

# NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

## ACTION

SECRET-

April 21, 1973

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

MR. KISSINGER

JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE

FROM:

SUBJ ECT:

Negotiating Instructions on the Future Status of the Marianas District of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Micronesia)

At Tab I is a draft memorandum from you to the President making recommendations on the Under Secretaries Committee memorandum to him (attached) on draft instructions for our upcoming negotiations on the future status of the Marianas District of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI). As you will recall, our negotiating with the Marianas separately from the other five TTPI districts resulted from the request of the Marianas, who have long wanted a closer permanent relationship with us than the other five districts have.

Your draft memorandum to the President differs with the USC recommender tions only on the question of U.S. land requirements in the Marianas -which is probably the major potential sticking point in the negotiations. We believe that we should not try to acquire the entire island of Tinian and to remove Tinian's population to nearby Saipan. First, our own evaluation of our military needs is that the acquisition of all Tinian for our exclusive use is not essential. Second, we believe that our floating such a request with the Marianas representatives would so stun them, given their expectations, that we would from the outset endanger our major immediate objective in these negotiations: to complete the Marianas negotiations in a way that will have the maximum beneficial effect on the negotiations with the other five districts, which have been stalled since last fall.

## Recommendation:

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

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SECRET HR 9/14/99 GDS Dec 31, 1981

#### THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

# ACTION

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MEMORANDUM FOR:	THE PRESIDENT
FROM:	HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT:	Negotiating Instructions of the Future Status of the Marianas District of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Micronesia)

PHOTOCOPY FRUM GERALD FORD LIBRARY At Tab B is a memorandum to you from the Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee asking your approval on their proposed instructions to your Personal Representative for Micronesian Status Negotiations, Ambassador F. Haydn Williams, for negotiations on the future status of Marianas District of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI). The draft instruction proposed by the USC is at Tab A. As you will recall, our negotiating with the Marianas separately from the other five TTPI districts resulted from the request of the Marianas, who have long wanted closer permanent relationship with us than the other districts.

The USC memorandum asks your approval on six points in the negotiating instructions:

Negotiating objectives. The USC-recommended primary objectives 1. are to seek a close, permanent political relationship with the Marianas that will bring them under U.S. sovereignty and satisfy our security requirements; to establish a stable political system there; and to satisfy U.S. obligations under our trusteeship agreement with the U.N. Our secondary objectives would include completing the negotiations in a way that will have the maximum beneficial effect on the negotiations with the other five districts, would keep our financial obligations in reasonable bounds, would keep simple our political and other relationships with the Marianas, and would secure majority approval in the U.N. Security and Trusteeship Councils. I have no objection to this statement of objectives.

Political status to be offered the Marianas. The USC recommends 2. that we offer a commonwealth arrangement -- the other options being integration with Guam, integration with Guam but with safeguards against Guam's domination of the less developed Marianas, and unincorporated

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<u>territorial status</u>. Commonwealth offers the best prospects for early agreement with the Marianas -- since the Marianas favor this on the grounds that it will give them maximum internal political control and will confer greater prestige -- and would be supportive of those in the other five districts who support Free Association and oppose independence.

All four options insure our primary objectives. Commonwealth would allow future integration with Guam, if both desired it. If the Marianas decided they wanted rather to negotiate any of the other three options, Ambassador Williams would be authorized to do so, but would have to return for further instructions in the unlikely event the Marianas wanted some looser relationship with us than commonwealth. <u>I agree with the USC</u> recommendation.

3. <u>Military land requirements</u>. The <u>USC recommends</u> that Ambassador Williams first try to <u>secure our maximum land requirements</u>: the <u>purchase</u> or lease of the entire island of Tinian, <u>relocating its 800 inhabitants to</u> <u>Saipan</u>, plus the acquisition of certain facilities and areas on Saipan and of the small uninhabited island of Farrallon de Medinilla. The <u>USC fallback</u> on <u>Tinian</u> -- the potentially serious sticking point -- would be <u>first to</u> modify or withdraw our requirements on Saipan, <u>second to leave Tinian's</u> population on the island but still to acquire the entire island, and <u>last to</u> acquire only three-quarters of the island (which the USC memorandum calls the "minimum and essential requirement"). The consequences of the last two fallbacks would be to reduce the military maneuver room on Tinian of (from almost the entire island of 26,000 acres to about 19,000 acres), and to leave us with some of the usual potential off-base relations problems with a native population.

We have serious doubts about taking all of Tinian, and a recent report from the State Department Political Adviser in the TTPI, whose past assessments have proved largely accurate, confirms these doubts as to the advisability of even trying to secure the Marianas' agreement to vacate Tinian's population to Saipan. (The report arrived after the USC memorandum was submitted.) The report (Tab C) confirms that such a negotiating request would be a complete surprise to the Marianans, would scotch Tinian's hopes to benefit economically from the U.S. military presence, and by greatly stimulating suspicions would set the Marianas negotiations back seriously from the outset. This would endanger our major immediate objective in the Marianas negotiations, and would also impact adversely on our negotiations with the other five fistricts. Equally important, our own evaluation of our military needs is that acquisition of all Tinian for our exclusive use is not essential.

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OMB recommended that our land acquisition be hald to the least amount required for military purposes. I recommend that Ambassador Williams take a position that fulfills at least our essential military land requirements on Tinian but does not attempt to remove its inhabitants to Saipan, and that satisfies our essential military land needs on Saipan and Farrallon de Medinilla.

Financial arrangements. The USC recommends that Ambassador 4. Williams offer the following financial assistance, making clear that this assistance is subject to Congressional approval:

-- Direct grants of up to \$12 million annually for the first five years, after which our normal budgetary procedures would apply. This level would be considerably above the annual \$7 million in direct assistance the Marianas now receives, and well above what we plan to offer the other five

be considerably above the annual \$7 million in direct assistance the Marianas now receives, and well above what we plan to offer the other five districts.
-- Federal programs and services, to be determined subsequently but which would be expected to be above the approximately \$2.5 million the Marianas now receive in such programs.
-- Short term assistance to cover transitional costs, to be determined through negotiation.
-- Land acquisition and relocation costs, to be determined through negotiation.
OMB recommends that direct grants be held to the minimum consistent with mutual agreement on program needs, and that any specific amount be approved by the Director of OMB. [Direct grants muts also take account of the sector of OMB.]

mutual agreement on program needs, and that any specific amount be approved by the Director of OMB. [Direct grants muts also take account of our need for an early and generous settlement. Your approval of the overall level would cover OMB's second point.]

I have no objection to the USC recommendations. We believe that overly stringent financial restrictions would contradict the impression of generosity which we are trying to create.

Interim arrangements. The USC recommends that Ambassador 5. Williams be authorized to negotiate with the Marianas on the implementation of the agreement as soon as possible, and prior to the termination of the Trusteeship as a whole if necessary and feasible. I have no objection

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Congressional consultations. The USC recommends that 6. Ambassador Williams be instructed to consult with Congress on the substance and implementation of this agreement. I have no objection.

At Tab A is the USC's draft instruction from you to Ambassador Williams with our suggested changes ad discussed above.

# Recommendation:

That you approve the draft instruction to Ambassador Williams as amended.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_



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