



THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
FOR MICRONESIAN STATUS NEGOTIATIONS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20240

OMSN-C17-80

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June 4, 1980

MEMORANDUM TO ROZANNE RIDGWAY

FROM: Peter R. Rosenblatt

SUBJECT: Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee
Oversight Hearing of June 3, 1980 (U)

(C) As you will by now have heard almost the entire hearing, which lasted for almost three hours, was given over to a discussion of the Committee leaders' concern about the 15-year lifetime of U.S. defense rights under the Compact.

(U) Eight of the eighteen members of the Committee were, at one time or another, in actual attendance at the hearing. Chairman Jackson presided for more than half of the hearing. Senators Johnston and McClure were there throughout. Other attendees were Senators Metzenbaum, Bellmon, Weicker, Bradley and Domenici. Senator Johnston has, as you know, been assigned responsibility for territorial matters within the Committee (he presided after the chairman left) and Senator McClure is the senior minority member involved in territorial matters.

(C) The interest of Senators Johnston and McClure in this topic goes back to a meeting which I had with them on May 25, 1978 and they said today that they had also discussed the issue with my predecessor, Ambassador Williams. In 1978 they had asked why the Trusteeship needed to be terminated at all or if it did, why our defense rights shouldn't be made to continue forever. They did not describe their concern as a make-or-break issue. It was in response to that meeting that we got the Micronesians to agree to Section 231 of the Compact which provides that we will have four years to negotiate continuation of our defense rights during which period those rights will continue unabated.

(C) Senators Johnston and McClure elaborated their position during today's hearing along the following lines:

(a) Why do we need to terminate the trusteeship at all?

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(b) If, for the sake of discussion, it is conceded that the Trusteeship must be terminated and the relationship with the Micronesians transformed, why have we not demanded that our defense rights continue in perpetuity?

(c) If we cannot obtain that kind of commitment, why have we not insisted that the Micronesians at least concede strategic denial in perpetuity?

(C) They seemed perfectly willing to contemplate continuation of all federal programs indefinitely as a quid, and they were equally willing to put the full faith and credit of the U.S. Government behind our financial commitments (a point which is not included in my negotiating instructions and which OMB disapproves).

(C) While Chairman Jackson's position on this issue is not entirely clear from his comments at the hearing, he appeared to be in at least basic accord with Senators Johnston and McClure. The latter two on several occasions said that they did not know whether their colleagues on the Committee would support their position, but that they could not support the Compact with the 15-year provision. They commented that if the Committee recommended against passage of the Compact the Senate would reject it.

(C) The discussion was constructive. Neither Senator adopted an intransigent or dogmatic attitude, but displayed genuine concern over this issue and appeared genuinely concerned with finding a way out of the situation which would cover what they regarded as a serious problem. Senator Johnston added a somber note to the dialogue when he speculated that the Compact had the potential of becoming an emotional and divisive issue which could equal or even exceed Panama. He encouraged further discussion between the Administration and the Committee on ways to avoid such a development.

(C) The Senators suggested specifically that the Administration had two choices:

1. If the Administration desired to go back to the Micronesians and renegotiate the 15-year provision and if

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we felt that it would be helpful to that effort for the Committee to go on record with a formal resolution disapproving the 15-year provision, the matter would be put to a vote in the Committee.

2. If the Administration felt that it did not wish to renegotiate the provision or that (as I said) such a revision in the draft Compact was, as a practical matter, unattainable, and if we therefore preferred to take our chances with the Compact in its present form, the Committee would agree to take no formal position at present, but consider the Compact as a whole after it had been formally submitted. Senator Johnston said that it was the Committee's desire to be as helpful and supportive of the negotiating process as was possible within the context of the disagreement on the 15-year issue and that he was open to as much further discussion on the subject as we desired in an effort to resolve the situation short of the kind of open debate which he thought carried the "Panama" risk.

(C) After the hearing ended I asked Jim Beirne, Committee counsel, what he thought the balance of sentiment in the Committee was likely to be on this issue. He said that it was likely that Chairman Jackson would side with Senators Johnston and McClure and that if the three of them or, for that matter, Senators Johnston and McClure alone, wanted to kill the Compact, they could.

(C) In a subsequent discussion of possible ways out of this impasse, DOD consultant, Steve Loftus, came up with a notion which Jim Beirne and I both believe may contain the seeds of a mutually acceptable compromise. This might involve:

A. A statement by the Micronesians (or perhaps a Compact provision) declaring Micronesia "neutral" subject, of course, to U.S. military rights for so long as these might endure. When and if these came to an end no one would be permitted to replace us (our military rights are a) our 15-year plenary authority and b) our specific base rights for however long these may yet be negotiated).

B. A unilateral U.S. declaration that Micronesian neutralization would be guaranteed by the U.S.

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(U) I believe that the fundamental character of this issue, taken together with the interest which the hearing has stimulated among the key Committee members, suggests the advisability of prompt IAG consideration of an approach along the foregoing lines in an effort to secure the Committee's support of the Compact in the nearest future. OMSN has called an IAG working group meeting to kick the issue around tomorrow, but I believe that it should be followed promptly by a full IAG session.



Peter R. Rosenblatt

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