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MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION FOR THE FILE

DATE 1/16/76

EXECUTIVE  
ST 51  
FG 38  
FG 36-4  
FG 36-10  
FG 1-2

LETTER, MEMO, ETC. \*

TO: Jon Howe  
FROM: Jeanne Davis ST (Northern Mariana)

SUBJECT: Request that the Vice President  
Intervene with three Senators  
on the Northern Mariana Covenant  
Issue

- Williams, G. Hayden
- Javits, Jacob (Sen.)
- Case, Clifford "
- Percy, Charles "

CORRESPONDENCE FILED CENTRAL FILES - CONFIDENTIAL FILE



1/16/76

THE MARIANAS COVENANT (H.J.R. 549, AS AMENDED)  
NEED FOR EARLY APPROVAL

The Covenant to establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in political union with the United States of America (H.J.R. 549, as amended) should be approved without delay. Prompt action will:

- be an important step toward fulfilling a U.S. international obligation by honoring the principle of self-determination
- promote the cause of peace and stability in the Western Pacific by assuring that those strategically located islands will not again become the object of international rivalry and armed hostility
- strengthen U.S. security interests in the Pacific and the defense of the vital military facilities located on nearby Guam
- provide a structure for the building of the institutions of self-government long desired by the people with funds already authorized by the Senate pending approval of the Covenant
- act as an incentive to the other parts of the Trust Territory to move ahead with decisions on their future political status
- forestall the administrative confusion and political uncertainties and tension which would be the result of delayed action
- demonstrate U.S. respect for the due process of self-determination and the overwhelming wishes of the people as expressed in a U.N.-observed plebiscite.

Failure on the part of the Senate to approve the Covenant would:

- undermine confidence in the American sense of purpose in the Pacific and throughout the Trust Territory
- create uncertainty as to the political future of the Northern Marianas and thereby tension and deep frustration
- contribute to a potentially unstable political situation and possible conflict between the Northern Marianas and the rest of the Trust Territory by denying both parties their desire to go their separate ways
- raise serious questions as to U.S. credibility and make the future negotiating environment for the termination of the U.S. trusteeship over the Pacific Islands much more strained and difficult
- undermine confidence in the U.S. and raise doubts as to whether agreements can be reached even when they have been worked out over a period of years with the full blessing and advice of those Committees of the Congress charged with legislative responsibility for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

THE NEED FOR EARLY SENATE APPROVAL  
OF H.J.R. 549, AS AMENDED

The Northern Marianas Commonwealth Covenant should be approved without delay. The Covenant will serve the national interest in many ways. It helps fulfill an international obligation assumed by the U.S. and it honors the principle of self-determination. It strengthens U.S. security interests in the Western Pacific and the defense of nearby Guam without expanding the international commitment of the U.S. It has been approved by the Marianas Legislature and by an overwhelming majority of the people in a U.N. observed plebiscite. Its passage by the Senate is supported by the Congress of Micronesia and the Guam Legislature. In July 1975 the President urged early Congressional action. In response the House approved the Covenant and the Senate Interior Committee reported the bill out favorable last October.

The question of the future political status of the islands of the Pacific has been pending for years and has been the subject of close consultation between the Congress and the Executive Branch since 1969. Negotiations leading to Commonwealth for the Northern Marianas were entered into only after consultation with the Congress. The talks were in response to the long-expressed desires of the people of the Northern Marianas for political union with the U.S. going back to the end of World War II. The final draft Covenant was submitted to the Interior Committee for review prior to its signature in February of last year.

Reasons for Early Approval:

- Approval now will be an important step in bringing the Trusteeship over these islands to an early and honorable end in accordance with the U.N. Charter and Trusteeship Agreement.
- Early approval will enable the Northern Marianas to move ahead in cooperation with the COM with a smooth and orderly separation which both parties desire. The COM has made it clear to the Senate that it honors the popular will of the people of the Northern Marianas and supports early Senate approval of the Covenant.
- Approval will clear the way for the appropriation of funds for self-government in the Northern Marianas which the Senate has already authorized pending final resolution of the Covenant.
- Approval will strengthen the chances of reaching a mutually satisfactory agreement with the other islands of the Trust Territory by resolving the uncertainty of the future status of the Northern Marianas.
- Finally since the Covenant has been negotiated in good faith and since the people of the Northern Marianas feel so strongly about being reunited with Guam under common U.S. citizenship, early approval of the Covenant by the Senate will be seen as a fulfillment of a moral commitment and increase the confidence and credibility of the U.S. in the Northern Marianas and throughout the Trust Territory.

Consequences of Delay or Deferral by the Senate:

- Deferral or Defeat of H.J.R. 549, as amended, could create serious problems in the Northern Marianas and damage U.S. credibility in the remainder of the Trust Territory and in Guam.

- Deferral or Defeat would be a great psychological letdown for the people. While they entered into the negotiations with the full knowledge that Congressional approval would be required, they have nevertheless been encouraged over the years by the strong expressions of support from members of the Congress and from visiting Congressional delegations for their aspirations to become a territory of the U.S. like their sister island Guam with whom they have close family, religious and historical ties.

- Deferral or Defeat will undermine and seriously weaken the pro-American political leadership in the Northern Marianas which has joined in a common cause to bring their islands under the American flag. It would at the same time encourage and strengthen the very small but highly vocal and critical anti-American minority which opposes union with the U.S.

- Deferral or Defeat could undo the progress that has been made between the COM and the Northern Marianas in reaching agreement for an orderly separation, and could forestall planning for the relocation of the capital of Micronesia.

- Deferral or Defeat would deny the people of the Northern Marianas the right to move forward toward self-government under the terms of the Covenant which were carefully negotiated with the advice and advance approval of the Interior Committees of the U.S. Congress since those provisions dealing with the drafting of their own Constitution become effective only upon the approval of the Covenant by the U.S. Congress.

- Deferral or Defeat will greatly complicate and lessen the chances for a satisfactory conclusion of the negotiations with the COM. Dealy will not change the fundamental political fact that the political aspirations of the Northern Marianas are for union with the U.S. while the rest of the Trust Territory is seeking an increasingly distant and temporary future association with the U.S. To ignore the fact that nearly 80% of the people of the Northern Marianas have already voted for Commonwealth and to then force them to continue to participate in the political process of the other districts would be awkward, disruptive and detrimental to the interest of all parties concerned.

- In summary, rejection of the Covenant by the Senate after approval by the House and after years of close consultation between the Northern Marianas and the Executive Branch and the U.S. Congress, or a decision by the Senate to postpone indefinitely the effective date of approval would seriously undermine confidence in the American sense of purpose in the Pacific, promote needless uncertainty and frustration in the Northern Marianas and create a much more complicated and difficult negotiating environment for the U.S. in its efforts to conclude a satisfactory agreement with the rest of the Trust Territory. An indefinite delay might indeed adversely affect the long-term interests of all parties concerned for no useful purpose.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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ACTION  
January 16, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: JON HOWE  
FROM: JEANNE W. DA [initials]  
SUBJECT: Request that the Vice President Intervene  
with Three Senators on the Northern Marianas  
Covenant Issue

The Covenant for the Northern Marianas is in trouble in the Senate Foreign Relations and Arms Services Committees. Ambassador Haydn Williams met with Bill Hyland January 16 to discuss Administration strategy to save the Bill (Tab A). Williams' January 15 letter (Tab B) to Brent Scowcroft and Max Friedersdorf explains the dim prospects for passage of the markup on the Bill. The markup is scheduled for Tuesday, January 20.

Ambassador Williams asked whether the Vice President could intervene with three Senators -- Javits, Case, and Percy -- to attempt to obtain a favorable vote for the Bill. Bill Hyland asked Tom Barnes to follow up on that request. Tab C lists arguments the Vice President might use in urging approval of the Covenant. The first page is in outline form; the last two develop the themes on page 1 in fuller fashion.

ACTION REQUESTED:

We would appreciate the Vice President's intervention on Monday, January 19, with Senators Javits, Case, and Percy.

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