



Columbia College

Columbia, South Carolina 29203

Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

7 February 1976

Dear Brent:

I'm sure it has been so many years that you don't remember me. However, since we did start off at West Point together, I thought you might not object if I mentioned a security issue I have been working on lately: Micronesia.

With a good chance that the Northern Marianas covenant will pass the Senate by the end of this month, the future of the other five districts must be considered. I am sending my article on this subject from the December issue of Army. Also I have heard that Haydn Williams will soon move on; the selection of his replacement is, I believe, of great significance.


Because Williams came from DoD, I am sure that State will think it is their turn. They will surely propose some very able Ambassador who has had considerable experience in Asia. However, I don't believe there is anyone in State with the background required to negotiate anything better than Free Association. And I don't believe that Free Association, or an independent "Micronesia," will adequately provide for our security in the Pacific.

On the other hand, Fred K. Fox of Houston, Texas is uniquely well qualified for this task because of his long, close personal friendships with most of the leaders in Micronesia. His selection would insure the best possible outcome. Would it be possible for you to see that he is not overlooked because the State Department is pushing one of their own?

I would be happy to give you additional information on why I think Mr. Fox should be Ambassador Williams's replacement, but you can also obtain it from Ray Shafer, George Bush, John Tower, or--in your own office--Jay Taylor.

Please call on me if I can be of any assistance on this issue.

Sincerely,


Sam C. Holliday



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The time has come for the United States to settle the future of its Central Pacific dependencies, steering a middle course between its own security needs and the demands of anticolonialist critics.

By Col. Sam C. Holliday
U.S. Army, Retired

The debate over a commonwealth status for the northern Marianas has again focused attention on the islands of the Western Pacific. It is clear that this new relationship is in the best interests of those concerned—in the northern Marianas and the United States. Yet our attention on the northern Marianas has detracted from a serious security issue. What is the future of the other 5/6 of Micronesia?

Micronesia contains some 2,000 islands spread over an area of the Western Pacific as large as the continental United States. Other than the Mari-

In isolation the arguments of each of these three groups have strong appeal. Yet, none of their arguments is based on a realistic evaluation of U.S. security interests in the Western Pacific. It is time for such interests to receive some consideration.

A glance at a map of the Pacific basin reveals the strategic importance of Micronesia. It lies between the United States and an arc including China, Southeast Asia, Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand. During World War II its importance was proved in blood. From bases in Micronesia, Japan was able to launch its initial drives; then the United States had to fight through these islands before victory was achieved.

Have technological developments of the past 30 years altered the strategic importance of Micronesia? To some extent, the increased range of aircraft, nuclear weapons and missiles have caused a revision of our strategic calculations: now it is not as important for the United States to have bases in Micronesia. However, it is just as important as ever that no other government have bases in that area. In discussions of the strategic importance of Micronesia this distinction is often overlooked: while having bases in Micronesia would deny this area to others, it would be possible to deny this area to others without having bases in the area.

Some well-intentioned Americans often think

Protecting American Security Interests in Micronesia Complex

anas, it includes the Carolines and the Marshalls. These islands are the home of some 120,000 people of diverse cultures, languages and ethnic composition. During World War II many Americans learned of the importance of these islands; after that war they became a strategic trust territory of the United States.

The more vocal advocates of U.S. policy on the Micronesia issue can be divided into three groups:

- First, there are some Americans who take it for granted that Micronesia is and always will be governed by the United States; they assume that these islands can be used for whatever military purposes the United States might want.

- Second, there are those who are today's version of the Boston-based missionaries sent to these islands 100 years ago. Instead of attempting to save souls with "the truth," however, their zeal is directed toward the saving of bodies with scientific truths.

- Third, there are the anticolonial idealists; they continue to espouse the doctrines of the 1950s and 1960s which brought turmoil to the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Africa.


in terms of World War II calculations. That it would be convenient for the U. S. Navy and Air Force to be able to operate from the islands of Micronesia cannot be denied. But is this critical to U.S. security interests? Those who think that it is might well be called narrow-vision patriots.

We can agree with the humanitarians and the anticolonial idealists that the U.S. administration of Micronesia over the past 30 years has been mediocre—at best. The past, however, may not be a harbinger of the future. Moreover, Americans must in the near future face the truth: this country cannot eliminate hunger, disease and poverty throughout the world.

This is not to argue that the goals of the humanitarians are not admirable, but only to suggest they are not realistic. On the other hand, if the Micronesians should elect some permanent association with the United States, Americans would certainly want to face up to the economic problems of the Micronesians—these newest Americans.

We cannot overlook the fact that anticolonialism is one of the most vigorous ideologies in the world today. Since World War II only Russia





and China have been able to retain empires of dependent territories. Thus, any denial of self-determination for the peoples of Micronesia will exact its price. Of course, Americans are not now as naive as they were in the 1950s and 1960s. Then, most enlightened Americans believed that "self-rule" would mean more freedom for the individual and greater acceptance of government through the democratic process.

Yet today, the governments in the Third World which have removed the "colonial yoke" allow less freedom for the individual and are more authoritarian than their colonial predecessors. It is suggested that the anticolonial idealists do not have a practical solution for Micronesia. "Self-rule" will not provide a secure future for the peoples of a united Micronesia.

On the other hand, a positive, practical solution which provides for the interests of both the United States and the Micronesians can be negotiated. There should be some middle ground between continued U.S. rule and the casting of the Micronesians loose to find their own course. It is time to find that solution.

The middle ground for Micronesia's future status is probably where the views of the narrow-vision American patriots, the body-saving humanitarians and the anticolonial idealists meet. But first, what are the American security interests in

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Micronesia? They can be summarized as follows:

- *Critical:* That no alien government ever be allowed to establish bases in Micronesia.
- *Secondary:* That the United States have access to military bases and sites in Micronesia.
- *Secondary:* That the United States have ready access to the significant resources—if any—of Micronesia.

With the future status of the northern Marianas established, the future of the other five districts must be considered. Three options are usually discussed: a continuation of the current status, a commonwealth similar to that just established for the northern Marianas and free association.

If the current status continues, the United States will probably have to use its veto in the Security Council of the United Nations. It would thus be possible to perpetuate the control of this area under UN mandate as long as the United States had the will to withstand criticism of colonialism. But does the United States want to follow the steps taken by Japan 40 years ago?

A commonwealth arrangement would probably be the most satisfactory solution, since it offers the greatest chance of reconciling the views of U.S. patriots, the humanitarians and the anticolonial idealists. Also, a commonwealth status would provide for the security interests of the United States. In addition, it would establish the conditions necessary for the economic development of Micronesia—which presumably would be in the best interests of the Micronesians.

To date, however, some of the leaders of the five districts have prevented such an agreement.

'There should be some middle ground between continued U.S. rule and the casting of the Micronesians loose to find their own course.'



Their reasons are varied, yet their opposition to commonwealth status has been clearly stated.


Free association is a temporary arrangement to serve as a transitional stage to full independence. It would not adequately provide for the security interests of the United States.

There is one other option. The United States could propose that some or all of the remaining five districts become demilitarized areas—similar to Antarctica. Each island would become independent. The people would be encouraged to revive the ways of their ancestors. Any district which selected this option would become essentially a living museum. This fourth option would be a redefinition of the meaning of "strategic trust area" and the United States would have to see that such islands were protected from all external influences.

While this option would not be as satisfactory—for either the Micronesians or the Americans—as a commonwealth arrangement, it would have two advantages: it would satisfy the critical security interests of the United States and would relieve the United States of some of the stigma of colonialism.

It is true that demilitarization would prevent economic development. The airports needed for a tourist industry are the same airports needed by military aircraft. The port facilities which would support an oceangoing fishing fleet could support naval vessels. But this is a problem the Micronesians, not the Americans, will have to weigh.

If they selected a demilitarized status—and the removal of all foreign influence—rather than a commonwealth one with the United States, it



The 7th Infantry Division fights its way across Kwajalein Island during World War II.

would be their own determination. It is only necessary for the United States to insure that its security interests are not endangered and that its commitments to the UN Trusteeship Council are met.

There is no reason to continue the present status for the five remaining districts of Micronesia if some permanent arrangement can be negotiated. Free association must be ruled out since it does not adequately provide for U.S. security interests. Therefore, each of the five districts should be required to select, in some appropriate manner, between federation of district commonwealth status with the United States or demilitarization, and independence for each island, with the removal of all foreign influence.

Soldier, Nik Your Houfs

At our weekly staff meeting my section chief asked, "I've been saying 'howitzer' for 30 years. Every soldier knows what one is, but does anybody know what it means?"

Several days later, he received the following reply:

a. Howitzer is apparently an adulterated Slovakian adjective. The thing was invented by a little old Czech gunmaker who christened his new machine "houfnice" (nice in Czech is pronounced "neetzshye").

The word comes from a similarly named ancient ballista. The "houf" in "houfnice" obviously describes the ballista's actions, as would "heft," "heave," "hurl" or "hurdle."

The "neetzshye" may be the old Slavic adjectival ending exemplified by Polish Air Lines "Linea Lotnitz (flying) Transport."

Or it may be the Slavic ending, "... nik" meaning "one who" like in Sputnik, bolshevic, etc.) Then again, it may be closer to the verb root

"noseet" meaning, to carry.

b. The Dutch bought some houfnices from the Czechs, changing the spelling to *houfnitze*. But the Dutch seemed to colonize better with beads and trinkets.

The Russians took some houfnices east, renaming them *gaubitsa*. The "gau" is simply the Cyrillic transliteration of the Latin "hou" but the pragmatic Russians seem to have changed the verb root from "noseet" (to carry) to "bit" (to kill or destroy, which is what howitzers are all about anyway).

c. As anyone can see, howitzer drifted into American through Lower Franconian, Middle German and English, picking up enroute the Anglo-Saxon version of the "nik" ending, "... er" (as in baker, shooter, etc.). To put it simply, a howitzer is just one who houfs like a houfnice.

d. The U.S. Army is equipped with many houfnices, including the M109 selvbropyeld houfnice.

LT. COL. DANIEL K. MALONE

