

MEMORANDUM

6788 ²³

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL with
SECRET ATTACHMENT

October 14, 1977

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: MIKE ARMACOST
SUBJECT: Micronesian Status Negotiations

Ambassador Peter Rosenblatt, who will be departing next week for the first round of formal Micronesian status negotiations in Molokai, Hawaii, needs your decision regarding one aspect of his negotiating instructions.

In the process of arranging this round of talks, Rosenblatt encountered some difficulties in securing the agreement of the Marshallese District to enter discussions focused exclusively on the free association formula we tabled at Guam in late July. The Marshallese counsel, Dick Copaken, has been arguing with Rosenblatt that sentiment in the Marshalls has shifted significantly in recent weeks toward a preference for independence. He therefore wishes to simultaneously negotiate free association and alternative status options among which the Marshallese can then pick and choose the most attractive features. This is obviously unsatisfactory from our standpoint. It would require that we lay out a smorgasbord, while leaving all the key choices to the Micronesians.

To assure Marshallese participation at Molokai, Rosenblatt has worked out a compromise with Copaken which is reflected in the attached letter at Tab A (which we expect the Marshallese will address to Rosenblatt in the next few days). Under this arrangement the Marshallese would agree to negotiate exclusively the terms of a possibly free association status. But once the free association option has been fully negotiated, we would be committed to immediately thereafter explore alternative status options, focusing on those terms of free association on which the U. S. position would differ under such other options. You will recall that PD-11 requires the U. S. negotiator to seek a free association agreement with a united

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PER 41200 NSC FILE NLL-99-170
BY J DATE 4/28/00

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Micronesia, and to obtain approval from the PRC, before falling back to any alternative arrangements (PD at Tab B).

The Rosenblatt-Copaken formula would not commit us to negotiate alternative status options, merely to "explore" them. Our objective in those explorations would be to demonstrate to the Micronesians that they would secure greater benefits from free association than under any alternative options (e. g. independence). This should help set the stage for a successful referendum on the free association compact. I believe this arrangement falls within the scope of the current negotiating guidelines. But I believe you should confirm this to Rosenblatt.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the attached memo to Ambassador Rosenblatt (Tab I).

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October 13, 1977

On behalf of the Marshall Islands Political Status Commission, I wish to express my appreciation to you for your invitation to resume formal political status negotiations in Molokai, Hawaii on October 24, 1977.

We accept your invitation with pleasure but wish to point out that our agreement to attend should be taken as an acceptance of the U.S. Guam proposal as a negotiating format only. We cannot commit ourselves to any particular political status in advance of negotiations and the Commission's acceptance of your invitation ought not to be construed by any party as constituting an acceptance of a specific future status, but we are optimistic that the free association concept as it evolves in the course of our negotiations will meet the needs of the Marshallese people.

We fully share your strong desire to reach agreement on a new political status expeditiously in order to meet the 1981 timetable announced by the President for terminating the Trust.

Accordingly we agree to negotiate exclusively the terms of a possible free association status and to defer the exploration of alternative status options until those negotiations have reached what we view as a satisfactory conclusion or an irreconcilable deadlock. It is our strong conviction that once the free association option has been fully negotiated we should be able to complete negotiations rapidly thereafter by immediately exploring alternative status options, focusing on those terms of free association on which the U.S. position would differ under such other options.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*with [unclear]
[unclear]
[unclear]*

~~SECRET~~

May 5, 1977

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Presidential Directive/NSC-11

TO: The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

ALSO: The Attorney General
The Secretary of Interior
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Transportation
The United States Representative to the
United Nations
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Office of Micronesian Status Negotiations

SUBJECT: Micronesian Status Negotiations

The President has reviewed the conclusions and recommendations of the Policy Review Committee concerning Micronesian Status Negotiations and has directed that the negotiations be conducted on the basis of the following guidelines:

-- The broad U. S. objective should be the conclusion of status arrangements which protect essential U. S. security and political interests, afford the Micronesians the opportunity to freely determine the nature of their future association with the U. S. , and permit termination of the trusteeship agreement by 1981.

-- Status Options. The U. S. negotiator should seek a free association agreement with a united Micronesia. If such an arrangement should prove unattainable, the negotiator is authorized, following approval by the Policy Review Committee, to seek alternative arrangements, including (1) a special treaty relationship with an independent Micronesia,

~~SECRET~~ (GDS)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

PER 3/1/84 NSC RE E 88-187

BY Q NARS DATE 7/29/99

or (2) a mixed arrangement embracing a free association agreement (or agreements) with those districts desiring it and a special treaty relationship with other districts should they choose independence.

-- Financial Arrangements. The level of U.S. post-trusteeship financial support for Micronesia should be contingent on the nature of the status arrangement negotiated. The negotiator is authorized to offer at his discretion the following financial assistance, with the understanding that such assistance is contingent on ultimate approval by the U.S. Congress.

1. No more than \$60 million annually in grant assistance for no more than 15 years after trusteeship termination.
2. Continuation of U.S. postal, weather and FAA services at FY-76 levels of activity.
3. \$10-15 million for relocation of capital, contingent upon the number of districts served by this installation.
4. No more than \$10 million annually, as necessary to obtain satisfactory and legally binding agreements covering exclusive U.S. use of all land, waters, and airspace required by the Kwajalein Missile Range and its activities for no less than 15 years after trusteeship termination.
5. Up to \$3 million on a one-time basis to obtain a long-term lease of land required for U.S. defense purposes in Palau.
6. No more than \$5 million annually to be provided to Micronesia on a dollar-for-dollar matching basis, to establish, in coordination with the Departments of Interior and Transportation, a surveillance and enforcement capability for the area.

-- Termination Date. The negotiations should be conducted with the objective of terminating the trusteeship in 1981. The President has directed that an affirmation of the U.S. intent to make every effort to achieve that objective may be issued in his name.

-- Marine Resources. The negotiator is instructed to offer proposals designed to allow the Micronesians the full management of marine resources.

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to help them develop marine resources, to guarantee to them that the economic benefits of such development would flow to them, and to seat them as members of U.S. delegations dealing with marine resources in their region. If a mutually acceptable free association agreement cannot be achieved on this basis, the negotiator is authorized to agree to Micronesian jurisdiction over marine resources, to accept complete Micronesian authority within a 200-mile zone, and recognize Micronesian competence to negotiate and conclude international agreements, and to be seated at international conferences on marine resources, subject to Micronesian agreement to refrain from actions which the United States deems incompatible with its international obligations or basic security interests.

-- Institutional Arrangements. Negotiations shall be conducted by a Special Representative of the President. Departmental recommendations concerning the negotiations will be coordinated by the NSC Policy Review Committee, chaired by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, and supported by the NSC Inter-agency Group on Micronesia, which will be chaired by the Counselor of the Department of State. Negotiations will be supported by the Office of Micronesian Status Negotiations. Arrangements for staffing and financing that Office will remain unchanged.



Zbigniew Brzezinski

~~SECRET~~ (GDS)