requirements.
      - Land issue in Palau.
    - Necessity for further Congressional consultations.
  - C. Three studies commissioned by USC.
    - Marianas - before HAK and President now.
    - Micronesia - delayed in bureaucratic process.
    - Future TTPI policy - delayed by first two.

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- II. Marianas Negotiations
  - A. Issues for resolution.
    - 1. Political status.




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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

By *HR*, NARA, Date *9/20/99*

- a. Congress prefers Guam unification.
    - Simple to put in effect.
    - Creates fewer problems with other territories
  - b. Commonwealth nevertheless preferred.
    - Marianas probably want as much self-government as possible.
    - So does U.N.
  - c. Believe commonwealth saleable to Congress.
    - Liberals will buy it.
    - Conservatives can be persuaded if it means getting Tinian base.
    - Will probably mean Guam must get the same.
2. Tinian Land
- a. Study recommends the whole thing plus Saipan sites.
    - FHW reaction when there in December.
    - Recent soundings reported by Status LNO.
    - Gangerly test with Pangelinan indicated very negative reaction.
  - b. Conclusion: Reaction to asking for whole thing could be so violent as to blow the whole negotiation
    - Shouldnt take that risk.
    - Need to begin with option 3 (control of the whole thing with leaseback provisions.)
3. Money
- a. \$9.3 annually now.
  - b. Study recommends up to \$12 in direct economic grants, plus transitional costs, plus regular U.S. programs.

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c. This may not be enough so need assurance we can get more in a hurry if needed.


B. Congressional Consultations

1. Because so much depends on implementing legislation - need reasonable assurances Congress will buy the product in advance.
2. Want agreement Congress will approve (along with Marianas) thus obligating itself to pass necessary implementing legislation and appropriations.
3. Split in Congressional Committees between "WWII type thinkers" and liberals.
  - Can trust only a few.
  - Must baby the rest.
4. Past consultations have gone well - intend to keep it that way.

C. Tactics and Strategy

1. Official opening May 14 in Saipan with preliminary informal unveilings the week before.
2. Marianas eager but still keeping anchor to windward and will not be push over.
3. Would like to get it wrapped up if at all possible by reaching agreement in principle at least on major issues. during forthcoming session, leaving experts and technicians to work out the details over coming weeks.

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4. Also have UNTC problem in June when separation of  
- Marianas likely to be big issue in light of known views  
of Visiting Mission.

### III. Micronesian Negotiations

#### A. Issues for Decision

##### 1. Independence Option

- State/Interior - Defense JCS split.
- Question one of degree of risk involved and its acceptability.
- Past views of USC and President.(Important)
- UN considerations and related issue of mandatory approval of UNTC and Security Council.

##### 2. Importance of Palau Requirement

- State-Defense split on strategy
- Relation to NSC 171.
- Judgment on popular attitudes towards U.S. military and money in Palau.
- Relation to overall land issue.

##### 3. Future dealings w-th JCFS

###### a Reliability of COM and its members

- Traditional vs. elective leaders.
- Inability to agree within JCFS

###### b. Fragmentation issue

- Past US. policy -
- U.N. views -
- Marianas influence -

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- Marshalls -

- Palau -

B. Congressional Consultations

- No real problems yet.
- Possible difficulties with UN questions and independence issue.

C. Strategy and Tactics

- Meeting with Salii May 4-5
  - Palau land holdup
  - Delay in talks until July or August.
- Need for U.S. position on land return

IV. Other Issues

A. Delayed Policy Study (No.3)

B. Support for OMSN

- Interior problems (Move to Executive Bldg/State?)
- Representation.

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